Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-600371

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

This study is humbly dedicated to the memory of the following airmobile battalion commanders who were killed in action during the period I commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam:

These gallant men-and all the honored dead of that war-will be always in the thoughts and prayers of their comrades-in-arms.

The United States Army has met an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own choosing, free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of waging armed conflict, the assignment in Southeast Asia has required superimposing the immensely sophisticated tasks of a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to demands covering a wide spectrum. These involved helping to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian population, dealing with the frustrations of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined regular units.

As this assignment nears an end, the U.S. Army must prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. While cognizant that history never repeats itself exactly and that no army ever profited from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its shortcomings no less than its achievements.

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories will provide a detailed and objective analysis of the experience in Southeast Asia, we have sought a forum whereby some of the more salient aspects of that experience can be made available now. At the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibilities has prepared a series of monographs. These studies should be of great value in helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at the same time contributing to the historical record and providing the American public with an interim report on the performance of men and officers who have responded, as others have through our history, to exacting and trying demands.

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official records, with additional material from published and unpublished secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To

facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography have, been omitted from the published version; a fully documented account with bibliography is filed with the Office of the Chief of Military History.

The author of this monograph, Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, has been involved with the airmobile concept since June 1939, when he participated in the first tactical air movement of ground forces by the U.S. Army. Participating in all the combat jumps of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment during World War II, he became an Army aviator in 1957, and later served as Director of Army Aviation and Commandant of the U.S. Army Aviation School. From April 1967 to July 1968 he served as Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), Vietnam. General Tolson is now Deputy Commanding General, Continental Army Command.

The purpose of this study is to trace the evolution of airmobility in the U.S. Army. The integration of aircraft into the organic structure of the ground forces is as radical a change as the move from the horse to the truck, and the process is only beginning.

Because this change is not the product of one man or one small group of men but rather a fortunate confluence of technology, tactics, and imagination, proper credit to every responsible individual is impossible. I have tried to identify some of those people who made a major contribution throughout the years. I apologize to those people whose names have been omitted either because of oversight or lack of space.

Although Vietnam was the first large combat test of airmobility, air assault operations in Southeast Asia would not have been possible without certain key decisions a decade earlier. This study attempts to trace the most important milestones which led to the eventual formation of airmobile divisions.

It would be impossible in a single volume to adequately describe every airmobile operation in Vietnam during the years 1961-1971. Therefore, only selected operations have been chosen as examples of different airmobile tactics. Many of these were selected because of the author's personal knowledge. Another author might have selected different operations.

I believe I'd be remiss in this account if I were not candid with the reader on some of the pros and cons of airmobility. Thus, throughout the text, I have inserted comments that are intended to broaden the reader's view of this issue.

This study is aimed at a broad audience, some of whom may only have a passing familiarity with Army aircraft systems. These systems are pictured in an appendix with appropriate data on each.

Over 300 major source documents were reviewed during the preparation of this study. For the serious student we have identified a rich vein that, as yet, has not been deeply mined. Thousands of important stories, yet untold, lay buried in these pages. Length has permitted us to extract only a few.

I wish to thank the many senior officers who went out of their way to contribute their own special comments for this monograph

and the officers who wrote special studies as basic reference material for the monograph. I have drawn extensively on two such studies prepared by Lieutenant Colonel John R. Galvin of Combat Developments Command and Major Bobby D. Harber of the U.S. Army Aviations Systems Command. Because the published version of my monograph contains no documentation, the extent of my indebtedness to these two officers is not readily apparent. Major Harber's manuscript was subsequently published by the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command under the title, Logistical Support of Airmobile Operations, Republic of Vietnam, 1961-1971.

Finally, I must recognize the two officers who were primarily responsible for researching, drafting, and compiling this volume. Colonel James J. Brockmyer, who was my senior assistant, has been associated with airmobility for more than two decades and was the editor of the test report of the 11th Air Assault Division. CW-2 Charlie M. Montgomery, who researched and typed the multiple drafts, was a special assistant to General Westmoreland for four years in Vietnam. These two officers must share with me any credit (or blame) that this study might generate.

Airmobility is no panacea; it brings with it many unique problems as well as unique capabilities. It is hoped that this study will give the reader some insight into both of these areas.