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Page 3(West Virginia Campaign)Next Page


West Virginia Campaign


Eastern and western Virginia were very different physically and politically.  The east was economically, politically, and socially dominated by plantation owners; the west was the home of small farmers.  Slavery flourished in the east, but was marginal in the west, and the people had not favored secession.

That made them a prime objective for the Union in the opening days of the war.  If the Federal Government couldn't protect its supporters, it would lose credibility throughout the country.  On the other hand, the Confederates had to defend what was legally Virginia.  And there was a serious strategic goal in western Virginia: the Baltimore & Ohio railroad.  The B&O was the fastest route between east and west, and a vital artery for the Union.

Pro-Union sentiment was strong enough that western Virginians had responded to Lincoln's call for volunteers, but the main Union forces came from over the border.  The first objective for George McClellan's men was Grafton.  The town was strategically posted on the B&O, but only lightly held by the Confederates.  Rather than face the stronger Union forces, the Confederates fell back to Philippi.  With their base at Grafton safe, the Union troops moved in two columns on PHILIPPI.  The fighting was quickly over, and the Confederates routed. 

Two weeks passed and a McClellan was appointed to command the district; he quickly organized the next steps of the campaign.  He had around 20,000 men; after subtracting about 5,000 to protect the B&O, and a brigade under Jacob Cox to move up the Kanawha River, it still left 12,000 for the main body.  McClellan led this himself, planning to trap the main Confederate force, which was just under 5,000.  With a large Federal force massing at Washington, the Confederacy had not been able to spare many men for western Virginia - nor were they well equipped.  McClellan divided his forces - he could afford to - and still routed the Confederates at RICH MOUNTAIN.  Over the next two days the Federals rounded up over a thousand prisoners, and made plenty of headlines for McClellan.  For the time being the Union was unopposed in the Alleghenies, but after First Manassas the Confederates would reinforce.

Meanwhile Cox's column moved up the Kanawha without much initial opposition.  Then in late August a Confederate raid at KESSLER'S CROSS LANES routed a small Union force, which only prompted major Union reinforcements to move in from the north under William Rosecrans.  On the march south Rosecrans fought at CARNIFEX FERRY, driving the Rebels back.  Rosecrans continued to push the Confederates eastward until Lee's reinforcements were a threat, when Rosecrans pulled back a safe distance.  After the Confederate reinforcements were withdrawn Rosecrans moved east again, clearing all of what is now West Virginia.

Lee had been acting as General-in-Chief for Virginia forces, and after the main front around Washington seemed secure he was able to head to western Virginia.  The goal was to head off the Unionist referendum on statehood for West Virginia, which loomed for late October.  By late August Lee had about 20,000 men, but dreadfully equipped.  He also expected too much from his subordinate commanders; they simply could not organize their men well enough to carry out the elaborate plans.  So in mid-September Lee's offensive came to an end at CHEAT MOUNTAIN.  Two weeks later the Union forces were feeling their oats and probed Lee's men at GREENBRIAR RIVER, but found the resistance too strong and pulled back.  Again in mid-December a Union probe at CAMP ALLEGHENY was repulsed.

The referendum went the way everyone expected: strongly pro-Union, although the turnout was low.  This was largely the result of pro-Confederate voters in a dozen counties (about a quarter of the district) boycotting the election; this sowed the seeds for future guerrilla warfare preventing any peace.

At the end of October, Lee was recalled from his fruitless efforts.  The priority was now defending the coast of South Carolina and Georgia after the US Navy had seized a base at Port Royal.

Official Reports:

West Virginia Campaign



Page 3(West Virginia Campaign)Next Page

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