the same time as Dai Do had good reason to believe that the attacks on Nhi Ha to the northeast and at Cam Phu to the southwest may have been the main effort of the 320th. With the beginning of the drawdown of forces from the Scotland area of operations, General Davis had more freedom of action to implement a more mobile concept in the 3d Marine Division sector, a strategy that the Marines had recommended in the DMZ area since late 1966 and early 1967. At that time, instead of the barrier, the Marines had recommended "a mobile defense by an adequate force-say one division give or take a battalion ...." Different circumstances provided different opportunities.81*

* Many of the reviewers of this chapter still had strong opinions about the differences between the earlier and later tactics of the division. Captain McTiernan, for example, wrote that, "the decisive change in tactics initiated by General Davis" was the most important factor in the defeat of the NVA offensive. Capt Matthew G. McTiernan, Comments on draft, n.d. (Jan 1995] (Vietnam Comment File). Colonel Max McQuown argued that prior to Davis assuming command there were "a myriad of static defensive positions of little tactical value. These positions and the rigid control the Division exercised over every combat unit, fragmented battalions, reduced their combat capability, and severely limited their freedom of action. Thus, after soundly defeating the NVA 'Tet' offensive the initiative passed to the NVA by default in the 3d Marine Division TAOR." McQuown Comments. On the other hand. Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, who served on the division staff and as a regimental commander later under General Davis, observed that although members of the division "knew very well that we were not mobile, that we were not carrying the war to the enemy . . ., General Tompkins did what he could to change the status quo." He blamed Tompkins' problems, in part, on the factor that the 3d Marine Division commander could not obtain enough helicopters from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Col Vaughn R. Stuart, Comments on draft, did 20Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). See the discussion in Chapter 25 on this last subject. Colonel William M. Cryan, who was the 3d Marine Division G-3 under General Davis, agreed that the division "was stymied by Dyemarker and fixed bases . . .," and credits General Davis for getting "the division moving." Col William M. Cryan, Comments on draft, 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). Colonel William H. Dabney, who served on the division staff under both Generals Tompkins and Davis, agreed with the statement in the text that "different circumstances provided different opportunities." He also declared that intelligence "was far from perfect the first time around, and that General Davis had the benefit of General Tompkins' experience for the second round." Dabney concluded, however, that the "difference in style' [emphasis in the original) between Davis and Tompkins may also have affected the outcome of Round II." Col William H. Dabney, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File).