Photo courtesy of lgor Bobrowsky

Marines and South Vietnamese Regional Force troops of Combined Action Platoon D-l fatrol near the hamlet of Thanh Quit south of Da Nang. These platoons were the cutting edge of the Combined Action Program, which integrated a Marine squad with South Vietnamese militia (Popular or Regional Forces) in the surrounding villages and hamlets.

ment. In many respects, these semi-isolated CAPs were the frontline of the Marine war in the villages and hamlets, the target of nearly 4() percent of the enemy attacks in I Corps in November and December 1967. They were among the first to indicate an enemy buildup in the Da Nang and Phu Loc sectors.'

By the end of 1967, the allies in I Corps had developed a rather sophisticated analysis apparatus for the collection and processing of local intelligence. The core of this collection effort was the District Operations and Intelligence Center (DOIC). Each center consisted of representatives from the South Vietnamese district-level government structure including the ARVN district S-2 officer. National Police, and Revolutionary Development cadre. A U.S. MACV/III MAF liaison team provided technical expertise. The establishment of 14 such centers since August permitted the analysis and supposedly rapid dissemina-tion of time-sensitive intelligence to those South Vietnamese and allied civilian agencies and military units and agencies able to take action. For example, in November 1967, the Dien Ban center provided information to the National Police that led to the arrest of 64 members of the VC Hoi An infrastructure and the capture of significant enemy planning documents.''

From various sources. III MAF received reports in December 1967 that the enemy was massing his forces in I Corps. There was the buildup of enemy forces at Khe Sanh and the eastern DMZ. In the CoBi-Thanh Tan region the 4th Marines and South Vietnamese sources reported the southeastward movement of elements of the 6th NVA Regiment and the appearance of a new regiment, the 4th NVA, in the Phu Loc sector south of Phu Bai. Of even more concern to the 1st Marine Division and the Americal Division was the forward deployment of the 2d NVA Dh'ision north into

*Lieurenant Colonel Oliver W. van den Bet's, Jr., who commanded the 1st Battalion, 5ch Marines at L)a Nan^ in November 1967, remembered chat a sniper team attached to his Company A 'killed a VC courier and his armed escort at ''(X) meters.' According to van den Ber^, rhe courier carried a lar^e ba^; ol documents 'which included a pay roster and many other documents.' Lieutenant Colonel van den Berg wrote that all of this was turned over (o intelligence personnel and may have been the source of information for the National Police arrest of the 6-1 members of the VC Hoi An infrastructure. LtCol Oliver W. van den Berg, Jr., Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).