Photu from Abel Collection Col Edu'in S. Schick. the 12th Marines caniinander. pulls the lanyard o f a Battery E. 2d Battalion, 12th Marines M101A1 105mm hou'itzer. This is the 200,000th round fired by the battery in Vietnam

By late 1967, the 12th Marines had become the largest artillery regiment in the history of the Marine Corps. If one included the artillery at Khe Sanh, the 12th Marines had some ISO field pieces of mixed caliber ranging from the 175mm gun to the 4.2-inch monar. Colonel Edwin S. Schick, Jr., the regimental commander, had under his operational control his four organic battalions, the 1st Battalions of both the llth and 13th Marines; the 1st ri-inch Howitzer Battery;

the 5th 155mm Gun Battery; two provisional 155mm howitzer batteries, and the 2d Platoon, 1st Armored Amphibian Company with its six LVTH-6s. In addition, he also had subordinate to him the U.S. Army 108th Field Artillery Group and the Marine 1st Field Artillery Group (1st FAG). The Army group functioned as the administrative and tactical headquarters for the Army 175mm gun and 105mm howitzer batteries attached to the Marine regiment while the 1st FAG performed a similar role for the Marine units. All told, as the year began, the 12th Marines controlled about 35 firing units positioned at 12 different locations spread from Khe Sanh to Phu Bai.''

achieved and maintained." Once the Marines manning the tower

obtained "an intersection oftwo, preferably three . . . bearin^Cs] . . ., the critical c(x)rdina(ion of friendly forces and potential enemy locations would precede the initiation of counter-rocker fire." He stared that the "authority to initiate fire was delegated to battery commanders." His "Golf Battery, 3/11 on Hill K), held the response record of less than fifteen seconds . . . ." According to Balzer, the towers identified enemy rockets about to be launched "just as Golf was prepared to fire (a] Harassing and Interdiction mission . . . ." After heiny loaded with "hi^h explosive pro)ectiles and charge - - . [with] A minor adjustment to azimuth and quadrant, . . . the six howitzers were ready to tire in a direct fire mode." This incident resulted in the capture of the 122mm rocket launcher. Colonel Balzer observed that "the first rounds in a rocket attack are 'free' for the enemy. It is only for the subsequent rounds that counter-battery fire may be effective. Warning messages may be transmitted to potential target areas by the observers of rocket launches. The observers note the an^'le ot (he flame trail and thereby exclude taryet areas which are not involved." He concluded, "coordination of triendly patrol schedules, definite times tor occupation of specific areas. and continuous monitoring of same arc all critical to ensure that counter-battery fire may be initiated safely. Time lost in dercrminins which areas are free of friendly forces after a rocket arrack has been launched ^ives the enemy additional time to complete his mission with impunity." Col George T. Balzer, Comments on draft, did l()Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

"�Colonel Schick, a veteran of both World War II and Korea, observed in his comments that his entire career "has been supporting arms." He had assumed command of the 12th Marines in May 1967 and remarked on the wide dispersion of the 12th Marines which until early 1%H had its main headquarters with that of the division at Phu Bai. According to Schick the infantry often was unaware of the firepower