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(Appomattox)

Appomattox Campaign

The Siege of Richmond and Petersburg had begun in June and ground on, into and through the long winter of 1864-65, but it was not the only military action.  The Confederates had scarcely won a battle elsewhere, and their armies were weak and being driven backward by the Union forces at almost every point.

Lee's army had been worn down by the long struggle, not just in numbers but the men themselves were weaker.  With few reserves it was difficult to rotate the men out of the trenches, and they grew less and less fit.  Rations and medical supplies were also short, and men's strength ebbed away.  Meanwhile Grant's moves had forced Lee to extend his defenses to 35 miles of fortifications.  With about 46,000 infantry to hold them (including the part-timers of the Richmond militia), backed up by 5,000 artillerymen and perhaps 6,000 cavalry (which had to be dispersed away from the two cities so the horses could forage) the line was everywhere thin.

Grant again planned multiple blows into the shrinking Confederacy.  Sherman was coming up from the Carolinas, Stoneman was to strike out of the Appalachians and hit the rear of the Confederate forces in North Carolina; Canby was advancing on Mobile, Alabama, with Wilson supposed to strike with his cavalry south into Alabama as well.  Meanwhile, he planned to open his own spring offensive on March 29, when he expected the roads would be passable after the winter rains.  He had about 101,000 infantry, 9,000 artillerymen, and almost 15,000 cavalry once Sheridan had arrived from the Valley.  Sheridan had done a bit more damage to railroads on his way over (Virginia railroads were already in bad shape) and linked up on March 26.  Sheridan refitted as much as he could in the few days available, and thousands of horses arrived at City Point from where Grant had sent them to winter.  But Grant had learned the terrible power of fortifications, and intended to turn the flank rather than attack head-on.

He re-organized the old Army of the James, separating Black and White troops into two corps; the Whites (now XXIV Corps) moved a little to the left, to free up the II and V Corps.  The Blacks (now XXV Corps) moved north, opposite Richmond.  Even before Gordon's sortie at Fort Stedman, Grant had moved II and V Corps to the left, around Hatcher's Run.  When Sheridan had his men more-or-less ready, Grant sent them out there too.  He wanted Sheridan to command the left wing, trusting the aggressiveness that had ripped up Confederate armies in the Shenandoah.

Sheridan moved out on schedule and on the 29th, the first day, encountered Confederates at LEWIS'S FARM.  He pushed them back to a stronger line along the White Oak Road.  Joshua Chamberlain was wounded by a bullet that cut through his horse's neck and hit him just over the heart - it's velocity was too low to kill him, but he was knocked out.  That night, and all of the 30th, it rained, slowing all movements on the narrow country roads of that sparsely-populated part of Virginia.

Lee had shifted all his available cavalry, three divisions under Fitz Lee, and bolstered them with George Pickett's infantry division from the Bermuda Hundred lines.  (He had to rob Peter to pay Paul, since his central reserve was tiny.) 
Sheridan was raring to go on the 31st, and fighting developed in two directions.  Around DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE the Confederates tried to counterattack, and gained some ground.  But Sheridan's cavalry repelled both cavalry and infantry, and thus held the key crossroads - from Dinwiddie Sheridan could head around the Rebel flank, or head northward and attack.  At WHITE OAK ROAD V Corps, supposed to be moving up to support Sheridan's cavalrymen, got tangled with Confederate infantry.  Attacks went back and forth, and Warren's men got disorganized and couldn't get to Sheridan in time.  Sheridan was angered, and he had a short fuze.

The next day the weather slowly improved, and Sheridan scouted the new Confederate line at FIVE FORKS.  By early afternoon he had his plan: feint to the west, hit the eastern end hard and grab the bridge that would both trap the Confederates and open the way to exploit the victory.  In a nutshell it happened, but in the confusion V Corps didn't do all Sheridan hoped, and he sacked Warren - the man the whole Army of the Potomac looked at as a Gettysburg hero.

Grant knew Lee was crippled, and would have to retreat.  Lee knew the same thing, but he also saw that he had to buy time.  For April 2 Grant ordered a division of Sheridan's force to attack north and make sure the South Side Railroad was cut, while most of the rest of the Army of the Potomac broke through Lee's weakened lines at Petersburg itself.

Miles' division hit battered remnants of the Five Forks force at SUTHERLAND'S STATION and broke through to the railroad.  In one way it didn't matter - Petersburg fell to the direct attack, not to the flanking pressure.  But with Grant on the railroad west of Petersburg, Lee had to fall back first north, then west: Grant was threatening Lee's path of retreat.

The main attack of the CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG didn't go like clockwork, but certainly did its job.  A dawn attack began on the right, attracting Confederate reserves.  Wright's VI Corps broke through and headed for the railroad (and the camps of the Confederate reserves, which got pillaged).  The IX Corps didn't actually break through, but they put Lee under tremendous pressure.  The outer defenses were all captured, and Lee's right flank was completely open, but the Union troops knew they had won a tremendous victory and didn't feel like risking their lives again - at least today.  Lee spent most of the afternoon organizing the retreat, and about 8pm the retreat began.

The news got to Richmond and there was some panic in the streets - suddenly a horse cost $1000 (in gold, Confederate money was worthless) while the official evacuation went reasonably well.  Official papers were packed or burned; the midshipmen from the Confederate Naval Academy escorted the gold and securities of the Confederate Treasury. 

On April 3 the 6th Wisconsin marched into Petersburg unopposed and hoisted the US flag before dawn.  Grant detached only one division to garrison the town (and round up any stragglers or subversives around) but swung the rest into column to pursue Lee.
Richmond was occupied the same day, by Black troops of XV Corps.  'Baldy' Ewell had been very thorough in carrying out his orders to destroy supplies, and the flames from burning warehouses spread - along with looters (and escaped convicts) who wanted to save something.  Ewell touched off the main magazine by the river and an estimated 750,000 shells provided probably the largest fireworks display in the country - and helped spread the fires.

So the Mayor, Joseph Mayo, was glad to have Union troops move in.  They restored order and fought the fires, even if the bands did play 'Battle Cry of Freedom'.  The news got to Washington, D.C. quickly and was rapturously received: there was an 800 gun salute (500 for Richmond, 300 for Petersburg) supplemented with 100 naval guns, church bells, and every steam whistle in town.

Back in Virginia the war was moving onwards.  Lee had moved west, with the Appomattox between his army and Grant's - but he had to move fast because some of Sheridan's men were already further west.  Lee arrived at Amelia Court House hoping to find rations waiting, as he'd asked the commissary department.  Instead, the hungry soldiers got hungrier; only ammunition was waiting, and the civilians couldn't spare anything, even after a personal appeal by Lee himself.  Lee knew the condition of his men - they needed food worse than ammunition, and he sent word ahead for rations to meet the army at Jetersville, down the railroad. But Sheridan intercepted the courier, which told him not only where Lee was moving and the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia.  On the 5th there was a cavalry battle around AMELIA SPRINGS, as the Federals intercepted Lee's supplies.  What was worse for him, the Union troops were in strength, and he had to march his tired, hungry men roundabout instead of the better road through Jetersville.  Grant could see the way the campaign was shaping, and that night started Ord's XXIV Corps towards Farmville, which he anticipated was Lee's next objective.

The 6th of April was the beginning of the end for the Army of Northern Virginia.  The exhausted men, many weakened by a long winter in the trenches, reservists with little esprit de corps, or from units that were all but destroyed at Five Forks, fought poorly.  Straggling increased dramatically as weakened men could no longer muster the strength or the will to stay in the ranks.  There were a number of battles that shaped the rest of the campaign.  At RICE'S STATION Longstreet was checked by Ord's men and had to move along north of the Appomattox River.

Just a little bit north, at SAYLER'S CREEK, a combination of Sheridan's cavalry and veteran infantry cut off a fair quarter of Lee's remaining men.  Appalled at the result, Lee muttered 'My God, has the army dissolved?'  He saved some men from the disaster behind Mahone's rearguard, and headed onward to Farmville.

Just on the outskirts of Farmville was perhaps the fiercest battle of the day.  Ord had sent a detachment to burn the key bridge - HIGH BRIDGE - and isolate the Confederates.  But Fitz Lee came charging up with grey-clad cavalry and caught the 900 Federals.  The bridge was saved for the Confederacy - until the next morning.

But that bought Lee a little time.  There were some supplies at Farmville, and Longstreet's men could start to cook a little, although the rearguard didn't have that luxury.  Even the main body had to turn around, throwing away part-cooked rations, and help the rearguard because Mahone did a lousy job of burning bridges.  He pulled back too soon, and Union troops scampered across and put out the flames unimpeded, so that Longstreet's men had to throw away their part-cooked rations and save the day. 

That staved off disaster, but with Grant's men on the north bank it meant no rest for the rebels.  Lee got his men out of Farmville after fighting in the streets. The moved up to CUMBERLAND CHURCH and beat back the Union pursuit throughout the 7th of April.

But Grant had around 80,000 men closing in.  On the evening of the 7th, Grant first proposed Lee surrender ('The results of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance…  '), but Lee wasn't ready ('… not entertaining the opinion you express of the hopelessness of further resistance …') and replied by asking the circumstances under which negotiations might occur.  Grant knew that negotiations were impossible - the Confederates had to surrender, not be treated as political equals.  He wrote back declining to negotiate, and Lee declined to surrender - yet.  So Grant continued the pursuit, with two infantry corps chasing Lee's men north of the river, while Sheridan's cavalry (supported by two more corps) cut straight to the next station

The 8th was full of marching rather than fighting.  Both sides were moving towards the next railway station west, Appomattox Station.  Bad news was coming thick and fast: Wilson was ripping through Alabama, and Stoneman had his men near Lynchburg, the source of Lee's dwindling supplies.  Lee called a council of war to consider what to do.  Guerrilla war was ruled out because it would end up with devastated countryside.  The supply train couldn't be abandoned to facilitate a quick retreat, because then the army would only be able to fight one battle, after which, without munitions, surrender would be automatic.  The third alternative was surrender, but Lee still refused to face the obvious.

I trust it has not come to that; we certainly have too many brave men to think of laying down our arms.  They still fight with great spirit whereas the enemy does not.  And besides, if I were to intimate to General Grant that I would listen to terms, he would at once regard it as such evidence of weakness that he would demand unconditional surrender, and sooner than that I am resolved to die.  Indeed, we must all be determined to die at our posts.

This was nonsense: the Union troops were fighting better than the Confederates, hundreds if not thousands of whom had already 'straggled' in the retreat west rather than die at their posts.  Lee did admit that the army was dwindling, and reorganized it into two corps (under Longstreet and Gordon, relieving among others George Pickett).

Meanwhile Sheridan had received news that trains were expected at Appomattox Station.  George Custer got there first, and the 2nd New York Cavalry captured four trains before word got back and no more arrived.  As Lee's advance guard moved closer to the station they scrapped with Custer's men, and drove them back a bit late on the 8th, but after dark Custer's men launched another attack and captured 20 guns from the reserve artillery.

Lee was surrounded.  To his west he could see the campfires of Sheridan's men.  To the east he knew there were two infantry corps marching fast.  His men were tired and hungry.  Grant's latest surrender proposal, offering generous terms, arrived after dark on the 8th.  Lee still would not see the obvious and replied '…  To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this Army …'.  But he did go on and suggest a meeting to talk about terms.

He intended one final fight to try and escape, and on the morning of April 9 Gordon's infantry and Fitz Lee's cavalry attacked westward, toward Appomattox Station.  They pushed Sheridan's cavalry back a bit, but then saw the lines of Union infantry formed and waiting, Gibbon's Corps and two brigades of African-American troops from the XXV Corps.

The game was up, and Lee asked for a truce.  It took a while before the white flags calmed everyone down, and it was afternoon before the meeting at APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE.  Grant offered lenient terms: officers could keep their personal arms (pistols and swords) and all ranks could keep their horses, so that the farmers could plow a crop that spring. 

It took a few days to parole all the Army of Northern Virginia, but Grant ordered up supplies and fed the rebels during the truce.  On April 12 the formalities were completed, and the southern troops headed home.  Their fellow soldiers in blue, fellow veterans, respected the difficult emotions and didn't rub in the defeat.
It took a few days for news to percolate down to North Carolina where Joe Johnston was still holding out.

Page 22

(Appomattox)