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(Struggle for Central Arkansas)

Struggle for Central Arkansas

After clearing Missouri of organized Confederate forces, General Samuel Curtis had a formidable Union force in the southwestern corner of the state.  Rather than disperse the army and pass the initiative to the Confederates for an invasion, he headed into Arkansas.  At the same time the Confederates began a counteroffensive.  The result, in March 1862 , was the battle of Pea Ridge.  This drove the Confederates back, and they shortly transferred most of their troops out of the theater to support operations in Mississippi.

Curtis' army stayed in northwest Arkansas, doing little except consume supplies, since most of the region was already Unionist, or abandoned.  The Confederates had their hands full trying to raise another army.  Thomas Hindman was remarkably successful in gathering men - and immensely successful at saying he'd gathered men.  Newspapers broadcast news of his burgeoning forces and Curtis began evaluating his options.  Staying put didn't look very enticing: if Hindman pinned Curtis' main body and used some of his 'stronger' force to cut the supply lines into Missouri then Curtis would be ruined.  Nor did Curtis want to advance further from his supply base and meet Hindman head-on in central Arkansas.  Retreat into Missouri would be politically bad, retreating just because of some rumors.  So he took a fourth option, moving eastward in Arkansas to join with other Union forces along the Mississippi.

He headed through the mountainous regions of northern Arkansas, and found little food and less resistance.  Hindman had not collected anything like as many men as Curtis feared, and most of them were ill-equipped (and poorly motivated).  So hunger and rough terrain were Curtis' main troubles.  The goal was the upper White River, where the Navy could deliver supplies.  But at SAINT CHARLES the Confederate river batteries checked the gunboats and transports long enough that they missed the rendezvous.  Curtis had to continue overland, brushing aside Confederate skirmishers at HILL'S PLANTATION before arriving safely at Helena in mid-July 1862.  After a long march and little action Curtis was promoted to command the Department of Missouri, including Arkansas, Kansas and the Indian Territory.

With Curtis' force gone from the northwest of Arkansas, the Confederates rushed back in.  Hindman and conscription officers turned up and gathered about 10,000 very unhappy men, who were left to train with strict orders to avoid battle.  Curtis shuffled his troops around and assembled 11,000 men of his own - but better trained, equipped, and motivated.  In September they moved down, drove off the Confederate cavalry screen (including an Indian brigade) and pounced on the raw recruits.  The men vanished back to their homes as if they'd never been in the army.  The Union troops stayed on as garrison for the area, but Hindman still hankered to recover it.

His opportunity came in the winter of 1862, when the Union forces dispersed to winter quarters.  He struck in the PRAIRIE GROVE CAMPAIGN, which backfired.  Another defeat in battle meant that another Confederate conscript army dissolved, and Arkansas was still undefended.

After Prairie Grove, much of the Confederate force, unwilling conscripts, had melted away back to their homes - or become bands of deserters.  The Union pursuit to the Confederate supply base hastened the breakup of Hindman's army, but the Union forces did not linger in northern Arkansas.  They had two main problems: not enough men to fan out and occupy everything, and vulnerable supply lines that stretched overland back into Missouri.  John Marmaduke raided the supply lines a month after Prairie Grove, causing the Union troops to hasten northward where the supplies were reliable.

But if it was hard to supply a large force, it was much easier to supply a small force, and the Federals left behind a recently recruited brigade of Arkansas volunteers.  Yes, they were only 1,500 strong, but the Rebels had stripped the area too and had less than 1,000 men themselves.  Moreover, the area was strongly Unionist in sentiment, and most civilians would sneak intelligence to their relatives in uniform.  Eventually the Union raids got so bad - they were regularly ambushing supply steamers on the river, burning bridges, and plundering Confederate supporters - that a concentrated counterstrike was necessary.  But it backfired: on April 18 the First Arkansas Cavalry in both armies charged each other at Fayetteville.  Initially the Confederates drove ahead, but in street fighting they suffered heavily and had to pull back.  Their casualties broke the back of Confederate strength in north-west Arkansas, letting the Unionists dominate the area.  (In turn this helped the Union cause in the Indian Territory.)

Meanwhile in the eastern end of the state ARKANSAS POST was captured, along with a substantial garrison, by Grant's army.  It was really a diversionary operation during the Vicksburg campaign, unusual for Grant who usually kept his men focused on the main task.  Vicksburg was unquestionably the main focus in the western theater, and Grant's progress in April and May 1863 had the Confederates looking for ways to distract him.  Joe Johnston had few troops and plenty of caution to the east of Grant's army.  West of the Mississippi River Kirby Smith had even fewer Confederates, but was bolder in his moves.  Two forces operated in western Louisiana (one throwing the Union garrison of New Orleans into a panic) and a third column headed from Little Rock to Helena Arkansas.  The goal was to capture the Union depot and wreck Grant's supply line, but Theophilus Holmes bungled almost every aspect of the battle of HELENA.  He did more damage to his army than to the Yankees.

In July 1863 the strategic situation changed dramatically in central Arkansas.  Not only had the Confederate forces taken a drubbing at Helena, Vicksburg had fallen, freeing Union troops for other operations.  Grant's men needed some refitting and rest, but two operations soon were underway: Banks pushed back into central Louisiana, and Union forces were on the march into central Arkansas.  The goal was to finally secure Little Rock, still a political and economic objective.  (There was also a second goal: prevent a suspected Confederate raid into Missouri.  A captured Confederate lieutenant had told his captors vivid tales of the invasion force mustering, and Grant intended to strike first and capture the Confederate base.)  With the state capitol in Federal hands it would bolster Union support and weaken Confederate legitimacy.  The Confederacy would lose the small manufacturing enterprises in Little Rock - including the State Penitentiary - and by pushing the Confederates further south there would be a little more peace in Kansas, Missouri, and the Indian Territory.

So Grant sent a division of the veteran XVI Corps, and a new commander - Frederick Steele.  The main force concentrated at Helena, but there were two other columns.  A mounted brigade (three regiments of pro-Union Indians, three of Whites, and one of African Americans) moved in from the west after victories over small Confederate forces in the Indian Territory, and a strong mounted division moving down from the White River, where it was in contact with US gunboats.  Meanwhile the battered Confederate force (now under Sterling Price, a big name in the Trans-Mississippi, if not a sterling general) was gathered where it stopped after pulling back from Helena: north of the Arkansas River, and east of Little Rock.

Steele started on August 10, and soon joined the cavalry division under Davidson.  Their combined force was about 12,000 against Price's 8,000 but numbers do not reflect the whole Union advantage.  They were well equipped and fully supplied; morale was high after victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Helena, and Port Hudson.  The Confederate troops were facing the opposite situation: now cut off in the Trans-Mississippi, under a new commander after their old one had launched a foolish battle, short on weapons and supplies.  Still, Price hoped Steele would launch a frontal assault and lose, bringing the campaign to a quick end.

Steele wasn't so foolish.  He operated carefully, to maximize his advantages.  Two weeks after starting he had a new base at DeVall's Bluff, closer to Little Rock and on a river so the Navy could easily supply him.  He also had no intention of a frontal assault, after seeing the results in the Vicksburg campaign.  First Davidson's cavalry drubbed their Confederate opponents, which forced the Confederates into fortifications - otherwise the Union cavalry would have quickly encircled the greyclad infantry in a field battle.  Then Steele outflanked Price's fortifications by sending his cavalry across the Arkansas downstream from Little Rock.  At BAYOU FOURCHE the cavalry routed the Confederate defenders; Price then had no option but to withdraw or Davidson's troopers would quickly surround him.
Price pulled back to Arkadelphia, while the Legislature high-tailed it for Washington, Arkansas.  There wasn't much left of Confederate Arkansas, and there wasn't even a quorum left of the Legislature, although the Supreme Court issued a dispensation and allowed it to meet. 

Steele had achieved his main aim, control of central Arkansas.  But there wasn't much point in occupying most of the state.  Federal garrisons were stationed in the main river towns: Fort Smith, Little Rock, Pine Bluff.  They could be easily supplied by river, and reinforcements could quickly be brought if there was a danger.  (The Confederates were weak, and many troops were demoralized, but they still had teeth: a raid on PINE BLUFF was only repelled after fighting in the middle of town.)  Most of the rest of the state was abandoned, and it quickly fell prey to guerrillas, bushwhackers, and thieves of all stripes.  With most farmers becoming refugees, there was little food grown, too little to feed large infantry forces but enough forage and scattered crops to feed cavalry raiders if they passed through.  Cavalry raids and skirmishes would plague Arkansas until Steele was ordered to take part in the Red River Campaign of early 1864.

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(Struggle for Central Arkansas)