We present The Last Campaign here in its entirety, consisting of the following four web pages. If you have not read Part One as it was published last month, then you can go to Part One first.

Before Cleburne's advance, Hood met with Generals Cheatham and Cleburne. His order to General Cheatham at this time was to advance to Spring Hill, seize the pike, and attack the enemy there. To General Cleburne, Hood then said: "General, you have heard the orders just given. You have one of my best divisions. Go with General Cheatham, assist him in every way you can, and do as he directs."⁽²⁵⁾ Once Cleburne's Division had crossed Rutherford Creek, Cheatham remained behind to hurry Bate's and Brown's remaining divisions, while Hood rode to the top of a nearby hill. What the Confederate general saw from his vantage point convinced him that the bulk of Schofield's army was still in Columbia, and his real threat would come from that direction rather than Spring Hill. This knowledge emboldened Hood. Rejoining Cleburne, Hood adjusted his orders accordingly, instructing Cleburne to have his men wheel and face south when they reached the pike.

Hood's revised order makes it apparent that he had failed to see Wagner's third brigade [Bradley's] concealed at the edge of a woods between Cleburne and his new objective. Bradley's 2,000-strong brigade had been ordered into position to protect the southeastern approach to Spring Hill on a wooded knoll just three-fourths of a mile south of town and a half mile east of the pike.⁽²⁶⁾ The Rally Hill Pike upon which Hood's infantry was advancing ran parallel to the Columbia Pike, the distance shortening between the two until they converged in the town. Wagner had also positioned 20 pieces of artillery in a semi-circle, running in a southeasterly direction, on an elevated ridge at the edge of Spring Hill. The Independent Pennsylvania Light Artillery, Battery B, along with the infantry support, was placed in advanced position south of Bradley's brigade to protect his right flank.⁽²⁷⁾ To strengthen his line, Bradley refused his right to face southeast, his main line remaining facing due east.

In Cleburne's front, a hill hid his view of Bradley and the pike. Though Forrest had recently pushed Bradley's skirmishers, the 64th Ohio, back to their main lines, he appeared unaware of the gathering Union presence that now opposed Cleburne's Division. It was 4 p.m., the daylight hours now mercilessly slipping away from Hood's army as Cleburne's three brigades prepared to advance. Federal forces had now swelled to 7,000 in the small town.

From right to left, Cleburne's three brigades, Lowrey's, Govan's, then Granbury's, stepped off at approximately 3:45 p.m. General Hood had promised to hurry Bate's and Brown's divisions up for support. General Forrest called upon Bell's Brigade to support Cleburne's right. These men only had four rounds of ammunition per trooper; Captain Dinkins of the 21st Tennessee Cavalry, Bell's Brigade, recalled: "...it was well understood that our command had no ammunition, and the only thing we could do was to yell."⁽²⁸⁾

Pat Cleburne and Bedford Forrest rode side by side behind Govan's Brigade. General Govan rode nearby also behind his brigade. With his sword drawn, Cleburne directed the movements of his men.⁽²⁹⁾ As the right of Lowrey's Brigade moved down the backside of the hill, it passed through an extension of woods and unknowingly passed directly in front of the 42nd Illinois, the refused portion of Bradley's line. Suddenly the 42nd poured an enfilading fire into Lowrey's ranks, catching Lowrey's men at a serious disadvantage. The advanced Pennsylvania battery, placed there earlier, also opened fire on the unsuspecting Lowrey.

Union Capt. John K. Shellenberger, of the 65th Ohio, described events: "They pulled down the rims of their old hats over their eyes, bent their heads to the storm of missiles pouring upon them, changed direction to their right on double-quick in a manner that excited our admiration, and a little later a long line came sweeping through the wide gap between the right of the 42nd and the pike and swinging in our rear. Our line stood firm, holding back the enemy in front until the flank movement had progressed so far as to make it a question of legs to escape capture."⁽³⁰⁾

Suddenly under fire, Lowrey ordered his brigade to wheel to the right in double-quick order. While reforming his line, the 42nd Illinois, thinking they had repulsed the attack, cheered loudly. Lowrey mistook this to believe he was being counter-attacked and called on Cleburne for assistance. Cleburne drew up his sword in animated manner and roared: "I'll charge them!"⁽³¹⁾ Galloping to the front of Govan's Brigade, he personally led them forward. Wheeling them to the right, he ordered the men to move in on the left of the line (the Union right). Lowrey, with the cooperative support of Govan's Brigade, soon turned the Federal right flank, exposing Bradley's main line to an enfilading fire. General Bradley himself was wounded while trying to bring forward a regiment to stem the Confederate tide sweeping his lines.

Though brief, the battle was a hotly contested one. Bradley's men were not long in taking flight towards Spring Hill behind the safety of the big guns to their rear. Many failed to get away quickly enough and were shot at point blank range in the back while fleeing. Cleburne's men continued their pursuit across the other side of a ravine, the blue-clad soldiers making a brief stand about a dwelling, horse lot, and outbuildings. As soon as the fleeing Federals cleared the cannons, eighteen guns opened up on Cleburne's pursuing men, bringing them to an abrupt halt. Many took cover in the ravine, remaining there until they could withdraw safely under cover of darkness. Wounded Federals sought refuge from the enemy and their own cannon in and around the dwelling. When night fell, this building was set afire by artillery shells and cast an eerie glow over the battlefield that filled the minds of the men of Bradley's Brigade with "solemn thoughts" of their helpless wounded consigned to the flames.⁽³²⁾

Granbury's Brigade had continued its straight course to the pike, despite the firing heard on their right. Due to intervening hills, they could not see to what extent the other two brigades were engaged. Shifting slightly to their right and north, this brigade quickly pushed the reserve regiment and supporting infantry to the advanced Federal battery, the 36th Illinois, back through the section of guns. Capt. Jacob Ziegler, commanding the Pennsylvania battery, hastily limbered up his two Napoleons and raced back towards Spring Hill, the 36th Illinois in front, and Granbury's charging men behind them.⁽³³⁾ Granbury attempted to move up and connect with the left of the new line, which was now facing directly north. To accomplish this, his brigade had to endure the concentrated cross-fire of the enemy's eighteen guns.

Cleburne now became aware of a new line of Federals forming to the east. This was Wagner's Brigade, commanded by Col. John Q. Lane, who had been sent to entrench on the eastern perimeter of town. When Lane saw Bradley's Brigade being overrun, he split his brigade in half, forming a line to face Cleburne's milling troops. Cleburne wanted to renew the attack before this line could be completed, but his men had been badly mixed together in the attack. Calling on his aide and former law partner, Leonard H. Mangum, Cleburne ordered Granbury's men to form a line of battle parallel to the pike. As he was giving this order, an artillery fragment struck his bay, Red Pepper, in the neck. The frightened horse reared violently. The anxious Mangum asked whether the general had been hurt. "No!" thundered Cleburne, his face set in determination. "Go on and tell Granbury what I told you."⁽³⁴⁾ In following this order, Granbury's men once again had to expose themselves to the massed artillery fire of the Union guns on the elevated ridge. This was accomplished with the loss of seven valiant Texans. While Cleburne was in the process of reforming his men, Colonel Bostick, of Cheatham's staff, delivered the order to halt his movement and await further orders. After complimenting his men on the field, Cleburne rode back to receive instructions. Meeting Gen. James Chalmers of Forrest's Cavalry, he remarked excitedly: "They are badly paralyzed. I rode within fifty yards of their works without danger."⁽³⁵⁾

After directing Cleburne's movements, General Hood rode south on Rally Hill Pike. Encountering Bate's Division, already formed en echelon along the road, Hood repeated the same change in orders to General Bate that he had previously given to Cleburne. Cheatham had climbed a range of hills to observe Cleburne's advance and therefore was unaware of Hood's orders to Bate. Upon leaving Bate, Hood retired to a position along the roadside a short distance north of the creek so that he could issue commands directly to Stewart's Corps and Johnson's Division when they came up. Up to this point, Hood had been at the front of his army, completely aware of every development, personally taking charge. However, he had also been strapped in the saddle for twelve hours and had taken a painful fall from his horse when it had slipped on the bank of Rutherford Creek earlier in the day. For a man who suffered from the physical handicaps Hood did, the day had taken its toll on his stamina. Hood rested on a log at the edge of a pond. The general sat and grew increasingly more agitated as he waited in vain for the sounds of battle, in the company of Sol Gregory and Isham Harris. This is where General Stewart found an angry General Hood at 6:15 p.m.⁽³⁶⁾

Meanwhile, Brown's Division arrived on the field at 4:45 p.m. with still enough daylight to plainly see the enemy's artillery and infantry in their front. As General Cheatham was giving instruction to General Brown, Cleburne rode up to inform Cheatham that he had reformed his men and was ready to renew the attack. Brown was ordered to form two lines of battle facing north and connect with Cleburne's right. Cheatham told both generals that Brown would lead the attack, followed successively by Cleburne then Bate, and that the sound of Brown's guns would be the signal for the other two to attack. Cheatham assured the generals that he would go personally to relay these instructions to Bate.⁽³⁷⁾ Cleburne then returned to his division to await the signal, while Brown ordered his skirmishers to advance.

Cheatham began to fret while riding south to find Bate, commenting to aides: "Why don't we hear Brown's guns? Let us go and see what is the matter."⁽³⁸⁾ Cheatham directed one of his aides, Lt. Schell, to continue in search of Bate and order him to connect with Cleburne's left. He and Major Vaulx would ride back to Brown's position. Cheatham and Vaulx were soon met by two staff officers that had been sent by General Brown to make Cheatham aware of new developments. Quickly, they explained that before Brown could move forward one of his brigade commanders, Brig. Gen. Otho Strahl, had reported finding the enemy's line was extended well beyond Brown's right flank. Forrest's Cavalry, whom it was thought would protect Brown's right, had retired from the field, and Brown feared disaster if he should move forward. General Cheatham directed on of Brown's staff officers to accompany him to see General Hood and repeat what he had just stated to Cheatham. He directed Brown's remaining aide to return to Brown with instructions to throw back his right and attack anyway.⁽³⁹⁾ It was now 5:45 p.m. Darkness had settled on the fields around the increasingly agitated General Cleburne, who still awaited the sound of Brown's guns to move forward.

It is at this point in the unfolding drama where pieces of the puzzling events no longer fit neatly together and first hand accounts begin to vary with each other. In summation, what then occurred ultimately led to Hood's postwar description of the "Affair at Spring Hill": The best move in my career as a soldier I was thus destined to behold come to naught."⁽⁴⁰⁾

Stewart received orders to cross Rutherford Creek and encountered the commanding general brooding beside the fire along the roadside. Hood had apparently not yet spoken with Cheatham. This was evidenced by Hood's anger and confusion as to why Cheatham had not obeyed his orders. Isham Harris had been sent at 5:30 p.m. to find out why there were no sounds of a general battle. Harris returned just prior to Stewart's arrival to inform Hood that possession of the pike had not yet been achieved. General Stewart was provided with a local guide and then ordered to march northward on the Davis Ford Road to block the Columbia Pike above Spring Hill. Both generals realized that it would take the better part of the evening for the entire corps to get into position. With this in mind, Hood and Stewart agreed to at least throw Stewart's lead division across the pike before going into bivouac.

While Hood was planning his move to block the pike above the town, his efforts to do so with Cheatham's Corps below Spring Hill were rapidly evaporating. General Govan and his staff were engaged in rescuing a family from a burning house that had been set afire by the Federal artillery, while Cleburne continued to await the signal to attack.⁽⁴¹⁾ General Brown, despite the plaintive urgings of his subordinates, adamantly refused to attack until he received further orders from Cheatham. General Chalmers, in his postwar writings, recalled the conversation when he came across General Brown standing idle: "I believe that, if you will join General Cleburne and make a vigorous attack, you can capture or rout the force in front of you." To which General Brown replied in a curt tone: "I have no orders."⁽⁴²⁾

General Bate's Division, of Cheatham's Corps, had reached the pike, his skirmishers driving off the 26th Ohio when Lt. Schell, Cheatham's aide, found him and ordered him to pull back. Having thus achieved his objective assigned by Hood, Bate was reluctant to cede the ground gained by his men under direct orders from the general commanding. Receiving a second order from another of Cheatham's staff repeating the command to withdraw, Bate managed to pull his men back with some difficulty and loss of time. Concerned with the conflicting orders, he sent one of his aides to locate Hood's headquarters. When the aide returned to inform him that in the presence of Hood, Cheatham threatened to have Bate arrested if he did not comply, General Bate became satisfied.⁽⁴³⁾ It was now 7 p.m. Complete darkness helped to hide the enemy passing unimpeded before the front of Bate's men, who were attempting to sidle up and connect with Cleburne's left.

Ironically, the Federals marching up the pike at this time were two brigades belonging to Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, traveling with Schofield. These men were astounded to find that the campfires along the pike were those of the enemy and not their own. The officers warned the men to secure any items that would make noise and march quietly lest they provoke enemy fire on the column. Occasionally, Caswell's Sharpshooters, of Bate's Division, who were less than 100 yards from the pike, would send a minie ball whistling into the blackness enveloping the pike. The contending forces were close enough to confound several Federal soldiers who inadvertently stumbled into the Rebel camps. A portion of these misdirected souls, upon discovering their mistake, would take advantage of the darkness and slip quietly back out into the night. An anxious Schofield joined General Stanley at the McKissack home to discuss the peril of his army.⁽⁴⁴⁾ When he became fully aware of the seriousness of his situation, Schofield suggested an outright surrender to Hood. Stanley balked at this idea. Sufficiently calmed by the deliberate manner of his subordinate, Schofield formulated plans to accompany Ruger's Division northward to Thompson's Station to see if his escape route, the pike north of Spring Hill, was open.
 

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