CHAPTER 16

Khe Sanh: Final Operations and Evacuation 16 April-11 July 1968

To Stay w Not to Stay-The 'Walking Dead'-Operation Scotland II-Operation Robin Razing Khe Sanh: Operation Charlie

To Stay or Not to Stay

General Westmoreland originally had ordered the defense of Khe Sanh as a block to enemy infiltration along Route 9 and as a possible 'jump-off point' for a planned invasion of Laos.' By the end of the siege, the Paris negotiations with the North Vietnamese had ended all thoughts of expanding the war into Laos. With the increased availability of additional mobile forces following the defeat of the enemy's Tet offensive, Westmoreland faced an entirely new tactical situation. As he recorded later:

It was dear . . . that the base had outlived its usefulness. We now had the troops and helicopters to control the area,. .. and we had the logistics and a secure forward base at Ca Lu to support these operations.2

In light of these new developments, Lieutenant General Cushman, the III MAF commander, and Army Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, the Provisional Corps commander, pressed for the evacuation of Khe Sanh immediately. According to General Rosson, he had prepared a plan which General Cushman had endorsed and that he thought had the tacit approval of General Westmoreland. Rosson had proposed the immediate redeployment of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to operation Delaware, and the 'progressive deployment eastward' of the 3d Marine Division units. As he recalled, he talked personally by telephone with Westmoreland and told the MACV commander that the Marine and ARVN units would remain at Khe Sanh only to ensure security for the 'removal of supplies' during the proposed 'inactiva-tion of the base.' In Rosson's opinion, 'General Westmoreland understood the plan that General Cushman and I had agreed upon,' and offered no objection.?

On 15 April, this understanding, if there was such an understanding, fell apart at a commander's conference that General Rosson hosted at his headquarters at Phu Bai. Rosson had called the meeting which originally was to include the 3d Marine Division and 1st Air Cavalry Division commanders and various staff members 'to finalize the plan and issue orders.' As a courtesy, Rosson invited his immediate superior, General Cushman, who in turn had invited General Westmoreland. The Provisional Corps commander remembered that he had just finished outlining the concept and had asked for comments when: 'General Westmoreland-to Cushman's and my own surprise and embarrassment-stated that Pegasus would not be terminated.' While permitting the greater part of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to redeploy to Operation Delaware, one brigade of the Air Cavalry and Marine and ARVN units would continue 'to comb the area' using Khe Sanh as their base of operations. Any decision to curtail 'these activities,' dismantle the base, or redeploy the remaining forces 'would await further developments.' General Westmoreland later would say that he basically agreed with Rosson's plan, 'but not its timing.' General Rosson remained puzzled:

'In essence, I either misunderstood General Westmoreland's approval, or he had second thoughts. . . . Why he did not communicate his disagreement to us prior to the conference continues to perplex me.' In any event, while Operation Pegasus did officially end on 15 April, U.S. units would continue to operate in and around Khe Sanh, for the time being, under the operational name of Scotland II.4**

^Like the meeting on 8 March (See Chapters 8 and 14) the participants had different interpretations about General Westmoreland's demeanor at the April meeting. According to Marine Brigadier General John R. Chaisson, who headed the MACV Combat Operations Center, when General Westmoreland learned that General Cushman, the III MAF commander, and General Rosson, the Prov Corps commander, planned to evacuate the base, 'Westy lowered the boom. He was so mad he wouldn't stay around and talk with them. Instead he told me what he wanted and left me to push it with Rosson and Cushman.' BGen Chaisson Itr to Mrs. Chaisson, dtd 17Apr68 as quoted in Ronald H. Spector, After Tet, The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (N.Y, N.Y: The Free Press, 1993), p. 129. On the other hand. General Rosson wrote: 'General Westmoreland certainly did not 'lower the boom' on me when he learned of the plan during our telephone conference. Nor did he do so during the commanders conference. While he was incisively firm in expressing himself on that occasion, he did not exhibit anger. Moreover, he remained after the conference for a short time to converse informally with various commanders, key staff officers, Cushman and myself. I frankly do not remember John's [Chaisson} remaining to 'push it with Rosson and Cushman.'' According to Rosson, he rather recalled 'resuming the conference after General Westmoreland's departure to forge a new course of action and revise the orders.' Gen William B. Rosson, USA, Comments on draft, dtd 29May95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rosson Comments, May95.