bridge and the South Vietnamese tankers in light M24 tanks "refused to go."35

As the Marine infantry started across, an enemy machine gun on the other end of the bridge opened up, killing and wounding several Marines. One Marine, Lance Corporal Lester A. Tully, later awarded the Silver Star for his action, ran forward, threw a grenade, and silenced the gun. Two platoons successfully made their way to the other side. They turned left and immediately came under automatic weapons and recoilless rifle fire from the Citadel wall. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel recollected that it was late in the afternoon and the sun was in their eyes: "We were no match for what was going on ... I decided to withdraw."36

This was easier said then done. The enemy was well dug-in and "firing from virtually every building in Hue city" north of the river. Lieutenant Colonel Gravel radioed back to Colonel Adkisson "for some vehicle support... to come and help us recover our wounded." According to Gravel, "the trucks didn't come and they didn't come . . . ." Becoming more and more agitated, the battalion commander took his radio man and an interpreter "to find out where in the hell the vehicles were." They came upon some U.S. naval personnel and a few of the American advisors in two Navy trucks and brought them back to the bridge. In the meantime, the Marines commandeered some abandoned Vietnamese civilian vehicles and used them as makeshift ambulances to carry out the wounded. Among the casualties on the bridge was Major Walter D. Murphy, the 1st Battalion S-3 or operations officer, who later died of his wounds. Captain Meadows remembered that he lost nearly a third of his company, either wounded or killed, "going across that one bridge and then getting back across that bridge."37*

By 2000, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines had established defensive positions near the MACV compound and a helicopter landing zone in a field just west of the Navy LCU Ramp in southern Hue. On that first day, the two Marine companies in Hue had sustained casualties of 10 Marines killed and 56 wounded. During the night, the battalion called in a helicopter into the landing zone to take out the worst of the wounded. According to Lieutenant Colonel Gravel, "it was darker than hell and foggy," and the pilot radioed '"Where are you? I can't see.'" The sergeant on the ground, talking the aircraft down, knocked on the nose of the CH-46, and replied, '"Right out here, sir.'" Gravel marvelled that the sergeant "had a knack about working with helicopter pilots . . . He brought it [the helicopter] right on top of us."38**

The American command still had little realization of the situation in Hue. Brigadier General LaHue later commented: "Early intelligence did not reveal the quantity of enemy involved that we subsequently found were committed to Hue."*** General Westmoreland's headquarters had, if possible, even less appreciation of the magnitude of the NVA attack on the city. Westmoreland cabled General Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the "enemy has approximately three companies in the Hue Citadel and Marines have sent a battalion into the area to clear them out."39

* Lieutenant Colonel Gravel in his letter to Batcheller gave the number of Marines from Company G that were wounded as 44. Eric Hammel in his account gives the casualties for Company G as 5 dead and 44 wounded, which probably does not include Major Murphy. Colonel Meadows, years later, commented that "to my recollection LtCol Gravel did not join us on the other side of the bridge. I remember calling him on the radio and giving him my sitreps and eventually the urgent need for vehicles." Gravel Itr, Feb68; Eric Hammel, Fire in the Streets, The Battle for Hue, Tet 1968 (Chicago, 111: Contemporary Books, 1991), p. 90; Col Charles L. Meadows, Comments on draft, dtd 13Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).

**0ne of the co-authors expressed doubts about the accuracy of the above account: "Not very long ago, I stood on an LZ trying to communicate with a CH-46 pilot through the helicopter's own 1C (internal communication} system. Impossible, and this helicopter was on the ground, at low power. A hovering helicopter is louder by at least a magnitude. I have been under them . . , when they are less than 10 feet off the deck and I can tell you that I don't believe this story for a minute. Having said all this, I still feel it's too good to pass up." Maj Leonard A. Blasiol, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 30Jun88 (Vietnam Comment File).

***General Earl E. Anderson, then the III MAF Chief of Staff at Da Nang as a brigadier general, recalled that he was in "constant contact by phone . . . [with] Frosty LaHue .... neither of us sleeping more than an hour or two a night." Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).