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(Grant's Overland Campaign)

Grant's Overland Campaign

In February 1864 Grant had been promoted to Lieutenant General and Lincoln had decided - before he ever met Grant - to entrust him with actual command of the armies.  Lincoln would still be the constitutional Commander-in-chief, but Grant would send out the orders.  It was a mark of faith in Grant, not so much his fighting talents but his strategic sense.

What, then, did Grant propose to do?  He was going to concentrate Union efforts, which had been badly scattered in previous years as local commanders everywhere launched local offensives.  NP Banks was allowed to continue with his Shreveport expedition (that turned into the disastrous RED RIVER CAMPAIGN) but was then to advance on Mobile, Alabama.  The Texas coastal and Mississippi River garrisons were to be withdrawn or reduced to reinforce him.  Sherman was to attack Atlanta, with troops pulled from across the Midwest.  And finally in the east there was to be a combined campaign, with columns heading from West Virginia (which had yet to celebrate its first anniversary after splitting away from Virginia) into the Shenandoah; a strong army under Ben Butler to move up the James and operate against Richmond's rear.  And finally Grant would move with the Army of the Potomac, though the Army would stay under the command of Meade.

With Butler's troops and the Shenandoah columns having territorial objectives, Grant knew he needed to pin Lee's army down.  So he set Meade's objective as the Army of Northern Virginia: 'Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also.'  He wasn't going to let the lure of Richmond go to his head; if he beat Lee's army then Richmond would fall, but the reverse was not as certain.  And Grant knew he had a better army than Lee.  First there was more of it, and most of the units were veterans, with veteran commanders who had risen because of experience and competence.  Grant had about 105,000 men, with plenty of food, weapons, and equipment.  His artillery and horses were better than Lee's and his fond hope was to fight a field battle against Lee, without entrenchments or obstructive terrain getting in the way.  Lee had just over 60,000 men, but wearing down after years of war and scant supplies.  Already he'd had to detach his cavalry because the horses had eaten all the grass near the army; it was 30 miles away, a day away incase anything happened.

But Lee still had his sense of timing.  He knew Grant was coming, and divined the direction and date, even without cavalry to scout.  Grant was coming through The Wilderness, a region he hoped to cross before Lee could react- which would mean Lee would either fall back, or give battle in open terrain, just what Grant had long hoped.  But even on the defensive, Lee was still aggressive.  Expecting he could jump a part of Grant's army, and knowing that he needed a quick victory, he attacked into THE WILDERNESS.  The battle swayed back and forth for two days, with neither side coordinating its troops well.  Lee almost turned both of Grant's flanks, but the troops were exhausted by the savage fighting and had to contend with forest fires started by their gunfire.  Many wounded perished in the flames, unable to escape.

Grant had undoubtedly lost more men than Lee, and Lee had shown he was as aggressive and hard-fighting as ever, but Grant didn't give up.  First he sent his cavalry to draw away JEB Stuart, a move he anticipated would make his next move easier.  (It only worked part-way; Stuart took half his cavalry to chase Sheridan, and Sheridan wasn't yet the cavalry commander he would become.  He won a tactical victory at YELLOW TAVERN, including the death of Stuart, but was away from the Army of the Potomac for fifteen days, leaving Grant and Meade largely blind.)

That next move was not the retreat (or politely, withdrawal) that had characterized Union armies in Virginia.  Grant knew he had to keep fighting to beat Lee, and he also knew it would be foolish to keep pounding in The Wilderness.  So he started moving, southeast in a way that threatened both Richmond and Lee's flank.  Grant has been called both a butcher who indulged in costly battles, and a maneuver commander; in fact he was both.  He knew that no matter how much he maneuvered he would have to fight, and he knew that through maneuver he could fight more favorable battles.

But his objective was SPOTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, a key road junction.  And because he had moved on Lee's eastern flank, he was actually closer to Spotsylvania than Lee was.  But lack of cavalry cost him dearly.  Confederate horse, some of the troops Stuart left behind, slowed the advance and allowed infantry to trickle into the line.  There were always just enough Rebels to match Yankee reinforcements, and Grant had failed to turn Lee's flank.  If he couldn't get around Lee, he was still going to try and break through.  Several attacks failed, some hopelessly, some narrowly and with heavy fighting and losses for both sides.  Tactical innovation was rare during the Civil War, but Emory Upton tried new tactics at Spotsylvania Court House that almost worked.  At least the attack at the Mule Shoe broke through, threatening to snap Lee's line- but Lee launched such savage counterattacks that the name today is Bloody Angle.

Both sides licked their wounds for several days and Grant puzzled at what to do next.  For Lee it was easier: he'd lost so many men that he could hardly risk another attack like The Wilderness, so he had to stay on the defensive.  Grant decided to move again, trying to lure Lee into an attack by sending one Corps substantially ahead of the rest in another flanking move.  However, Lee was relatively cautious and both sides moved to the NORTH ANNA River without much more than skirmishing.  Once there the Confederates established a very strong position, and Grant groped into a risky deployment that could have been disastrous, but Lee stomach was in an uproar and he couldn't exploit the slim opportunity.  (Meanwhile the Confederate cavalry on the eastern flank was trying to interrupt Grant's supplies, which were coming by boat along the numerous Virginia rivers.  At WILSON'S WHARF a cavalry attack was thwarted, and soon Lee found he needed all his men with the army.)

Checked at the North Anna, Grant decided to keep going south and east.  Sheridan's cavalry were now back, and they went ahead (and at HAW'S SHOP fought a day-long battle) to cover the advance to the Pamunkey River.  Lee watched the whole affair and moved to the TOTOPOTOMY CREEK, a tributary to the Pamunkey.  Grant probed a few times, but decided not to make any major attacks in the mucky terrain.  Instead he started yet another turning movement, trying one more time to get around Lee's right.  Again the cavalry were the first in action (at OLD CHURCH) and again the Confederates managed to stay a step ahead of the Federals.

Which brought the two armies to COLD HARBOR.  Grant  was feeling a little cocky, because Lee had dug so many trenches lately he reckoned that the Confederate infantry had lost their edge- so he decided to break through to Richmond.  He also had substantial reinforcements (troops he'd summoned from Butler's static Army of the James) and was running out of room to make another left hook.  All things pointed to trying a breakthrough, so he ordered one for dawn, then had to postpone it a day thanks to tired, slow-moving troops.  When they finally did attack the Rebels had entrenched again, but did fight fiercely.  The first Union wave was smashed, with tremendous casualties.  There was no chance that the men could be persuaded to make another advance (and if they had it would only have raised the casualty total) but Grant wouldn't ask for a truce to recover the wounded.
Only after dark could the Federals move back, and the survivors crept gratefully away.  Grant dug in, thinking about what he would do next because it was obvious that Lee's men would still fight.  There still wasn't enough room between Lee's flank and the James River for a turning movement, so Grant decided to do something far bolder: cross the James and attack not Richmond, but Petersburg.  This would have much the same effect because without the railroads that funneled through Petersburg, Richmond would have to be evacuated.  Yet he had to find a way to keep Lee's army away while the Army of the Potomac crossed the James- otherwise he was sure Lee would wait and attack his rearguard.

The solution was to make sure that Lee never learned what was going on, and that meant Lee's cavalry had to be distracted.  At no point in the campaign had Sheridan been able to simply push the Rebel horsemen back, so Grant decided to send him on a raid to draw Lee's cavalry away rather than trying to push it away.  The raid would also damage the railroads and was intended to take Sheridan out into the Shenandoah where he could do even more mischief.  All in all it was a good plan, and Sheridan dutifully rode away.  But at TREVILIAN STATION the Confederates blocked the way in a two day battle.  The first day was a confused melee, and the second saw more organized violence but little positive results for the Union.  Wade Hampton, Stuart's replacement, earned his spurs and Sheridan had to return the way he came.  And Hampton chased after him, looking to add injury to insult.  At ST MARY'S CHURCH he nipped at Sheridan's rearguard, but was driven back.  Sheridan got safely back to the James, where navy gunboats could keep pesky Confederates at bay.

Meanwhile Grant had indeed crossed the James, on the war's biggest pontoon bridge, and marched to Petersburg.  But he couldn't break the defenses, and had to settle down to a siege that would last until the first days of spring, 1865.

Page 18

(Grant's Overland Campaign)