1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in an adjacent area zipping about all over."3*

Despite the massive and even decisive role the Marine helicopters played in the resupplying of the Marine hill outposts at Khe Sanh, ground officers elsewhere had complaints about helicopter support. Immediately after the recapture of Hue, newspaper accounts circulated that Army helicopter pilots flew under more adverse conditions than Marines. In response to a criticism in one article about a 500-foot ceiling limitation during the battle, Major General Anderson wrote that the wing placed such restrictions on "all aircraft operations subject to the exigencies of the tactical situation." The wing commander remarked the reason for the 500-foot ceiling was "because of the extreme vulnerability to enemy fire of low flying helicopters . . . ." He then argued that the "Army UH-1 type aircraft has more capability for contour flying than the CH^6 and was therefore occasionally useable when the CH-46 was not . . . ."** Even with the deplorable flying conditions during much of the battle of Hue, Anderson pointed out that the Marine helicopters flew 823 regular sorties, transported 1,672 passengers, carried more than a million pounds of cargo, and conducted 270 medical evacuation sorties, lifting out 977 casualties. More to the point, he maintained provisions existed in the order to override the flying restrictions when the tactical situation demanded. General Anderson admitted, however, "that this proviso, in all honesty was little known or understood. The order is widely distributed, but little read."4*"

By April 1968, Brigadier General Earl E. Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff and also an aviator,

*Colonel David S. Twining, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded Marine Air Control Squadron 4 in 1968 and earlier served in the Dong Ha DASC, agreed with General Anderson that to an extent the difference between Marine Corps concepts of helicopter usage and that of the Army was based on "Marine Corps conservatism as a result of having far fewer helicopter assets." Twining, nevertheless, claimed that Marine Corps "helicopter doctrine or practice in Vietnam was not only conservative but relatively unimaginative." While seating that the Marine Corps was the "first of the services to institute a program to work out helicopter combat techniques," he believed that internal divisions within the Marine aviation community between fixed-wing and helicopter pilots hampered Marine helicopter innovation. In Twining's opinion, "it was only due to the insistence of the ground community and the Commandant himself, that we entered the war with the helicopter inventory that we had and this proved to be insufficient for the innovative tactics that we might have otherwise developed." Col David S. Twining, Comments on draft, dtd 15 Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant Colonel Thomas F. Miller, who served on the MAG-16 staff and commanded a helicopter squadron in 1968, was unimpressed with the Army helicopter organization and tactics. According to Miller, some Army helicopter operations "anticipated aircraft losses of up to 25% of the first assault wave. I don't believe the Marine Corps would ever consider accepting such losses." LtCol Thomas F. Miller, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Miller Comments.

**0ne experienced Cti-^6 helicopter pilot suggested that the CH^6 has the same capability as the HU1 as far as contour flying, but that the Army helicopter was smaller and able to fit into tighter landing zones than the larger Marine craft. LtCol Dale Johnson comments to author.

***In a contemporary letter. Brigadier General Earl E. Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, expressed the following opinion about the subject: "Regardless of what we said in our official response, the fact remains that if the weather isn't above 1,500 feet and two miles, the mission has to be declared a priority one before the Wing will fly. If the weather is 500 feet and a mile, the requesting organization must declare an emergency before the helicopters will fly. If the weather is less than 500 feet and one mile, and if helicopters are required, the mission must be declared as mandatory, and the only two individuals who can approve a mandatory mission are the Wing Commander and the Commanding General III MAF. I should say, they were [emphasis in the original) the only ones who could approve such a mission, because following my investigation of certain allegations made during the Hue battle, General Anderson, at General Cushman's insistence, expanded the individuals who could approve a mandatory mission to include the two Assistant Wing Commanders, and the Chief of Staff, III MAF." Anderson concluded that even this was "not adequate. The helicopter pilots will fly, and do fly, in almost any kind of weather, but to require a requesting unit to go to the Wing Commander or the III MAF Commander to have a mission flown, when the ceiling is 400 feet, does not seem to be justified." BGen E.E. Anderson Itr to MajGen McCutcheon, dtd l4Mar68, End, Gen. Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Lieutenant General Richard E. Carey, who as a lieutenant colonel commanded a fixed-wing squadron in 1968 and also served on the 1st MAW staff, recalled that during the battle for Hue a "CH46 did not do a MedEvac because of an extremely low ceiling (allegedly on the ground). At wing we were notified that a Huey had done the Med Evac for us because of our 500-foot restriction. We reiterated the proviso about exigencies of the tactical situation but too late. Unfortunately, this incident gave an impression that the Army provided better helo support than us. The 1st Cav observation helos buzzed around at low altitudes further emphasizing the difference in equipment, numbers of birds, and methods of operations, which certainly didn't enhance our support image to Marine ground units." LtGen Richard E. Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Several Marine helicopter commanders emphasized their willingness to fly under adverse conditions. For example. Lieutenant Colonel Walter H. Shauer, who commanded HMM-362, wrote, "We were mission oriented merely flying in whatever weather, terrain, or combat situation in a manner ro accomplish the mission. In my briefings the only restriction was attempt no mission that you were not capable of performing, otherwise, attempt it later when you could get thru." LtCol Walter H. Shauer, Comments on draft, dtd l Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Shauer Comments. See also Col Roger W. Peard, Comments on draft, dtd 9Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Peard Comments and LtCol Jack E. Schlarp Comments on draft, dtd 21Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Schlarp Comments.