Page 8

(Antietam)

Antietam

A short week after whipping Pope's army as Second Bull Run, Lee decided it was time to take the war into the North.  He had several reasons.  Most important were the political ones: he reckoned that an advance would prove the magnitude of Pope's defeat.  If the Union armies merely clustered to defend Washington, the Confederacy would gain immense credibility in Europe - perhaps even diplomatic recognition.  Recognition would break the blockade, ensuring adequate supplies of food, industrial machinery, and munitions.  It might even bring European intervention, forcing the Union to defend the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, diverting energy away from the invasion of the South.

There was also domestic politics on Lee's mind.  Maryland was a slave state, and her adherence to the Union was shaky.  There was the chance that a substantial Confederate presence would convince Maryland to join the Confederacy, isolating Washington, DC.  His presence in Maryland would also undermine the credibility of Lincoln's government - especially if he could stay there for an extended period.  With Congressional elections due in November, Lee wanted to see more Democrats elected to weaken the Union war effort.  Victories on Union soil would count far more in the election campaign than repelling another Union attack.

In the short run, Lee was confident of more modest gains.  He would be able to recruit pro-Confederate Marylanders.  He would be in a fresh region around harvest time, and could purchase or impress crops, horses, wagons, shoes - all sorts of material.  At the same time Virginia farmers would be able to gather their crops and Confederate purchasing agents would secure food for the winter ahead.  Union garrisons - notably that at Harper's Ferry - could also be gobbled up and exchanged for Confederate prisoners.

In all this Lee was counting on two things: first that the Army of the Potomac would stay demoralized, second that it would deploy defensively, covering Washington rather than chasing him into the field.  If he stayed on the offensive, kept the initiative, he could maneuver, harvest, capture, fight where he chose, and withdraw victorious.  This was a risk, especially since his army was badly reduced from a long series of battles - and almost as seriously from straggling.  Losses facing McClellan outside Richmond had been over 20,000, and chasing Pope in northern Virginia had cost another 10,000 or so; yet there were roughly 15,000  who had dropped from the ranks here and there.

So on the morning of Thursday, September 4, 1862, the dirty, ragged Army of Northern Virginia splashed across the shallow Potomac fords just north of Leesburg to the strains of 'Maryland, My Maryland.'  Two days later 'Stonewall' Jackson's advance force of 5,000 men marched down Market Street in Frederick and camped north of town. The remainder of Lee's 40,000-man army soon followed.
In Frederick, Lee drafted a Proclamation to the People of Maryland, urging them to join the Southern movement.  For a few days Lee's troops, upon strict orders not to pillage and forfeit local sympathy, bought food and all the shoes and clothing they could find at the stores in town. But soon it became obvious that the citizens of Frederick, though polite, had no sympathy for the Southern cause.  In fact, pro-Southern sympathy was mainly in eastern Maryland; Lee had misjudged where his supporters were.

So Lee revised his plans.  He split his forces in four.  Jackson would take six divisions (22,000 men) to eliminate the 12,000-strong Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry.  The remaining three divisions (18,000 men under Longstreet)  would spread out northwest, over the Catoctin and South Mountain ranges to Boonsboro and Hagerstown, a distance of 25 miles.
Jackson was scheduled to rejoin Lee and Longstreet at Hagerstown. Then, using the mountain ranges to shield his right flank, Lee could move the combined army northeast, up the rail line to Harrisburg, a key Union rail center.  Early on Wednesday morning, September 10, Lee's forces began leaving Frederick on their separate ways.

Three things combined to wreck Lee's plans.  McClellan reorganized and revitalized the Army of the Potomac in days, rather than weeks.  He arrived in Frederick just two days after Lee left.  Second, the garrison at Harper's Ferry stood and fought rather than fleeing.  (It was ordered to hold out until reinforcements arrived, but that was pie in the sky thinking against fast-moving Confederate columns.)  Third,  a copy of Lee's plan of campaign (Special Order 191) was picked up, in an envelope and wrapped around three cigars, by a Union private in an abandoned Confederate campsite the next day.  McClellan not only had his army in the field, he knew exactly what Lee had in mind, and could move to pick the Army of Northern Virginia apart piece-by-piece.  He boasted 'Here is a piece of paper with which if I cannot whip Bobby Lee I will be willing to go home.'

When Lee learned that McClellan's army was moving westward from Frederick - sooner and faster than he'd expected -  he realized his perilous position.  He improvised.  Troops went to block the three main passes over South Mountain; Longstreet's northernmost men were ordered to fall back to support the thin line at the mountain passes.  Jackson was warned of developments, in hopes that he could wrap things up at Harper's Ferry or at least save as many men as possible.

McClellan had the golden opportunity, but didn't squeeze very hard.  He saw that the South Mountain passes were the key terrain, and pointed his army there, expecting to break through and trap Lee's northern-most elements.  But on September 14 at SOUTH MOUNTAIN he didn't use all his available men.  Badly outnumbered as Lee's forces were, they held just long enough.

Longstreet force-marched his men south, but didn't reinforce the defenders at South Mountain because he thought his men too exhausted to be useful.  Instead he headed for Sharpsburg, the hub of local roads.  The South Mountain remnants could fall back to him and Jackson's men could join up soon.  McClellan didn't do much with his partial victory at South Mountain, moving his large columns through the narrow passes and deploying slowly on the ridge east of Antietam Creek.

The delay meant several things.  The least important was a bit of time for Longstreet's men to recover.  More important was time for Jackson to capture HARPER'S FERRY and bring his troops up to join the main army.  The garrison was badly commanded and badly positioned.  Harper's Ferry is overlooked by three sets of hills and the garrison only occupied one.  Jackson (familiar with the area since he'd operated there in the early days of the war) deployed guns on the other two, then quickly ejected the Union troops from the third.  Penned in, their senior officer killed (which saved him a court-martial for stupidity), the Union troops surrendered on the 15th.  McClellan hadn't saved them, and Jackson immediately started several divisions marching north - to Sharpsburg.

So Lee got the bulk of his men in position.  In the late afternoon of the 16th the Union right, under Hooker, pushed forward a little and there was skirmishing on the northern end of Lee's line.  It wasn't much, and nothing like what was going to come the next day, the battle of ANTIETAM.

After the battle Lee was still pugnacious, and prepared a shorter line in case McClellan wanted to fight Round 2.  McClellan didn't.  His army was badly hurt, and he was one of the generals who could only see his own problems, never imagine that the enemy had any.  After a quiet day (quiet except for the wounded, many of whom were evacuated, often painfully, on this day) Lee began his withdrawal to Virginia.  There was some skirmishing that might have been trouble for either side at SHEPHERDSTOWN but in the end it was much ado about little.  The Confederate rear-guard escaped mostly unharmed and didn't do much damage to what McClellan sent as in 'pursuit'.

The campaign had achieved nobody's aims.  Lee hadn't raised volunteers and hadn't won anything beyond a tactical victory, nothing to cause despair in the North.  McClellan had the conditions for victory handed to him on a platter but hadn't done much with the opportunity.  Lincoln plucked the only plum from the pie, taking the opportunity to declare a victory and his new policy of Emancipation.
Antietam

A short week after whipping Pope's army as Second Bull Run, Lee decided it was time to take the war into the North.  He had several reasons.  Most important were the political ones: he reckoned that an advance would prove the magnitude of Pope's defeat.  If the Union armies merely clustered to defend Washington, the Confederacy would gain immense credibility in Europe - perhaps even diplomatic recognition.  Recognition would break the blockade, ensuring adequate supplies of food, industrial machinery, and munitions.  It might even bring European intervention, forcing the Union to defend the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, diverting energy away from the invasion of the South.

There was also domestic politics on Lee's mind.  Maryland was a slave state, and her adherence to the Union was shaky.  There was the chance that a substantial Confederate presence would convince Maryland to join the Confederacy, isolating Washington, DC.  His presence in Maryland would also undermine the credibility of Lincoln's government - especially if he could stay there for an extended period.  With Congressional elections due in November, Lee wanted to see more Democrats elected to weaken the Union war effort.  Victories on Union soil would count far more in the election campaign than repelling another Union attack.

In the short run, Lee was confident of more modest gains.  He would be able to recruit pro-Confederate Marylanders.  He would be in a fresh region around harvest time, and could purchase or impress crops, horses, wagons, shoes - all sorts of material.  At the same time Virginia farmers would be able to gather their crops and Confederate purchasing agents would secure food for the winter ahead.  Union garrisons - notably that at Harper's Ferry - could also be gobbled up and exchanged for Confederate prisoners.

In all this Lee was counting on two things: first that the Army of the Potomac would stay demoralized, second that it would deploy defensively, covering Washington rather than chasing him into the field.  If he stayed on the offensive, kept the initiative, he could maneuver, harvest, capture, fight where he chose, and withdraw victorious.  This was a risk, especially since his army was badly reduced from a long series of battles - and almost as seriously from straggling.  Losses facing McClellan outside Richmond had been over 20,000, and chasing Pope in northern Virginia had cost another 10,000 or so; yet there were roughly 15,000  who had dropped from the ranks here and there.

So on the morning of Thursday, September 4, 1862, the dirty, ragged Army of Northern Virginia splashed across the shallow Potomac fords just north of Leesburg to the strains of 'Maryland, My Maryland.'  Two days later 'Stonewall' Jackson's advance force of 5,000 men marched down Market Street in Frederick and camped north of town. The remainder of Lee's 40,000-man army soon followed.
In Frederick, Lee drafted a Proclamation to the People of Maryland, urging them to join the Southern movement.  For a few days Lee's troops, upon strict orders not to pillage and forfeit local sympathy, bought food and all the shoes and clothing they could find at the stores in town. But soon it became obvious that the citizens of Frederick, though polite, had no sympathy for the Southern cause.  In fact, pro-Southern sympathy was mainly in eastern Maryland; Lee had misjudged where his supporters were.

So Lee revised his plans.  He split his forces in four.  Jackson would take six divisions (22,000 men) to eliminate the 12,000-strong Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry.  The remaining three divisions (18,000 men under Longstreet)  would spread out northwest, over the Catoctin and South Mountain ranges to Boonsboro and Hagerstown, a distance of 25 miles.
Jackson was scheduled to rejoin Lee and Longstreet at Hagerstown. Then, using the mountain ranges to shield his right flank, Lee could move the combined army northeast, up the rail line to Harrisburg, a key Union rail center.  Early on Wednesday morning, September 10, Lee's forces began leaving Frederick on their separate ways.

Three things combined to wreck Lee's plans.  McClellan reorganized and revitalized the Army of the Potomac in days, rather than weeks.  He arrived in Frederick just two days after Lee left.  Second, the garrison at Harper's Ferry stood and fought rather than fleeing.  (It was ordered to hold out until reinforcements arrived, but that was pie in the sky thinking against fast-moving Confederate columns.)  Third,  a copy of Lee's plan of campaign (Special Order 191) was picked up, in an envelope and wrapped around three cigars, by a Union private in an abandoned Confederate campsite the next day.  McClellan not only had his army in the field, he knew exactly what Lee had in mind, and could move to pick the Army of Northern Virginia apart piece-by-piece.  He boasted 'Here is a piece of paper with which if I cannot whip Bobby Lee I will be willing to go home.'

When Lee learned that McClellan's army was moving westward from Frederick - sooner and faster than he'd expected -  he realized his perilous position.  He improvised.  Troops went to block the three main passes over South Mountain; Longstreet's northernmost men were ordered to fall back to support the thin line at the mountain passes.  Jackson was warned of developments, in hopes that he could wrap things up at Harper's Ferry or at least save as many men as possible.

McClellan had the golden opportunity, but didn't squeeze very hard.  He saw that the South Mountain passes were the key terrain, and pointed his army there, expecting to break through and trap Lee's northern-most elements.  But on September 14 at SOUTH MOUNTAIN he didn't use all his available men.  Badly outnumbered as Lee's forces were, they held just long enough.

Longstreet force-marched his men south, but didn't reinforce the defenders at South Mountain because he thought his men too exhausted to be useful.  Instead he headed for Sharpsburg, the hub of local roads.  The South Mountain remnants could fall back to him and Jackson's men could join up soon.  McClellan didn't do much with his partial victory at South Mountain, moving his large columns through the narrow passes and deploying slowly on the ridge east of Antietam Creek.

The delay meant several things.  The least important was a bit of time for Longstreet's men to recover.  More important was time for Jackson to capture HARPER'S FERRY and bring his troops up to join the main army.  The garrison was badly commanded and badly positioned.  Harper's Ferry is overlooked by three sets of hills and the garrison only occupied one.  Jackson (familiar with the area since he'd operated there in the early days of the war) deployed guns on the other two, then quickly ejected the Union troops from the third.  Penned in, their senior officer killed (which saved him a court-martial for stupidity), the Union troops surrendered on the 15th.  McClellan hadn't saved them, and Jackson immediately started several divisions marching north - to Sharpsburg.

So Lee got the bulk of his men in position.  In the late afternoon of the 16th the Union right, under Hooker, pushed forward a little and there was skirmishing on the northern end of Lee's line.  It wasn't much, and nothing like what was going to come the next day, the battle of ANTIETAM.

After the battle Lee was still pugnacious, and prepared a shorter line in case McClellan wanted to fight Round 2.  McClellan didn't.  His army was badly hurt, and he was one of the generals who could only see his own problems, never imagine that the enemy had any.  After a quiet day (quiet except for the wounded, many of whom were evacuated, often painfully, on this day) Lee began his withdrawal to Virginia.  There was some skirmishing that might have been trouble for either side at SHEPHERDSTOWN but in the end it was much ado about little.  The Confederate rear-guard escaped mostly unharmed and didn't do much damage to what McClellan sent as in 'pursuit'.

The campaign had achieved nobody's aims.  Lee hadn't raised volunteers and hadn't won anything beyond a tactical victory, nothing to cause despair in the North.  McClellan had the conditions for victory handed to him on a platter but hadn't done much with the opportunity.  Lincoln plucked the only plum from the pie, taking the opportunity to declare a victory and his new policy of Emancipation.

Page 8

(Antietam)