CHAPTER 13
Prelude to
Escalation
The close of 1964 marked the end of a
full decade of American political, economic, and military advice and assistance
to South Vietnam. That 10-year period saw a fragile state born and begin its
struggle for survival only to have its existence threatened by a new brand of
Communist aggression-the 'war of national liberation.' It also saw the U.S.
commitment to Vietnam's defense deepen in almost direct proportion to the
increasing threat. Despite growing amounts of American aid and advice, there was
little doubt that South Vietnam stood near the brink of destruction at the hands
of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies as 1964 ended. In many
respects, the disaster which befell the Vietnamese Marines and ARVN Rangers at
Binh Gia on the final day of 1964 marked a critical turning point in the war
being waged in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland feared that the battle
heralded 'the beginning of the classic and final 'mobile' phase of the war.' 'To
the South Vietnamese government,' he reported, 'it meant the beginning of an
intensive military challenge which the Vietnamese government could not meet
within its own resources.' ' Brigadier General Carl Youngdalc, Westmoreland's
assistant chief of staff for intelligence and the ranking Marine assigned to
Vietnam, assessed the meaning of the battle in equally distressing terms. 'Binh
Gia,' he explained, 'was just part of the whole thing. All the reserve-the
strategic reserve- was fixed: the airborne and the four Marine battalions had
all been committed. There was absolutely no strategic reserve left.' 2 So, as
1964 ended, hope was fading rapidly among American military officials in Saigon
that the ground war for South Vietnam could continue for long without more
vigorous participation of the United States.
Pressures other than those produced by
military events in the South were also working to move the United States toward
direct military intervention against the Communists in Indochina. Although
sustained open warfare had not occurred as a result of the Tonkin Gulf crisis of
early August, tensions continued to mount between North Vietnam and the United
States throughout the autumn. On 1 November, just after the cessation of the
U.S. air strikes which followed the Tonkin Gulf incidents, Vict Cong mortar
squads attacked American facilities at the Bien Hoa airbase near Saigon. Four
American servicemen were killed, five B-57 medium bombers destroyed, and eight
others heavily damaged in the raid.
President Johnson's reaction to the Bien
Hoa attack was to initiate a month-long review of U.S. policy regarding North
Vietnam. In early December that review culminated in the adoption of a
two-phased plan to discourage further North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong
by expanding the air war. Phase I, approved for implementation in December,
called for stepped-up air operations against the vital Communist infiltration
routes in Laos, and for the intensification of covert operations against North
Vietnam. Approved 'in principle,' Phase II involved 'a continuous program of
progressively more serious air strikes' against North Vietnam. The
implementation of Phase II, it was agreed, would depend on future enemy
actions.3 As if to indicate that Communist policy makers had settled on a
parallel course of escalation, Viet Cong terrorists bombed a U.S. officers'
quarters in Saigon on Christmas Eve, killing two Americans and wounding over 50
others.*
The new year, 1965, would open against
this portentous combination of intensified U.S. air activites over Laos, a
worsening military situation on South Vietnam's battlefields, and the existence
of the Phase II contingency plans. It was this situation which would spawn a new
series of events as the first months of 1965 unfolded-events which would
determine the direction of American
*Among the wounded was Major Damm, the
Assistant Senior Marine Advisor.
