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(Prairie Grove)

Prairie Grove

After Pea Ridge the Confederates had shifted most of their forces out of Arkansas to reinforce Bragg's battered army after Shiloh.  The new commander in Arkansas was Thomas C. Hindman, a local lawyer and former Congressman who now turned his hand to warfare.

He conjured troops where there had been none (mainly by strictly enforcing the conscription laws - his eloquence and local roots must have helped smooth things), cobbled together arms and equipment from factories he had organized.  He built, from scratch, a force of around 20,000, backed by an adequate 46 guns.  Moreover, he wanted to use it.  Hindman not only wanted to eject the Union from any portion of Arkansas, he wanted to liberate Missouri from what he saw as the Union yoke.  Yet his army was fragile: he'd created it through heavy-handed enforcement of the conscription laws.  If he tried to move the troops across the Mississippi many would find ways to leave the army, and if the new Confederate army was defeated then many, many men would go home.

After Curtis marched the Union forces out of northwestern Arkansas the Confederates moved in; Hindman's conscription officers rounded up another 10,000 or so, but the men from this largely Unionist area were extremely unwilling.  And Curtis saw the threat forming: he gathered a small army and sent it into the area.  They pushed aside the cavalry that were screening the recruits' training camps, and pounced.  Hindman had left strict orders to avoid combat, but a forced march took the Union troops into the Confederate base; the conscripts took the opportunity to head for home.  Hindman was livid and cashiered the officer who let the 'battle' happen, but none of that changed the fact that the 10,000 would never be back in Confederate grey.

But Hindman was undeterred; he still had his attention on northwest Arkansas and the Union garrisons there.  By late August he was moving towards the Union positions in northwestern Arkansas, and in October he pushed a mixed cavalry-Indian force around the bluecoats into the southern edge of Missouri.  That didn't last: Schofield, the regional Union commander, scattered the Indians and the cavalry drew back into the rough Boston Mountains. 

Hindman, like many politicians, saw opportunity in everything, and advanced the main body.  He reckoned the Federals would become over-confident, as they did.  In mid-November Schofield scattered his three divisions into winter quarters and availed himself of sick leave.
It presented Hindman the opening he sought, since there was now an inferior Union force (Blunt's division of roughly 7,000 men) at Fayetteville, separated from support and weaker than his own field force of about 12,000.  Then he got orders to head in the opposite direction, down to Vicksburg.  He hit the roof, claiming that his locally-raised troops would fight for their home state but desert if marched past their homes to fight somewhere else.  Not waiting for his superiors to ponder the argument, he moved his main body.

The advance guard had already skirmished with Blunt's men at CANE HILL, which was a minor Union victory.  Blunt had stayed on the ground he'd won, but knew that the Confederates were out in force, so he wired for reinforcements.  But help was well over 100 miles away, and would only bring overall numbers up to even.  The Confederates were closer and stronger.  It would be touch-and-go for Blunt.

But Hindman's route was through rough country, and Schofield's deputy was a fighter, and hounded his men up the good road.  Herron started off the same day Hindman did, and arrived on the day of battle.  Hindman hadn't hit Blunt head-on, but like Van Dorn had flanked his opponent.  This left him between the two Union forces, in a confused battle at PRAIRIE GROVE.

Though losses were roughly even, the Confederates had to withdraw to their supplies.  Many demoralized men, whipped up by Hindman's oratory (and conscription agents) and then deflated by defeat, melted back to their farms, either deserting or straggling, depending on whether they intended ever to rejoin.  Worse was soon to follow: Schofield had resumed command and meant to exploit the victory.  He sent his cavalry after the weakened Confederates and destroyed their depots at Fort Smith.  Hindman had to pull back to Little Rock for supplies, but very few of his men followed.

The Union could pull back to well-supplied winter billets in Missouri, confident there would be no Confederate forces to oppose them next spring.  The north of Arkansas was empty of both armies, except patrols and guerrillas, which made life a misery for the hill folks.

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(Prairie Grove)