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(Jackson's Valley Campaign)

Jackson's Valley Campaign

Thomas Jackson had commanded troops in the Shenandoah Valley even before he became 'Stonewall' Jackson, the Hero of Manassas.  In November 1861 he was appointed to command the Valley District, and the troops in it also formed the left wing of the main Confederate forces in Northern Virginia.

During the winter he inaugurated the Romney Expedition, which failed to capture exposed Union garrisons and provoked much angry correspondence.  Then things were quiet again until early March, when Joe Johnston got word from spies that McClellan was about to move and land behind the Confederate right; Johnston bugged out of Centreville and left Jackson sitting high and dry in the northern Shenandoah.

At the same time Nathaniel Banks was moving his substantial corps (20,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 80 guns) down the Valley and Jackson wisely withdrew rather than fight with his 4,200 men.  His cavalry screen did a fine job of protecting his infantry, and the Federals thought the whole force had left.  So Banks started phase two of his operation, moving troops east to reinforce McClellan's main body.  But Jackson hadn't gone far at all and once he got word that the Yankees were leaving he looked for a way to attack.  His orders were to pin down as many Federals as he could so that Johnston would have an easier time against McClellan, and he wouldn't be obeying orders if he watched them march away.

So he marched north.  His cavalry had done excellent work of screening his retreat, and good work in finding that the Yankees were moving east, but they failed completely to find the strength of the Union rearguard.  At FIRST KERNSTOWN Jackson hit what he thought was a weak covering force; it was really Shields' whole division.  Jackson lost the battle and had to march his men south once more.

But the results were better for strategy than tactics.  Shields assumed Jackson wouldn't have attacked if he wasn't expecting reinforcements, and reported this to Banks.  Banks reported it on to Washington, and three things happened, all to McClellan's dismay and Johnston's benefit.  First, Banks stopped moving his other division out of the Valley.  Second, Lincoln ordered a division detached from the Army of the Potomac and marched around to the forces in West Virginia.  Third, McDowell's corps (at Fredericksburg) was ordered not to march south to join McClellan (incidentally on Richmond's open northern flank) but to await developments.  All this went far to exasperate McClellan, and increase his tendency to caution.  And in turn this would buy the Confederates enough time to organize their defense of Richmond. 

But Jackson wasn't through.  Banks delayed as long as he could find excuses, then finally moved slowly down the Valley.  He was worried about his supply route, but was more concerned to defend it than to beat his enemy.  His caution took him out of the picture momentarily, while other Union operations tugged Jackson in a different direction.

Out in West Virginia, John Frémont was planning a swing into the Shenandoah and then a long, victorious march into East Tennessee.  It was a grandiose plan, and quickly came undone.  The Confederate government was substantially bolder than Lincoln's (at this point; Lincoln would learn more about military operations and take more risks later in the war) and reinforced Jackson with troops from west (the Alleghenies) and east (troops that had been watching McDowell at Fredericksburg).  Now strong enough to attack, Jackson left his cavalry to baffle Banks and headed west and hit a detachment of Frémont's men at McDOWELL.  He won a narrow victory in terms of casualties, but the Union troops pulled back west into the mountains and had wrecked Frémont's grandiose plans.

What's more, he had separated the two enemy forces: Frémont could not easily move to support Banks.  And Banks was Jackson's next target.  Banks was a political general, and had widely dispersed his troops; nothing was likelier to get Jackson marching to the attack.  At FRONT ROYAL he annihilated a 1,000 man detachment, a move that outflanked Banks' main body.  It became a footrace between Banks (on the paved road) and Jackson (on the muddy one).  Banks narrowly won, but it didn't do him much good.  His army was demoralized by retreating without battle and by realizing how foolishly their commander had acted to get them into the situation.  When Jackson attacked Banks at his main supply depot, the fighting didn't last long.  FIRST WINCHESTER was a complete Confederate victory.

Jackson moved slowly north to increase the panic in Washington (and the city reacted well) and give his teamsters time to haul off all the supplies that Banks had left behind.  But every step north was a dangerous one.  Frémont was still in the mountains behind him; Banks had large numbers ahead; McDowell was moving westward now, trying to link up with Frémont and trap the Confederates.

It was a combination of luck (the weather), cautious and conflicting Union commands (the results of Lincoln's and Stanton's arrangements), and fast Confederate marching that got Jackson's army out of the noose.

But Jackson was not only safe, he was still aggressive.  With his pursuers scattered behind him he decided it was time to turn around and strike.  First at CROSS KEYS he stopped Frémont's advance, buying enough time to hit McDowell's advance guard at PORT REPUBLIC the next day.  This was a hard-fought action and Jackson drove the Union advance guard back, but only as far as their main body.  There they were safe because Jackson had worn out one of his brigades in the initial attack, and had to keep open a line of retreat with Frémont's men breathing down his rear.

Jackson recognized he'd wrung as much out of the circumstances as he could.  Frémont and McDowell could now unite; the combination was far too strong for the Army of the Valley to challenge.  (However, Lee did feint sending more troops to Jackson in order to pin these Union forces down; the troops entrained in Richmond but returned their with Jackson's divisions as well.)  Besides, bigger events were happening outside Richmond.  Jackson had achieved everything and more of his objectives in the Valley.  McDowell couldn't send any men to McClellan; he had to cover the approaches to Washington.  Banks' forces were either operating defensively under McDowell or recuperating and trying to find answers how they had lost.  Frémont pulled back into West Virginia when it became clear that no Union force was going to stay in the Shenandoah and cover his left flank.  And all this left Jackson free to entrain his men for Richmond.

With forces a fraction the size of his opposition Jackson had won not only a string of battles, but wrung strategic results out of a campaign.  Moreover, he'd done it more by marching than by fighting.  Certainly he'd won battles, but only in the little engagement at Front Royal had he destroyed the opposition.  The rest of the time he'd unhinged Union plans - often more by putting a fright into generals than killing privates.  He won because he was bold, because he inspired his men, but also because he faced shaky opposition.  None of the commanders facing him were much good; hardly any of them were bold; most saw their own problems without realizing that Jackson had problems too.  And through it all Jackson had the great advantage of being in charge.  When he faced Federal forces four times his numbers they were always divided into different commands, in communication with Washington more than they were with each other.  The various Union generals knew their own problems but couldn't see the big picture.  Jackson took this too far at times; he seldom told his subordinates why they should move somewhere just that they must.  As long as Jackson knew exactly what he was doing it worked fine.  But when Jackson was tired or didn't know the ground (as would shortly be the case in the Seven Days' Battles) it was counter-productive.  And it relied on Jackson being alive to issue those orders; once he was dead there were few who had any experience of independent command, partly a result of his style of command.

Official Reports:

Jackson's Valley Campaign

Page 5

(Jackson's Valley Campaign)