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Chapter Four President Kennedy's War
JOHN
Fitzgerald Kennedy's victory in the November 1960 presidential
election was welcomed by many who saw the dynamic young President as a
refreshing departure from the legacies of the Cold War, John Foster Dulles'
brinksmanship and the intellectual stagnation of the Eisenhower years. Under the
rubric of The New Frontier, the incoming Democratic administration promised to
seek new and innovative solutions to the problems of America and the world.
Kennedy's election was widely viewed as cause for hope, not only in the United
States but throughout the world. Among his earliest acts as President were a
number of senior appointments by which he signalled his determination to
implement policies which, if not as sharply divergent from those of the past as
many perceived, he intended to pursue with unprecedented determination and
vigor. At his inauguration on January 21, 1961, he named Dean Rusk Secretary of
State, Robert Strange McNamara Secretary of Defense and McGeorge Bundy National
Security Policy Adviser. A salient characteristic of war is the manner in which
it gives play to personalities at the top, taxing strengths, magnifying foibles
and seeking out weaknesses with a seemingly human intelligence, and all of these
men were to leave the imprint of their personalities on the Vietnam War. Among the first and most
serious foreign policy challenges to confront the new President and his team of
subordinates and advisors were those of Southeast Asia. Particularly threatening
was the situation in Laos where Pathet Lao insurgents threatened to overturn the
1954 Geneva Accords. In August, with the American Presidential campaign in full
swing, a neutralist paratroop coup had overthrown the rightist Vientiane regime.
Chaos ensued as the Soviets intervened with aid for the insurgents. Kennedy
responded by sending military aid and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors, while
at the same time pursuing behind-the-scenes diplomatic initiatives. The
situation did not at once improve, and in the spring of 1962 Kennedy dispatched
troops and air power to northern Thailand to reassure the Thais, to serve as an
implied threat and as a safeguard against communist victory. Eventually
Kennedy's combination of firmness and restraint paid off: the military situation
stabilized, and Britain and the Soviet Union reconvened the Geneva Conference to
negotiate an end to the crisis. On 23 July, 1962, the parties to the Geneva
Conference signed a series of accords under which Laos was to be ruled by a
neutralist government under Prince Souvanna Phouma - whom the Eisenhower
administration had considered too accommodating to the communists -with rightist
and Pathet Lao participation. The Geneva Formula proved amazingly enduring;
Souvanna Phouma was to serve as Premier of a nominally neutral, but in fact
increasingly anti-communist, government for another twelve years. At the same
time, the Formula papered over an unpleasant military reality. Most of eastern
Laos was under North Vietnamese control, notably the vital lines of
communication and resupply linking North Vietnam with Viet Cong staging areas in
the Central Highlands of South Vietnam and along the Cambodian border, the Ho
Chi Minh Trail.
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