CHAPTER 7
The 1st VC Again- Operation HARVEST MOON
The
Abandonment of Hiep Due-Activation of Task Force DELTA and Planning the
Operation-The VC Strike and the Marines Are Committed-The Search of the Phouc Ha
Valley-The Fight at Ky Phu-The Wrap-Up
The Abandonment of
Hiep Due
In November, the l st VC Regiment,
obviously recovered from the beating received during Operation STARLITE,
attacked the South Vietnamese outpost located at Hiep Due, 25 miles west of Tarn
Ky.* This district capital, situated on the headwaters of the Song Thu Bon, was
the western gateway to a fertile mountain valley which later became known to
Marines as the Nui Loc Son Basin, named for a rugged, narrow hill that protrudes
from the center of the valley floor. Also known as the Que Son Valley, the
broad, heavily populated expanse of farm land constituted one of the more
strategic areas between Da Nang and Chu Lai. During the northeast monsoon
season, heavy rain clouds shrouded the valley and its western approaches, thus
allowing the enemy freedom of movement without being observed from the air.
On the evening of 17 November, the
enemy regiment, with all three of its battalions, the 60th, 80th, and 90th,
overran the small Regional Force garrison. Enemy units were identified later
from captured documents and by interrogation of a VC defector. Hiep Due District
leaders reported 174 of the 433 defenders missing and 315 weapons lost.
Soon after reports reached Da Nang of
the loss of Hiep Due, F-4B Phantoms from MAG-11 and A-4 Skyhawks from MAG-12
arrived over the outpost and conducted strikes against enemy positions in the
surrounding hills. At the same time, the two helicopter groups, MAG-16 and
MAG-36, prepared to helilift two South Vietnamese battalions into the battle
area.
Colonel Thomas J. O'Connor, the MAG-16
commander and airborne coordinator for the operation, Lieutenant Colonel Robert
J. Zitnik, the commander of VMO-6, and the South Vietnamese infantry commander
made an early morning reconnaissance flight over the fallen base on 18 November
' 'to look over the area and select a landing zone.'' O'Connor remembered as
they looked down:
The area was ominously quiet. We didn't
see a living soul. There was much evidence of the fight the day before. The
typical triangular-shaped French fortification in the village had been
penetrated in several places. There were several corpses hanging on barbed wire
around a few of the outposts across the Song Thu Bon.;
In their search for a suitable landing
zone, the three officers rejected a rice paddy about 500 meters north of Hiep
Due because of the potential of an enemy ambush. Instead, the South Vietnamese
commander selected a small hill, about 80 meters high, 700 meters southeast of
the village. With this decision made, the three returned to Tarn Ky where the
transport squadron commanders were organizing the lifts to Hiep Due.
The site chosen for the landing zone
would create problems. It was quite small and could only accommodate two
helicopters at one time. Furthermore, the hill on which the landing zone was
situated was the western end of a ridgeline stretching
* Colonel Wyckoff, remarked in his
comments on the draft that he was unconvinced that the 1st VC ever recovered
from STARLITE. He believes that its 'resurgence as a fully active unit was the
result of reinforcement by North Vietnamese Regulars.' Colonel Wyckoff recalled
message traffic at the time in which the VC main forces were 'notifying the
local guerrillas to stick it out on their own until help came down from the
north; that their current role was to be assistance to the main force, not vice
versa.' Col Don P. Wyckoff, Comments on draft MS, dtd 160ct76 (Vietnam Comment
File).
