Page 19

(Early's Raid)

Early's Raid

Lee had to reinforce the Shenandoah after Breckinridge had been beaten.  But he was thinking beyond the defensive for Early's Corps.  If they could push the Union forces back then they might advance up the river, almost in a replay of Jackson's Valley Campaign.  There were obstacles - notably Hunter's substantial forces - but real opportunities, because Grant had seriously depleted the garrisons.  Harper's Ferry had only a few thousand men, and Washington itself had only militia because Grant had pulled most of the men out to replace losses during his Overland Campaign.  There were three possibilities, all good for the South: Early might actually capture Washington, or he might cause Grant to send veterans north and relax the pressure on Petersburg, or Grant might be provoked into launching his men at Petersburg's fortifications.

Hunter did what Lee needed, and more: on making contact with Early he withdrew - but westward into West Virginia rather than north up the Shenandoah.  The road north was open.  He gave his men a day to rest, then they headed north, 14,000 strong.  He hoped to pick off Union garrisons at both Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, West Virginia.  But Franz Sigel bolted out of Martinsburg and carried the Harper's Ferry garrison away with him long before Early could get to him.  Early paused to supply himself from the Union depots (and issue new shoes), then crossed the same ferry Lee had used after Antietam.

He crossed first the Antietam battlefield, then moved through the pass at South Mountain and to Frederick - almost Lee's 1862 campaign in reverse.  His cavalry was off wrecking railroads (primarily the Baltimore & Ohio) or levying ransom from towns ($20,000 from Hagerstown) and not scouting.  His first opposition was the most serious battle in the campaign: MONOCACY.  Lew Wallace had assembled a scratch Union force and boldly moved west to fight and buy time.  He didn't win, but he did buy time: Early was delayed one day.

24 hours were enough.  When Early turned up at FORT STEVENS his men were too tired to make a serious attack.  After a day's rest they were ready - but Grant had moved two divisions of veterans back to Washington.  Early could tell circumstances had changed: instead of the motley uniforms of the variegated defenders, now there were the faded uniforms of veteran troops.  Early turned back, but not before Abraham Lincoln could watch the skirmishing.  The President stood on the earthworks, apparently a good target, but also a lucky one.  Eventually a cry of 'Get down, you damn fool' brought him to his senses and he let the soldiers do their job.

Early withdrew unharmed from Washington, back into the northern end of the Shenandoah, where Grant was determined to cut him off.  Two whole corps of the Army of the Potomac had been sent back (only the lead two divisions had turned up at Fort Stevens), and there were other forces as well: Sigel, Lew Wallace, and George Crook who had replaced David Hunter in West Virginia.  In theory they could advance from four directions and have Early in a vice - but like Stonewall Jackson, Early wasn't intending to be squeezed.

He swung at Wright's pursuit from Washington, and hit the nose of the Union column at COOL SPRINGS.  Losses were about even, but he'd discouraged the pursuit.  Three days later the tactical advantage went the other way at RUTHERFORD'S FARM and Early had to pull back down the Valley. 

Then Halleck (who was trying to coordinate the campaign from the end of a telegraph) made a mistake.  He thought it was over, and recalled Wright's veterans, intending to send them back to Grant.  Early had other ideas and smacked Crook at SECOND KERNSTOWN.  The losses weren't too heavy, but Crook's men were disorganized and fell back all the way behind the Potomac.  Early followed up, sending cavalry to raid Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.  The horsemen demanded $100,000 in gold (or a half-million in paper money) not to burn the business district, in retaliation for the burning of some private residences in Virginia.  The businessmen were tightfisted and the town center was put to the torch.  (The rebels were doubtless extra happy to burn Thaddeus Stevens' factories.)  On the way back the butternut cavalry damaged the B&O (skirmishing at FOLCK'S MILL) and made it back to Virginia empty handed.  They were also seriously embarrassed by their rout at MOOREFIELD, when they had been surprised and whipped by well-handled Union cavalry.  Casualties were not heavy, but the blow to Confederate morale and confidence - and the boost to the Union cavalry - would influence the future fighting in the Shenandoah.

Early's raid was over, but he still lurked in the Shenandoah.  He'd had a golden opportunity to seize Washington, but the loss of time at Monocacy had crippled things.  It was always a long shot, and Early's pause at Harper's Ferry may have been the real problem since Lew Wallace might not have been in position a day sooner - but Early's men needed the rest and they might have arrived at Washington too weak to do anything.  Early fought well during the withdrawal, and his success had serious repercussions.  Grant had to make a choice: take another risk on the Shenandoah and possibly Washington by concentrating on Petersburg, or slow down operations at Petersburg and make absolutely sure in the Shenandoah.  He took the conservative option and sent Sheridan for yet another Shenandoah Valley campaign.

Page 19

(Early's Raid)