defense plans, and functioning of local governments- showed similar, if less dramatic, improvement. According to Marine Corps criteria, 5 5 percent of the population in I Corps in December lived in secure areas, ranging from a high of 80 percent in the Phu Bai sectors to a low of 34 percent at Due Pho. The Marines credited several factors for this upsurge, not the least of which was the insertion of Army units in southern I Corps to take up the slack left by the departure of the Marines for the northern battle sector. Yet III MAF believed that its innovative pacification techniques accounted for much of the progress.71
With the coming of the Christmas and New Year season, the war continued on its ambivalent course. The holiday truce periods symbolized the cross-currents of the conflict. Giving vague hints of peace, the Communists agreed to a 24-hour truce over Christmas and a slightly longer, 36 hours, respite over the New Year's celebration. Taking advantage of the cease-fires and the halt in U.S. air operations, the North Vietnamese moved supplies to their forward units. Over Christmas, American air observers spotted some 600-800 vehicles and boats hauling and landing military provisions and equipment in southern North Vietnam. MACV reported 118 enemy violations-40 of them major-over Christmas, and 170-63 major-during the New Year's truce period. The New Year's violations resulted in 29 allied soldiers dead and 128 wounded, with two South Vietnamese troops listed as missing in action. In turn, the allies killed 117 of the enemy. The American command called both standdowns a "hoax" and recommended that any cease-fire for the Vietnamese Tet or lunar new year be as short as possible.72*
U.S. leaders worried over the Communist intentions for the new year. In a departure from the optimistic public rhetoric of his administration about the war, President Johnson privately warned the Australian Cabinet in late December of "dark days ahead."73 Much evidence indicated that the enemy was on the move. American intelligence reported two North Vietnamese divisions near Khe Sanh and a third along the eastern
DMZ. Further south, prisoner interrogations revealed the possible presence of a new enemy regiment in Thua Thien Province. American commanders believed Hue was a major enemy objective although the 1st ARVN Division could not "credit the enemy with 'the intent' nor the 'capability' to launch a division-size attack" against the city.74 At Da Nang, III MAF received information that the 2d NVA Division was shifting its area of operations to Quang Nam Province.75 Captured enemy documents spoke of major offensives throughout South Vietnam. One in particular observed "that the opportunity for a general offensive and general uprising is within reach . . . ," and directed the coordination of military attacks "with the uprisings of the local population to take over towns and cities."76
By January 1968, a sense of foreboding and uncertainty dominated much American thinking about the situation in Vietnam and the course of the war.77 According to all allied reports, Communist forces had taken horrendous casualties during the past few months, causing one senior U.S. Army general to wonder if the North Vietnamese military command was aware of these losses.78 Yet, all the signs pointed to a major enemy offensive in the very near future. Although captured enemy documents spoke of assaults on the cities and towns, General Westmoreland believed the enemy's more logical targets to be the DMZ and Khe Sanh, while staging diversionary attacks elsewhere. He thought the Communist objectives to be the seizure of the two northern provinces of South Vietnam and to make Khe Sanh the American Dien Bien Phu.79**
While planning their own offensive moves, MACV and III MAF prepared for a NVA push in the north. General Cushman reinforced Khe Sanh and in Operation Checkers began to deploy his forces toward the northern border.
* Major Gary E. Todd, who served as an intelligence officer on the 3d Marine Division staff, commented that the "the last shot fired before the 'cease fire' took effect was like a starter's pistol to the North Vietnamese, crouched down and tensed to explode into a sprint" to resupply their forces in the south. Todd Comments.
* *Army Lieutenant General Philip B. Davidson, the MACV intelligence officer, commented that General Westmoreland stated his expectation of the coming enemy offensive "in broad terms as a result of series of war games conducted by and at MACV headquarters. It was considered as nothing more than a 'probable course of enemy action' . . . . " Davidson contends that the MACV commander was open "to consideration of other possible forms of the enemy offensive right up to the initiation of the Tet offensive." Davidson observed also that General Cushman "concurred" with the MACV expectations. LtGen Philip B. Davidson, Jr. (USA), Comments on draft chapter, dtd 250ct68 (Vietnam Comment File).
