Page 20

(Sheridan's Valley Campaign)

Sheridan's Valley Campaign

The Shenandoah Valley was vital real estate in the Civil War.  Economically it was one of the nation's top wheat-growing regions (the Midwestern prairie was not yet broken to the plow) as well as a variety of other food crops.  Geographically it pointed just west of Washington, where the Potomac was readily forded; in a few days a Confederate army could move from Richmond by rail, march up the Shenandoah and outflank Washington.

The mere threat was usually enough to rattle the US War Department, and they took good care to see that the Shenandoah was well garrisoned.  Yet there were times when all their care didn't do the job.  Jackson's Valley Campaign in the early summer of 1862 had never really threatened Washington, but only because his army was so weak.  In September 1862 Lee had launched a major invasion of Maryland that was only checked by the bloodiest day of fighting in the war, at the Antietam creek.  In July 1863 Lee followed up his victory at Chancellorsville with yet another move up the Shenandoah, this time reaching into Pennsylvania before being brought to battle.

And it happened a third time in three years when Jubal Early had moved his corps up the Valley, this time not looking to move around Washington but definitely aiming to rampage into the Federal capitol.  This was too much for the powers in Washington; the Shenandoah was too dangerous to leave in Confederate hands; it had to be cleared once and for all - and steps taken so that even if it was ungarrisoned the Confederates wouldn't waltz north again.

The first step was to take the problem seriously.  Since everyone in Washington had felt the approach of Early's men to the western end of 7th Street, nobody took it lightly.  And the War Department did the right thing in reorganizing the command structure.  Previously the Confederates had the advantage because their forces in the Valley were under one commander, while up to four Union generals tried to coordinate their movements.  Now everything was to be under one man.  Grant ran down a mental checklist of officers for command and (after deciding against a few others) nominated Philip Sheridan to be that man.  It was a surprising choice, because Sheridan had not done brilliantly with the Army of the Potomac's cavalry although he had done very well as an infantry division commander in the west.  Still, Grant knew Sheridan was a fighter and that's what was needed.  There were some eyebrows raised in Washington about Sheridan (who was only 33) but he was approved.

The next step was to give Sheridan enough men.  Three corps (Wright's VI, Crook's VIII from the eastern theater, Emory's XIX pulled out of Louisiana to a more vital theater) were allotted and two cavalry divisions too, for a total of over 40,000 men.  Considering that Early had about 20,000 it looked to be plenty of men.  However, Lee could shuttle divisions back and forth to the Valley from Petersburg if he dared, so from time to time Early had substantially stronger forces.

On August 6, 1864 Sheridan took command of his new army.  His orders were to beat the Confederates in the Valley - but also to go through the Valley like a fine-toothed comb and 'take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for your command … such as cannot be consumed, destroy.'  The Union was taking the war to the Southern people, but also making sure that no future Confederate army could invade through the Shenandoah.  Also in keeping with Grant's bulldog focus on the enemy army, he was to follow the Confederates wherever they went.  Sheridan didn't need to worry about taking towns, or holding passes or anything other than the Confederate army in front of him.

Despite his fighting reputation, despite his aggressive instructions, Sheridan's first moves were cautious.  Grant got word that Richard Anderson's Confederate corps was being moved to the Valley which would radically alter the balance there, putting the Confederates at a rough numerical parity with Sheridan's men.  It also came at a time when Sheridan was an unknown quantity as an army commander, commanding a mixed bag of troops and many of those troops had just been whipped by Early.  Grant wired Sheridan to be cautious.  The report was exaggerated, only one division from Anderson's corps was moving west (Kershaw's, of South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi troops) and the scare was just a scare.

Sheridan had already begun a march down the Valley (and Early had avoided contact) as a shake-down of his new army, but once he got the word he withdrew back to the Harper's Ferry area.  Early maintained his relative position, and as Sheridan moved north so did the Confederates.  Despite a successful ambush of Kershaw's men at GUARD HILL, Early judged Sheridan a weak and tentative commander - a decision that he might later revise.  With his low regard of Sheridan, and his new reinforcements, Early tried to cut off part of the Union rearguard at SUMMIT POINT, but the Federals fought well and beat off the attacks.  Once Sheridan had his men clustered safely around Harper's Ferry Early kept the pressure on, although at SMITHFIELD CROSSING his infantry did little more than push the Union cavalry back a few miles.

By early September Sheridan was more comfortable with his troops and his staff, and started back down the Valley - but slowly.  Early still believed Sheridan cautious, and looked to hit the Union advance guard hard.  Not only would the victory be useful, but if he read Sheridan right it would provoke another quiet period.  But the fighting at BERRYVILLE was indecisive.  Sheridan was now in position east of Winchester, but his slow movements still left Early unconcerned.  Wanting to keep political pressure on Washington, he had most of his army in the northern Valley, where it might slip across the Potomac and head east or could raid the Baltimore & Ohio railroad, a key national transportation artery.

But Sheridan was planning something big.  Grant had arrived at his HQ, talking about reinforcing the Army of the Shenandoah for a big strike.  He'd received word from an abolitionist schoolmistress that Kershaw's division had just left the Valley (in response to pressure at Petersburg) which told him how weak Early's position was.  Early's deployment was aggressive but only one of his four divisions was in a position to block a Union attack.  Sheridan wanted to smash that one division - which would isolate the other three divisions for Sheridan to deal with later.  Grant considered the plan, then approved: 'Go in.'

Sheridan went in and hit Early hard.  Confederate casualties were about a quarter of their whole force, including 2,500 prisoners.  But thanks to slow Union deployment they didn't trap Early's army, and he withdrew behind his cavalry to Fisher's Hill, 20 miles further down the Valley.

After a day off to rest and reorganize, Sheridan moved his men down to look at Early's position.  A month before the armies had been in this exact position, except Early was just about to receive Kershaw's division as reinforcements and Sheridan was about to pull back to Harper's Ferry.  Nothing could be further from his mind now, although he was still hesitant to launch a frontal assault.  Federal skirmishers pushed Rebel pickets back across Tumbling Run, and Sheridan personally scouted the position.

He decided not to attack FISHER'S HILL head on, but sent an entire corps on a brilliantly successful flank attack.  Early's line crumpled and Sheridan was like a whirling dervish, driving his infantry to pursue the Rebels but not getting good results from the cavalry.  One cavalry major general was unceremoniously sent to West Virginia where he might - or might not - ever get another job.

Fisher's Hill wrecked Early's army for the time being, and Sheridan could turn to the other part of his orders.  He began confiscating and burning, resting his infantry and sending the cavalry to scour the countryside as far as Staunton and Waynesboro.  Grant was entranced by the strategic options open, and for a while urged Sheridan to move his whole army against Richmond.  Sheridan thought he didn't have enough wagons and Confederate partisans and raiders would cut his supply lines, and preferred to stick to his initial orders and cauterize the Shenandoah.  He did offer to send Grant one of the veteran infantry corps, which mollified Grant considerably.

So Sheridan's men spent the last week of September and the first week of October burning farms, barns, mills, and all public buildings that had survived the previous campaigns through the Shenandoah.  They drove herds of animals away, and liberated hundreds of slaves who would have been required to plant the spring crop of 1865.  Sheridan was thorough, and his men did their work with enthusiasm.  After only a few days his interim report was over 2000 barns burned, as well as other destruction.  Hundreds of civilians had to leave, not at gunpoint but because there was no way to feed themselves if they stayed.  Sadly, many were pacifists, Quakers, Mennonites and other German sects who didn't support the war but would sell to the Confederacy; by October 1864 there was no more room for neutrality.  Sheridan was making sure no more Southern armies would tramp up the Valley Turnpike.

Early tried to do what he could to limit Sheridan's depredations, but his army had been beaten twice - badly each time - and he had to keep his distance.  The cavalry did harass the Yankees, but at TOM'S BROOK the Federal horsemen (formerly ineffective in the Valley) turned the tables and demolished their grey-clad opponents.  Sheridan was mollified that his cavalry were at last fighting, and continued back up the Valley, shortening his supply lines and preparing to dispatch Wright's VI Corps to Petersburg.

But the Confederates had other plans.  Early had been reinforced (Kershaw's division was back, along with a cavalry brigade) and was feeling much more aggressive.  Each side knew the other's condition: Early knew Sheridan was sending a corps away, and Sheridan knew Early was reinforced.  But even reinforced, Early had about half the Federal strength, and Sheridan wasn't too worried.  Called to a strategy conference in Washington, he left the senior corps commander in charge.  But Lee was egging Early onwards: a letter from Petersburg warned Early that Lee had stripped his lines bare to reinforce the Shenandoah area, and that Early needed to win so that 1)troops could move back to Petersburg and 2)to neutralize the threat in the Shenandoah.

So Early was geared up to attack.  And he took advantage of a slight tactical opening in the Union position.  Deployed behind CEDAR CREEK, the Federal line relied on difficult terrain to cover the left (east) while the bulk of the troops were further west.  Early drew up a complicated plan to hit the eastern end of the Union line at dawn, and at first surprise tipped the balance; he routed the VIII Corps.  But the Confederates couldn't maintain their momentum, and gradually the Union line stabilized.  Then Sheridan returned - back from the Washington conference, he galloped once he heard the sounds of battle.  A powerful counterattack drove the Rebels off the battlefield, recapturing all they had taken in the morning and more.

Early's army was broken beyond repair.  It limped away, and the Union cavalry (after Sheridan's earlier tongue-lashings) was more effective in the pursuit.  He would have to send men back to Lee without having neutralized the Yankee army in the Valley, which was the last strategic option open to Lee.  Once the troops were back at Petersburg they didn't leave again, and Early's men were too few (and too demoralized after three straight defeats) to threaten Sheridan's army.

Sheridan had won three battles, although overall losing more men than Early, but done his job.  Confederate options were seriously narrowed, and there was no chance of a Rebel offensive out of the Shenandoah.  Plus the victories added to the tide swelling behind Lincoln's election campaign.

Page 20

(Sheridan's Valley Campaign)