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Page 102(Airmobile Developments, 1966 )previous pagenext page


CHAPTER VI

Airmobile Developments, 1966

The Genesis of the 1st Aviation Brigade

 

The Army faced a dilemma at this period of time in that it had spread its aviation assets in Vietnam to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam divisions, one Republic of Korea division, the 1st U. S. Army Division, the 173d Brigade, and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne with non-organic aviation units. Only the 1st Cavalry Division had sufficient organic aircraft. There was little experience in supporting non-airmobile divisions with separate aviation assets and the Army was not sure of the proper mix.

The finite limitations of available Hueys and Army aviators forced the decision to support the average size division or Vietnamese elements with considerably less than had been devoted to the airmobile division and eventually a ratio was determined of one assault helicopter company per brigade in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. At this time, the Marines had the responsibility for aviation support in the I Corps Tactical Zone. But, the mere spreading of limited aviation assets did not solve the problem of organization command and control. It was obvious from the beginning that some sort of centralization was going to be necessary. The companies in Vietnam at that time all had developed distinct methods of operations and procedures which they had worked out on an ad hoc basis with the supported commanders. As a result, it was very difficult to take a company from the highlands and switch its support operations to the Delta or vice versa for it entailed relearning complex command relationships, terrain, and methods of operation. Therefore, a high degree of standardization of training, procedures, and methods of operations was obviously indicated.

In contrast to this need, there was a strong underlying feeling that centralization of Army aviation at a brigade level would be a major step backwards from the fundamental principle that Army aviation had held since World War II, that is decentralization to the lowest possible commander who could use and maintain it.



Page 102(Airmobile Developments, 1966 )previous pagenext page



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