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(Pensinsula Campaign)

Peninsula Campaign

The Peninsula Campaign is testimony that to beat an army you really need to beat the commander.  McClellan had a wonderful strategic plan, and his subordinates were usually tactically successful - but Lee won the campaign despite losing most of the battles.

After molding the Army of the Potomac over the winter of 1861-62, McClellan was the most popular general in the east.  His men adored him; most politicians deferred to his strategic judgment.  Yet the plan he produced would earn him accusations of treason.

He had been too quiet over the winter of 1861-62, even sat still while the Confederates blockaded the Potomac with batteries on the south bank.  McClellan's 'big idea' was to swing downriver to Urbanna, putting himself in Joe Johnston's left rear - actually between Johnston and Richmond.  But Johnston moved first, abandoned his camps, and pulled back to the Rappahannock.  McClellan was left looking foolish when he marched out of Washington and found the fortifications were studded with wooden mock-guns.

So McClellan extended his amphibious hook.  He intended to move the army by sea around to the peninsula between the James and York Rivers in eastern Virginia.  The army would have a secure base, the Navy could cover the flanks, it would be much closer to Richmond, and there wouldn't be a lot of natural defenses in the way.  (The Navy's ability to cover the flanks had been demonstrated at HAMPTON ROADS.  The CSS Virginia - according to rumor a world-beater - had been checkmated by the little USS Monitor.)  McClellan contrasted this with the terrain between Richmond and Washington: if he headed due south, he would have to follow the rail lines which exposed his flank and supply lines to the constant threat of attack from the Shenandoah; he had over 100 miles to go in a straight line, but couldn't move in a straight line because of the layout of the railroads; all the rivers ran mainly east-west, so that each one would be a defensive barrier and the Confederate army could fall back from one river to the next as if little had happened.

But rabid Republicans in Congress took alarm that the Democrat McClellan wanted to take the army away from Washington.  What did he really have in mind?  If Washington fell, it would be a catastrophic blow to the Federal Government both at home and abroad.  McClellan slowly, repeatedly, explained his reasons and won grudging approval.  He had to leave a substantial garrison in Washington - and on the eve of his departure bewailed the nervous politicians who snatched yet another division away from him.

Lincoln had been unhappy with McClellan's lack of action over the winter and took the opportunity to clip the general's wings when, on March 17, he began embarking troops.  No longer would McClellan command the US Army, nor even all the forces in the eastern theater.  He would only command the Army of the Potomac, and Lincoln nervously sliced off one-third of the infantry to protect Washington.  (One Corps would cover Washington direct, another division would try and retrieve the mess in the Shenandoah that Stonewall Jackson was making.)  So McClellan was put ashore with 'only' 92,000 men, about twice what Johnston had in his army and far more than the Confederates had in the region.

Yet McClellan never had enough of anything except excuses for delay.  Now the Navy provided one: they couldn't move up the York River because of batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point.  To be fair, McClellan's first instinct was aggressive: he would outflank Yorktown by pushing straight up the Peninsula.  But he didn't have a good map and he didn't know about the Confederate defensive line behind the (deliberately dammed) Warwick River.  John Magruder, Confederate commander in Tidewater, had built a good line and handled his men ably.  McClellan was always overestimating Confederate strength, and Magruder played to this by marching his men around, playing music, having the men cheer, and remaining vigilant everywhere.  But in a siege, time would tell, and McClellan (who'd been an observer to the siege of Sevastopol in the Crimean War) did his job thoroughly.  Magruder was good to the last drop, and pulled out the night before the heavy batteries opened fire.

That cost McClellan a month.  He was anxious to pursue quickly, and set his cavalry on Johnston's heels, but at WILLIAMSBURG Longstreet's rearguard bought the needed time.  McClellan tried to use his amphibious advantage and hook around via ELTHAM'S LANDING, but Johnston had foreseen the threat and the division he detached checked the Union advance there.  Johnston withdrew up the Peninsula without further ado, which annoyed Jefferson Davis who was wondering just where his general would fight.

McClellan was taking advantage of some of the opportunities that developed.  He not only advanced up the Peninsula on Richmond (and developed a massive supply base at White House) he occupied Norfolk which had become isolated.  This forced the scuttling of the Virginia and perhaps prompted another river expedition.  The Navy went up the James to see how close they could get to Richmond - if they could get all the way to Richmond they could not only shell vital munitions plants but likely destroy key railroad bridges, as well as humiliate the Confederate government.  But foreseeing problems downriver, the Confederates had a strong fort at DREWRY'S BLUFF.  The wooden ships in John Rodgers' flotilla prudently stayed out of range while the fort beat a tattoo on the ironclads.  Monitor couldn't elevate her guns high enough to shell the bluff, while Galena had her high sides riddled.  So the James was blocked, and McClellan would have to fight to get into Richmond.

McClellan was still moving slowly; it was not until May 20th that the main body arrived at the Chickahominy, not a major river but one with broad marshes that lay mainly on the Union left.  Since McClellan chronically believed himself short of manpower, he intended to move to his right, across the Chickahominy swamps, and reach out to McDowell's Corps around Fredericksburg.  (Meanwhile, Lee had urged and Davis had agreed to reinforce Jackson in the Valley in order to draw troops away from Richmond.  It worked; on the 24th Lincoln ordered 20,000 of McDowell's men to head west, away from Richmond.)  McClellan was kept informed, and knew that McDowell's strength had been slashed, but he acted only slowly.  He kept three of his five Corps on the north side of the swamps, and on May 27th sent Fitz John Porter's Corps to sweep away the Confederates on the otherwise open flank.  Porter sparred with J R Anderson's division around HANOVER COURT HOUSE and did their job.  Not only did they inflict heavier casualties, they drove the Confederates back towards Richmond.

By now Johnston had around 63,000 men in the defenses of Richmond, but he knew that if it became a siege he would lose.  His President was also growing more upset, and wondering what it would take to force a battle: Johnston was defensive by nature.  Yet the circumstances were good for an attack: McClellan had his army straddling the Chickahominy swamps.  Two corps were on the south side, the bulk on the north - and few bridges in between.  But SEVEN PINES was not fought well and the moment was wasted.  Except that Joe Johnston was wounded.

If a wounded commander could be good news then Johnston's wound at Seven Pines was amongst the best ever, for it brought Robert E. Lee to command.  His first moves were uncharacteristically defensive: he improved Richmond's fortifications.  So far in the war Lee had achieved little: in western Virginia his campaign was a flop; he had successfully organized the coast defenses of Georgia and South Carolina; he'd advised Jeff Davis about strategy.  None of this played well in the headlines, and from his days in the Deep South he picked up the nickname of 'King of Spades' to which he was now adding.
But he had something more daring in mind.  On June 12 he sent JEB Stuart to scout McClellan's northern flank.  Lee was contemplating an attack, and wanted to know what he would face up there.  Stuart took a full brigade (about 1,100 riders) not just around the Union flank, but around the whole army.  In three days he marched 150 miles, destroyed supplies, captured several hundred prisoners, and came back with the desired intelligence.  He also came back with almost his entire command: he lost only one man.

Lee now had the necessary information and a bold plan.  Where Johnston had attacked the Union left he would reverse things.  McClellan's right flank was in the air, and bold marching and attack could not only catch the Yankee right against the Chickahominy swamps but get between the army and its supply base at White House.  Then the only place to go would be south to the James, and Lee dreamed of penning up the whole Army of the Potomac and forcing a massive surrender.
To make it happen the Confederacy drew troops from all over.  The Governors of Georgia and the Carolinas had to part with 17,000 men.  Jackson's Army of the Valley was brought to Richmond as fast as the trains could roll.  And Richmond's improved defenses meant Lee could thin his right to concentrate troops for his left hook.
Meanwhile McClellan had shifted the bulk of his army south of the Chickahominy; there was only one corps (plus the cavalry that had just proved itself ineffective) north of the Chickahominy.

Lee drew up relatively complicated plans that came unglued because of terrain and fatigue: Jackson's valley troops had to clear the roads and Jackson was himself tired, to tired to drive his men as hard as normal.  So what should have been a flanking movement turned into an expensive frontal attack at BEAVER DAM CREEK.  The next day was the 27th, and Lee had four large divisions to send into the attack on Porter's men, who'd fallen back to GAINES' MILL.  The fighting was long and hard, and Union reinforcements were sucked in from the south but could not stem the Confederates last attack.  Over 2,000 men and 20 guns were captured, but Porter got the majority of his men back over the Chickahominy intact, if shaken.  (To keep McClellan from moving more men north against the main attack, Lee had Magruder feint at GARNETT'S AND GOLDING'S FARMS.  It worked fairly well, mainly because McClellan was so cautious.)

Now McClellan had an enormously difficult task: he changed his base while under attack.  With the Confederates to his right threatening to cut his supply lines he moved his wagon trains down to the James (which might have been a better starting point) while he used the terrain advantages to help hold off Lee's attack.  Lee actually sat still a day because he couldn't be sure what McClellan would do.  Little Mac might move closer to White House and reopen his supplies that way; he might pull back down the Peninsula toward Fort Monroe; or he might indeed head to the James.  So the 28th was quiet, except for a little more probing by Magruder. 

By the 29th Lee had divined McClellan's movement, and tried to pounce.  Everyone was ordered to converge, Magruder from south of the Chickahominy and the rest from the north; Magruder's pressure would make it easier for the rest to cross the swamps.  But Jackson continued lethargic and wasted time rebuilding the bridge the Yankees had burnt behind them.  So SAVAGE'S STATION was another tactical frustration for Lee.

By the 30th McClellan had everybody safely behind the Chickahominy; there was nothing for Lee to cut off.  With over 5,000 wagons pulling back he still needed time to get them to the James and left two divisions to cover the Chickahominy (to prevent the Rebels building quick bridges) and deployed most of the rest around GLENDALE.  The rearguard held off Jackson at WHITE OAK SWAMP, while at Glendale the Confederate attack was not only smaller from Jackson's (and DH Hill's) absence, the remaining divisions fought too loosely and each attack was driven back.  Still, the fighting was fierce, and continued until after dark, but the Union line held. 

McClellan pulled back one more step for July 1, to MALVERN HILL.  It was a superb defensive position, and problems in the Army of Northern Virginia gave the Union artillery a field day.  The Confederate reserve artillery never deployed, leaving the divisional batteries to be crushed individually; when Lee mistook a Union movement and ordered an infantry attack the Union guns flayed the grey lines.

Yet still McClellan fell back, this time to an impervious position around his new supply base, Harrison's Landing.  Lee moved up and looked at it, knowing that there was no more retreat possible for the Yankees, but McClellan had such a strong position and naval support that Lee backed off and began reorganizing his army.

So from a brilliant strategic move McClellan had snatched defeat.  He had lost only one battle, and that tactically, but he was close to defeated in his own mind before he fought a single battle.  He had ludicrous ideas about Confederate strength: if the Confederates had twice the Union strength why did they sit on the defensive?  He thought too much of sieges and too little of moving and fighting - here his experience watching at Sevastopol may have colored his thinking.  Joe Johnston proved himself prudent, avoiding many unfavorable battles, but his prudence was a sort that the Confederacy couldn't afford.  Too many retreats and there wouldn't be a Confederacy.  Lee was aggressive, but didn't know many of his subordinates or what the troops could (and could not) do.  His aggression was good, but his detailed plans could have been much better. 

When it was all over Lee was free to dismiss McClellan as a threat to Richmond, which was important.  John Pope had a large army in northern Virginia and was moving on Richmond.  Lee could afford to ignore Little Mac and head his men, where they would meet the next foe at Second Manassas.

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(Pensinsula Campaign)