Department of Intense (USMC) Photo A374442
A Marine from the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines during Operation Allen Brook cautiously approaches a damaged hut. The VC dominated the hamlets in the Go No/.
the command group of the 3d Battalion together with Companies A of the 1st Battalion and G of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, together with Company I, 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, recrossed the Thu Bon River and "moved in a single file under cover of darkness for security." Ironically, the 3d Battalion had none ot its own organic companies in the operation as it reached its line of departure about 2,500 meters northeast of Liberty Bridge, just north of the objective area, a few hours prior to dawn. According to Barnard, Colonel Hall, who had monitored the radio traffic, "was beside himself with the success" of the plan to reenter the Go Noi.'"
Lieutenant Colonel Bamard remembered that his objective "was a suspected NVA installation .... We had reason to believe they did not know we were there
. . .." According to the battalion commander he was to attack to the south with the mission "to search for, fix, and destroy the enemy." As the Marines advanced with two companies on line and one in reserve, they were "hoping to execute a major surprise." In fact, both sides were to surprise one another. About 0900 on the mom-ing of the l6th, the 3d Battalion encountered an NVA battalion in the hamlet of Phu Dong (2) about 4,000 meters west of Xuan Dai, the scene of the latest heaviest fighting. According to Bamard, "we hit a hornet's nest." Two of his companies came under deadly machine gun fire and the battalion commander described the situation "like being in the butts at the rifle range." The Marine battalion tried to flank the enemy position, but as Bamard recalled, "we needed more resources than we had for the situation." He recalled that even maximum supporting artillery and mortar fire failed to break the NVA defenses. Finally, extensive close air support, including over 50 air strikes, "carried the day." By early evening, the Marine infantry which had fought continuously throughout the day in the oppressive heat finally forced the NVA out of their trenches and bunkers. Afraid of encirclement, the
�Colonel Barnard credited the 7th Marines commander. Colonel Hall, with the idea of openly pulling out the 2d Battalion, and unobtrusively bringing in the 3d Battalion under cover ot darkness. According to Barnard, Hall "was convinced chat after a week of 2/7 stirring up the AO [Area ol Operations], we could fool the enemy into believing the Marines had had enough." Col Roger H. Barnard. Comments on draft, dtd 13Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).