CHAPTER 14

The Siege of Khe Sanh

Digging In-Opening Moves-'Incoming!'-The Fall of Khe Sanh Village Reinforcement and Fighting Back-Round Tu'o-The Fall o/Lang Vei-The Intensifying Battle Settling the Score-Operation Pegasus

Digging In

By late January, U.S. planners at every level were determined to defend Khe Sanh, despite the suggested possibility oi 'another Dien Bien Phu.'' General Westmoreland voiced numerous reasons for defending the remote outpost. It was a valuable base for monitoring North Vietnamese infiltration through Laos along the 'Ho Chi Minh' and 'Santa Fe' Trails.** It was also important to Westmoreland's planned invasion of Laos by which he intended physically to cut the trails. Moreover, Khe Sanh served as left flank security for the Strong Point Obstacle System, also known as the Dyemarker Project. Finally, and vitally significant when considering the unpopularity of the war to many Americans by 1968, was the psychological significance of Khe Sanh. While it had no intrinsic political importance, being neither a cultural nor economic center, to relinquish it in the face of North Vietnamese pressure would result in a major enemy propaganda victory.'' Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and Westmoreland's immediate superior, concurred in this analysis, saying 'withdrawal from any portion of Vietnam would make immediate and sensational news, nor only through the Western news media, but also through the Communist capitals as a major propaganda item.''

At Khe Sanh, the 26th Marines had the responsibility to prevent the base from tailing to the surrounding Communist forces. With three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a full range of supporting units, including tank and antitank detachments, antiaircraft weapons, engineers, shore parry, air control, communications, and a host of others, Colonel David E. Lownds, the 26th Marines commander, continued improving his defenses.

Unnumbered Department of Defense (USMC) Photo An aerial vieu' of the Khe Sanh Combat Base looking west was taken during the siege. The runway of the airstrip can he seen helou' and m the top right n f the picture is what appears to be a rocket pod hanging below the aircraft taking the picture.

The Marine positions arced around the combat base from the westnorthwest to the north, forming a line of heavily fortified, mutually supporting strongpoints. Seven kilometers northwest of the combat base. Company I and Company M occupied Hill 8S1 South, from which Company I sortied on 20 January

* Sec Chapter-4 fora detailed discussion of the events preceding the Battle for Khe Sanh.

**The 'Santa Fe' Trail was actually part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, entering South Vietnam from Laos northwest of Khe Sanh. See Chapter 3.

*** In his comments. General Westmoreland wrote that 'the abandonment ot that central terrain feature (Khe Sanh] would have made available to the enemy a route to the populated area near the coast. Our control of Khe Sanh forced the enemy to change his battle plans and to reduce the threat to the coastal areas and its population.' Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA), Comments on draft, dtd 180ct94 (Vietnam Comment File).