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Bristoe
Station Campaign
After the retreat from
Gettysburg, Lee concentrated his army behind the Rapidan River in Orange
County. Meade advanced to Rappahannock River in August, and in mid-
September pushed strong columns forward to confront Lee along the Rapidan.
In early September, Lee took a chance on Meade staying passive and dispatched
Longstreet with two divisions and the artillery of his Corps to reinforce the
Bragg's army in Georgia. The gamble paid off; Meade did not attack Lee,
and the only Union move was to similarly send troops to the west, XI and XII
Corps going Tennessee by rail in late September after the Battle of Chickamauga
(September 18-20).
Lee always favored the offensive, and thought he was taking the measure of
Meade. In early October, Lee began an offensive sweep around Meade's right
flank with his remaining two corps (Ewell and A.P. Hill), forcing the Federals
to withdraw along the line of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Meade
was not going to get caught as Pope had, halfway along the railroad with room
for the Confederates behind him.
J.E.B. Stuart was back in top form, effectively screening Lee's movement and
providing plenty of intelligence. He was probably feeling the shame of his
independent operations in the Gettysburg Campaign, because he bombarded Lee with
reports, keeping his staff officers busy as couriers. He fought the
improved Union cavalry and infantry twice around AUBURN, neither time gaining
much advantage nor biting anything off the main Union columns.
After a few days marching it was clear Lee wasn't going to get around Meade's
rear, but he still he hopes to pick off some part of the Union rearguard.
He selected the aggressive Hill's Corps to take the lead and pointing to BRISTOE
STATION as a good point to try and pounce. Meade had not allowed his
forces to spread out; all the Corps stayed compact, nor was there much space
between Corps. So when, at noon on October 14, Hill spotted a Union Corps
halfway over the Broad Run, the situation was not all the Confederates thought.
Hill saw a vulnerable half -Corps, waiting for him to pounce, and he lost no
time: Heth's division was instantly told to deploy, and attacked with half his
men when it seemed there wasn't any more time available. But Hill had
missed Warren's II Corps, deployed along a railway cut. The two brigade
charge was smashed with heavy casualties and many prisoners left to the Union.
After this victory, the Federal withdrawal to Centreville was unmolested.
Lee's Bristoe offensive sputtered to a premature halt. After minor
skirmishing near Manassas and Centreville, (including a cavalry ambush at
BUCKLAND MILLS the Confederates gleeful called the 'Buckland Races') the
Confederates retired slowly to the Rappahannock destroying the Orange &
Alexandria Railroad as they went.
At Bristoe Station, Hill lost standing in the eyes of Lee, who angrily
ordered him to bury his dead and say no more about it. Lee eventually
pulled back behind the Rappahannock, but left a fortified bridgehead at
Rappahannock Station to disrupt Union deployments. Meade was slow to move
back south, but turned up on November 5, and probed at Lee's
fortifications. Receiving confident reports, Lee was little worried by a
dusk engagement, but it was in fact bad news. He'd lost two regiments
overrun at Kelly's Ford and most of two brigades at RAPPAHANNOCK STATION.
He fell back behind the Rapidan, substantially worse off than he was before
beginning the campaign.
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