| Page 4 | (New Mexico Campaign) |  |  |
New
Mexico Campaign
The South had long encouraged American expansion into the South West,
anticipating the formation of slave states to offset the free states that would
be formed in the Midwest. When secession came, their efforts increased,
for a variety of reasons. First, the US had quantities of military stores
in the area that the Confederacy badly needed. Next, the Confederates
wanted the opportunity to expand in that direction - they even had hopes that
California would secede, and the New Mexico Territory (which included what is
now Arizona) would be a vital link to California. Also, there were hopes
of obtaining several states in northern Mexico, which Southern leaders thought
would either join or could be conquered; again, New Mexico would be a key land
bridge. Finally, with gold in California and mines opening in Colorado and
Nevada, everyone was predicting mineral riches from New Mexico, and the
Confederacy wanted its hands on them.
There was some sentiment for secession in the Territory, but not as much as
Southerners thought. There were few settlers in the area, and the Apaches
and other tribes hardly cared who claimed the area as long as there was little
interference in their way of life. The bulk of the population were
Hispanics, until very recently Mexican citizens and lukewarm to either US or CS
governments. The Southerners in the Territory mistook their own views for
those of a majority and also expected the US Government to sit idly by while
they seceded.
Confederate leaders also expected to play all factions. It was
clear the Confederacy didn't have a lot of people to send to settle the area and
ensure loyalty. Instead they hoped to ally with the Native tribes to keep
the existing settlers in line, and also to ally with the Mormons in Utah (who
had no reason to love the government in Washington after the 1857 Utah
Expedition), and even hoped for support from a population of Georgians who had
moved to Colorado. But the Georgians rapidly found how small a minority
they were, the Mormons preferred neutrality, and the troops raised from the
Civilized Tribes were needed to protect the Indian Territory.
The Federal Government saw the same reasons to protect New Mexico, but had
little strength available. There were roughly 2,500 Regulars scattered in
garrisons across the Territory, and several regiments of volunteers were raised,
but the (New) Mexicans had little stomach for fighting. Supplies could be
just as much of a problem, since New Mexico produced little surplus food, and
hardly anything else. But the communications routes to the rest of the US
were open, and the pre-war depots were intact so Edward Canby didn't have to
worry - yet. Canby gathered his Regulars and drilled his recruits and
hoped nothing would develop. His troops were shaky, the Regulars because
they hadn't been paid in many months, the New Mexicans just unenthusiastic and
prone to mutinies. (Two militia regiments were actually disbanded before
seeing action rather than put such unreliable units in the line and risk
defeat.)
The Confederates had even less to start with, but moved fast. In New
Mexico itself they could only count on sympathizers, and had to create whatever
army they would send to the Territory elsewhere. That meant in Texas, and
it had to be done at the same time that Texas was organizing volunteers for
service further east. The first step was raising men, and John Baylor
quickly gathered 350 recruits who had to bring their own equipment.
Calling his force the 2nd Texas Mounted Rifles he headed to Franklin (now El
Paso) and accepted the surrender of the tiny garrison at Fort Bliss.
Moving on, they crossed into New Mexico in late July 1861, heading up the Rio
Grande to Fort Fillmore, next to the town of Mesilla. The Union garrison
was about twice the size of Baylor's force, but was cautiously led. The
Confederates were warmly welcomed in Mesilla - one of the few towns that was
pro-Southern - and repulsed a weak Union sortie. With that, the Union
commander, Major Isaac Lynde, lost his nerve and evacuated. His men were
demoralized by the lack of action, and many straggled (perhaps helped by the
distribution of whiskey; many had no water in their canteens) only to be rounded
up by Baylor. Eventually the mounted Texans caught up with the US
infantry, who were exhausted and demoralized; Lynde surrendered. (Lynde
was subsequently discharged from the Army.) The Confederates paroled their
prisoners but could advance no further. Their force was tiny, and Lynde
had at least destroyed most of the supplies at Fort Fillmore.
During the summer of 1861 both sides were recruiting volunteers all over the
country. One force was being raised in Texas specifically for service in
New Mexico. Colonel Henry Sibley had obtained Jeff Davis' approval for a
bold plan to secure the whole South West. It rested on recruiting a
brigade of Texans (with a bit of artillery) and then rampaging across New Mexico
to California. Sibley knew the area and how sparse both men and supplies
were, and Davis warned that the Confederacy could spare little for the
campaign. Sibley had to rely on capturing supplies and raising volunteers,
but he was an optimist and believed success would feed success.
Back in Texas he did raise his brigade, three regiments plus a battery of
artillery and a wagon train for his military supplies - food and fodder would
have to come from the countryside. By January 1862 he had moved his column
into New Mexico and joined with Baylor's men.
The Union had been raising troops too, and had five regiments of New Mexico
Volunteers to supplement the Regulars who had been left on the frontier.
More important, Canby had gathered the bulk of his men to Fort Craig, on the Rio
Grande, where he had some 4,000. He was contemplating advancing southward,
although he knew Sibley was coming with Confederate reinforcements, when Sibley
moved north first.
Canby had gathered the bulk of Union forces in the Territory to block the
natural route of advance: the Rio Grande valley. That was the farming
district, it was the populated area, it was the only place the Confederates
could reliably supply themselves. Sibley was smart enough not to attack it
head-on (Canby had been thickening the adobe walls, hoping for something so
foolish) but swung around the fort to cut it off from up-river supplies.
Canby had to do something, and the battle of VALVERDE was the result. The
Union forces were chased back into their fort, minus their artillery.
Sibley had a choice: he could sit outside Fort Craig until Canby surrendered
the place, or he could move north upriver to control more of New Mexico.
While he knew the Union forces were disorganized, and the Texans disdained the
'Mexicans' (they generally left off the 'New'), he would still have to tackle
the strong Fort Craig. Canby had deployed some 'Quaker guns', logs shaped
and painted to look like artillery, and the soldiers wanted no part of storming
what looked like a fortress.
What's more, Sibley was short of supplies and the only way to get them was to
go upstream to places like Socorro, Albuquerque, and eventually Santa Fe.
So they moved fast. At Socorro the remnants of the 2nd New Mexico
surrendered, and other scattered parties of local troops also yielded, sometimes
to tiny parties of Confederates. But the big depots were all either
evacuated or burned. Canby had sent orders to destroy all public supplies,
but especially food; he would starve Sibley out. Sibley found virtually no
military supplies, and he also found the people sullen. Most would not
offer supplies to the Confederates, wouldn't take Confederate paper money, and
wouldn't volunteer. He gathered supplies from the few sympathizers and
confiscated more, but his position was tenuous.
Sibley was marooned in a hostile land - both people and climate hostile -
with Union forces north and south of him. Canby had sent his unreliable
units away (they did him no good in battle but consumed food) but kept the rest
to block the Rio Grande valley so Sibley could get no supplies from Texas.
Meanwhile reinforcements from Colorado were moving as fast as they could
(through rough terrain in winter) to join with the few reliable troops in
northern New Mexico. Sibley occupied the bulk of the Rio Grande valley,
but he needed the military supplies at Fort Union, to the northeast, to sustain
his position; if he got the supplies he could force Canby's surrender. He
would also block the main route into New Mexico from Colorado, protecting his
gains and creating the opportunity to move north.
The first move was to guard against a Federal advance from Fort Union, and
600 men were sent to guard Apache Canyon while Sibley gathered what supplies he
could and brought up the main force. In two days of fighting at GLORIETA
PASS the Confederates suffered the heavier casualties, but that was nothing
beside their other loss: their wagon train with its supplies. Short of
munitions (about 10 rounds per man remained), food, even blankets, Sibley had no
choice but to pull out. And now Canby's force at Fort Craig appeared in an
entirely different light.
Canby was running out of food, but the news meant that the Confederates
couldn't stand and fight. So with about 1,200 men he started north along
the Rio Grande. Sibley had to pull back from Santa Fe to Albuquerque to
protect what few supplies he had there, and reached it ahead of Canby's
column. Two days of minor skirmishes showed neither side really wanted to
fight, and Canby moved away to join the 1st Colorado who brought him more
supplies. Sibley took the opening to start his retreat. On April 12
they started back toward Texas, with Canby starting along their path on the
14th. He did not push hard, and when the Confederates stopped at Peralta
only a few miles south he did nothing more than skirmish and bombard. Many
thought ill of Canby (he was Sibley's brother-in-law) and he certainly missed
opportunities by not taking some risks. But he had little to gain: New
Mexico would be safe if the Confederates retreated or were captured, and if they
were captured then Canby would have to find some way to feed them.
Whatever
Canby's motives, Sibley did retreat. And since the Rio Grande valley was
blocked by the remaining garrison at Fort Craig, he had to head east across the
desert. Making a 100-mile march through the desert cost him the remaining
artillery and wagons, as well as many men who broke down and died of dehydration
along the way.
Sibley returned to Texas with about half his original force, but had lost
nothing of his big ideas. He reported that they had won every battle AND
that they were well-supplied and -equipped. Few in his command or
elsewhere believed him.
The New Mexico Territory was vast, including modern Arizona, and the
operations in modern New Mexico were not the whole story. Sibley had sent
a company to Tucson, where the population was reported to be
pro-secession. They had arrived unopposed, and rapidly settled down to
patrolling the area and gathering as many supplies as they could in the very
sparsely populated area. Their very activity gained them attention because
it looked like they were a larger force.
For a long time there wasn't much
the Union could do; there were no troops to spare from the Rio Grande valley,
and it was a long and difficult trip from California. Eventually a
regiment of California volunteers was organized and sent across to Yuma - it had
to be sent in dribbles since there wasn't enough water for a whole regiment at
once - where it reorganized for the move to Tucson. Moving along the Gila
River they circled to the north of Tucson. While moving south, a patrol
met a Confederate patrol at Picacho Pass. Thirteen Federals skirmished
with sixteen Rebels; total losses were eleven and the Confederates
retreated. This was the westernmost land engagement of the Civil War,
which is its main mark in history.
With the retreat of Sibley's main force the detachment (only about 80 men) in
Tucson had to skedaddle too, and when the Californians moved in they found only
some wary civilians, who were not sure if they would be punished as
collaborators.
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