CHAPTER 13

Post-Tet in I Corps

The Immediate Ramifications of the Tet Offensive-Readjustment in I Corps Readjustments in the U.S. I Corps Command Structure-Planning for the Future March Operations in the DMZ Sector-March Operations in the Rest of l Corps-Regaining the Initiative

The Immediate Ramifications of the Tet Offensive

By the end of February and the beginning of March with the securing of the city of Hue, the enemy's countrywide Tet offensive had about shot its initial bolt. According to American estimates, the Communists lost about half of their attacking force, more than 40,000 from an estimated 84,000 men. In I Corps alone, from January through March 1968, Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, the III MAF Commander, later calculated that allied forces killed over 30,000 of the enemy, the equivalent of 74 infantry battalions.1*

The Communist command, itself, admitted to several shortcomings. As early as l February 1968, the Central Office of South Vietnam, the Viet Cong governing body, issued a circular to its subordinate commands. According to the Communist leadership, 'we failed to seize a number of primary objectives and to completely destroy mobile and defensive units of the enemy.' The memorandum blamed the Viet Cong military forces for failure 'to hold the occupied areas,' and, moveover, held the political cadre accountable for not motivating the 'people to stage uprisings and break the enemy oppressive control.' In Military Region 5, which included both Quang Ngai City and Da Nang, the Communist headquarters conceded that its troops and cadre within the cities were not strong enough to assist the main force units outside of the cities. In an official history, the Communist author acknowledged that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacking units 'did not meet the basic requirements that had been set forth.' Contrary to the enemy expectations, the South Vietnamese Army had not disintegrated and in many sectors acquitted itself reasonably well, especially on the defensive.2

Still the tenor of the Communist communiques was one of defiance. They all claimed the achievement of great victories and made references to final victory for their cause. At the same time, however, the enemy leadership warned their supporters: 'Our people's struggle has stepped into an extremely tense and fierce phase and is developing very rapidly.' They no longer spoke of a short-term campaign, but that 'the General Offensive and General Uprising will not last for only a few days, but that it is a phase of a general attack against the enemy.' One phase was over and another was to begin.3

The American military was also examining the consequences of the enemy's offensive. While confident that Tet was a major military defeat for the Communists, U.S. commanders were well aware of the cost to their side. Allied casualties during the fighting totaled in excess of 12,000, with about two-thirds suffered by the ARVN. The battle of Hue was a near thing, especially in the first few days. While expecting an attack, especially in the north around Khe Sanh or possibly the DMZ, General Westmoreland and the MACV staff had underestimated the breadth and extent of the enemy general offensive. Some 600,000 civilians were now refugees, about 100,000 in I Corps alone. The pacification effort had sustained a major setback. In mid-February, Marine Brigadier General John R. Chaisson, the director of the MACV Combat Operations Center, observed in a letter home, 'the damage in the cities and to the economy is staggering. ARVN will be somewhat less than effective for weeks.' He then wrote, however, '... there is a general tightening up of everything, and if the guys on top don't panic this could be the turning point of the war-even though he [the enemy] initiated it for us.' Chaisson expressed the sentiments of many of the MACV commanders including both Generals Westmoreland and Cushman.4

In Washington, the Johnson administration also began its reevaluation of the Vietnam War in light of the enemy offensive. Other factors also clouded the situation. On 23 January, North Korean gunboats captured the U.S. intelligence ship, USS Pueblo (AGER-2),

* Cushman's statistics include figures before and after Tet and, therefore, give a somewhat distorted picture of the enemy's Tet casualties. It, nevertheless, is indicative of the intensity of the fighting in the I Corps sector during the Tet period and of the enemy's losses.