 |
Abraham Lincoln's Evolving
Stance On Slavery
From 1861 - 1863
by John D. Mason
|
Three billion dollars - that was the amount the abolition of
slavery cost the Confederacy in terms of lost property. In 1990 dollars,
that would be the equivalent of a $3 trillion loss to the Gross National
Product. Few nations could afford those kinds of losses and still remain
viable. In retrospect, given the effect this loss would have on the Confederacy's
ability to wage war, it is remarkable to think that emancipation was not
initially one of the Union's primary war aims. Emancipation had enormous
potential as a weapon of economic warfare. (1)
But newly elected president Abraham Lincoln was not ready to make it
one. The Southern states had begun seceding from the Union on December
20, 1860, fearing that his election would threaten the rights and liberties
they held most dear - the right to own slaves and the liberty to take them
wherever they pleased. They could not have been more wrong. Although Lincoln
personally hated slavery and considered it to be the greatest single threat
to peaceful development and prosperity then facing the nation, he had no
intention of abolishing it. In fact, at the time of his inauguration, he
viewed slavery as a right of property protected under the Constitution.
Lincoln's main concern was the preservation of the Union.(2)
From the position he took in his first inaugural address ("I have no
purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery
in the States where it exists"), Lincoln slowly evolved a new philosophy
on how he would handle slavery. Many historians and commentators, past
and present, have chided the pace with which Mr. Lincoln approached emancipation.
But in reality, could he have moved any more quickly and at the same time
preserved the Union? The answer to this cannot and should not be viewed
in light of today's notion of political correctness. Instead, like the
president, one must envision the environment as it existed in 1860, and
move appropriately. True, Lincoln may have moved slowly, but it was inexorably
towards a definitive goal. It is that single-minded approach that defines
Lincoln's greatness. There was perhaps no other individual of that, or
any other, generation that could have approached the problems Lincoln faced
and enjoyed the success he would ultimately enjoy. His pace was slow, but
it was sure. As he himself said, "I can only go as fast as I can go."(3)
The Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, April 12, 1861, came at a time
when Congress was not in session. As a result, Lincoln essentially ran
the country and the war by himself for the first ninety days of conflict.
The first real test of the administration's position on slavery came in
May 1861 when Union Major General Benjamin Butler, commanding troops at
Fortress Monroe, Virginia, began refusing to return escaped slaves to their
masters, claiming them instead as "contraband of war." Lincoln disapproved
of this action, but as the seizure of contraband was a recognized right
among combatants, he allowed it to remain in force.
When a special session of Congress finally convened on July 4, Lincoln
addressed it in an effort to mobilize national will and define the conflict
as a struggle to save democracy. At one point, Lincoln alluded to the issue
of slavery, saying:
"This is essentially a People's contest. On the side of the
Union, it is a struggle for maintaining in the world, that form, and substance
of government, whose leading object is, to elevate the condition of men
. . . to afford all, an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race
of life."
He then clarified his point to specify that he meant a white people's
contest, by saying:
"Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men,
as to what is to be the course of the government, towards the Southern
States, after the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive
deems it proper to say, it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided
by the Constitution, and the laws; and that he will probably have no different
understanding of the powers, and duties of the Federal Government, relatively
to the rights of the states, and the people, under the Constitution, than
that he expressed in the inaugural address."(4)
At this point, Lincoln, unsure of his constitutional abilities, was willing
to let slavery survive in a reunited nation, although he personally favored
instituting a gradual, compensated emancipation.
After hearing this speech, Senators Charles Sumner of Massachusetts,
Benjamin Wade of Ohio, and Zachariah Chandler of Michigan went to Lincoln
requesting that he make the annihilation of slavery an aim of the war,
saying it would cripple the Confederacy and hasten an end to the rebellion.
Lincoln listened to what the men had to say, but did not respond. At this
point, he simply wanted to contain slavery, not destroy it.(5)
As a result, Congress decided to force the issue and passed the First
Confiscation Act on August 6, nullifying owner's claims to fugitive slaves
employed in the Confederate war effort. Lincoln reluctantly signed the
bill. He considered himself the proper and most competent judge of questions
relating to the status of slaves, and therefore, especially considering
the presidential war powers, Congress should take its cue on this issue
from him. After careful deliberation though, he decided that signing the
act was his only real choice; vetoing the somewhat nebulously worded document
would instead appear that he was justifying the use of slaves for military
purposes. Lincoln made it clear that in spite of this act, emancipation
was still not one of his war aims.(6)
This first tentative step toward emancipation did not come cheaply however.
Although this act did not specifically free anyone, its tenets went too
far for the Democratic and border-state congressmen, who all voted against
it. This was the first breach in the bi-partisan support Lincoln had worked
so hard to attain. Further, it indicated that if the conflict were to be
fought for abolition, it would be solely a Republican effort. This change
in attitude did not escape the President's notice. In fact, it would weigh
heavily in his next major decision.(7)
On July 25, Lincoln had appointed Major General John C. Fremont as Commander
of the Union's Western Department, stationed in St. Louis. Unequal to the
task to which he had been assigned, Fremont lost nearly half of the state
to the Rebels in his first two months of command. Feeling trapped and losing
control of the situation, he issued an order on August 30 putting the whole
state under martial law. In and of itself, this would have been all right,
but he also decreed that guerrillas captured behind Union lines be executed,
that Rebel property be confiscated, and that the slaves of all Confederate
sympathizers in Missouri be freed. His plan backfired.(8)
While the abolitionists and radical Republicans were overjoyed that
at last there was someone who understood the way to destroy the root of
the rebellion, Lincoln did not share their enthusiasm. On September 2,
he sent Fremont a letter "written in a spirit of caution and not of censure"
suggesting that the portions of the edict relating to slavery be modified
to conform to the wording of the Confiscation Act. Fremont refused, so
on 11 September, Lincoln ordered him to modify the statement, saying:
"Your answer, just received, expresses the preference on your
part, that I should make an open order for the modification, which I very
cheerfully do. It is therefore ordered that the . . . proclamation be so
modified."
Shortly thereafter, Fremont was relieved.(9)
Scarcely had the fallout over this issue subsided when another premature
edict, this time written by one of Lincoln's own cabinet, was published.
On December 1, Secretary of War Simon Cameron submitted his annual message
to Congress without first getting consent from the White House. In it he
advocated that:
"Those who war against the government justly forfeit all rights
to property, privilege, or security derived from the Constitution and laws,
against which they are in armed rebellion; and as the labor and service
of their slaves constitute the chief property of the rebels, such property
should share the common fate of war . . . It [the government] has a right
to use the voluntary service of slaves liberated by war . . . in whatever
mode may be most efficient for the defence [sic] of the government, the
prosecution of the war, and the supression [sic] of rebellion."
This report had already been printed and was in the mail when Lincoln first
read it. On a Sunday, he called Cameron to the White House and ordered
him to recall the report and substantially revise it. The final version
read: "The disposition to be made of the slaves of rebels, after the close
of the war, can be safely left to the wisdom and patriotism of Congress."
And within weeks of this document's issuance, Cameron, like Fremont before
him, was removed from office.(10)
Lincoln was continuing to move slowly on the road to emancipation, carefully
considering all the social and political ramifications inherent in such
a move. Always a gradualist, Lincoln hoped to end slavery with the cooperation
of the slave owners gained by offers of compensation and colonization.
In November, he drafted a plan to be tested in Delaware where that state
would gradually free the slaves over the next 30 years. In so doing, the
owners would receive $500 for each slave held in 1860 who was ultimately
freed. If that plan was successful, Lincoln believed that the effect this
voluntary emancipation would have on the Confederacy would lead to a shortened
war. In December, he confided that he was considering a similar plan for
the other border states, and that according to his figures, it would cost
the country only a third of what would be spent on the war. On December
3, he urged Congress to adopt these plans.(11)
Congress, where radical Republicans could hardly wait to make slavery
a war issue, complied. By mid-January 1862, no less than seven bills concerning
emancipation and confiscation were in one committee or another. By spring,
these bills began to reach the floor.(12)
Spring also brought about a fundamental change in the president himself.
On February 20, Lincoln's eleven-year-old son Willie died, probably as
a result of typhoid fever. The president was devastated, but returned to
the issues at hand with a new perspective. He would tell Senator Sumner
"that he was now convinced that this was a great movement from God to end
slavery and that the man would be a fool who would stand in the way."(13)
Supporting his change in attitude, a new article of war was approved
by Congress on March 15 stating that:
"All officers or persons in the military or naval service of
the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under
their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service
or labor, who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service or
labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by
a court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service."
This decision was followed closely by acts on April 10 pledging financial
aid to any state that undertook a gradual emancipation in the form of compensation
to the owners, and on April 16 abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia,
offering compensation to loyal owners and appropriating money for colonization
of former slaves to Liberia, Haiti, or any other country.(14)
As these acts began to have an effect, Lincoln again had to rebuke a
senior officer for issuing an unauthorized emancipation order. Along the
Georgia and South Carolina coasts, fugitive slaves were flocking to the
Union lines of General David Hunter. On May 9, General Hunter issued General
Order Number 11 saying, "all the persons in these three states - Georgia,
Florida, and South Carolina - heretofore held as slaves, are therefore
declared forever free." Lincoln learned of this by reading it in the newspaper,
and was justifiably furious. Emancipation was an issue he intended to handle
himself. "No commanding general shall do such a thing, on my responsibility,
without consulting me", he said, and on May 19, as he had done before,
he rescinded the order. But this time, there was a difference. Instead
of simply revoking the order, the President for the first time stated that
the authority to "declare the slaves of any state or states, free . . .
I reserve for myself."(15)
On July 17, Congress enacted both the far-reaching 2d Confiscation Act
and the Militia Act. The Confiscation Act was the first total-war measure
enacted in the Civil War. It freed the slaves and authorized the capture
and sale of any property belonging to anyone engaged in or assisting the
rebellion. More importantly, it went on to forbid any military personnel
to doubt the validity of a slave’s claim to freedom and to authorize the
president to employ "persons of African descent" in any capacity to suppress
the rebellion. The Militia Act then took this one step farther by providing
for the employment of "persons of African descent" in "any military or
naval service for which they may be found competent," and then by granting
freedom to the slaves so employed and to their families (if they belonged
to disloyal owners). Significantly, these types of acts were now finally
beginning to gain the open support of the president.(16)
While Congress passed the appropriate legislation, Lincoln tried on
at least three occasions to convince the border states to voluntarily join
his gradual emancipation program. In March, and then again in May, their
representatives refused to consider any type of emancipation. "You cannot,"
admonished the president, "be blind to the signs of the times." But they
were. So on July 12, Lincoln once again invited these legislators to the
White House to discuss the issue. This time, he also issued them a warning:
"The incidents of the war can not be avoided. If the war continue
long . . . the institution in your states will be extinguished be mere
friction and abrasion . . . and you will have nothing valuable in lieu
of it."
 Once again, by
a vote of 20 to 9, they rejected his plan.(17)
This was the last straw for the president, who said that the government
would no longer play "a game in which it stakes all and its enemies stake
nothing." That night, he made up his mind to issue an emancipation proclamation.
Sometime earlier, famous underground railroad conductor Harriet Tubman
had said that God's timetable was faster than Lincoln's, and that "God
won't let Massa Linkum beat de South till he do de right ting." Lincoln's
timetable was about to speed up.(18)
Page 2
--->
1. Gabor S. Boritt, ed., The Historian's Lincoln:
Pseudohistory, Psychohistory, and History, (Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 1988), p. 94, hereafter referred to as Boritt, Psychohistory.
James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 17, hereafter referred to
as McPherson, Revolution.
2. Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works
of Abraham Lincoln, 8 Vols. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1953), p. 262-271, hereafter referred to as Basler, Collected
Works. McPherson, Revolution, p. 26.
3. Oscar and Lilian Handlin, Abraham Lincoln
and the Union, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1980), p.153, hereafter
referred to as Handlin, Union.
4. Basler, Collected Works, Vol, IV, pp
438-439.
5. James M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The
Civil War and Reconstruction, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992),
p. 73, hereafter referred to as McPherson, Ordeal. Ibid., p. 262.
Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Life of Abraham Lincoln,
(New York: HarperPerennial, 1994), p. 252, hereafter referred to as Oates,
Malice.
6. Oates, Malice, p. 252. Benjamin Quarles,
Lincoln and the Negro, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962),
p. 69-70, hereafter referred to as Quarles, Negro.
7. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of
Freedom: The Civil War Era. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), p.
356, hereafter referred to as McPherson, Battle Cry.
8. McPherson, Ordeal, p. 161-162.
9. Basler, Collected Works, Vol, IV, pp.
506, 518. McPherson, Ordeal, p. 162.
10. McPherson, Ordeal, p. 268. Stephen
F. Miller, Freedmen and Southern Society Project, (Internet. www.inform.umd.edu/ARHU/Depts/History/Freedman/Cameron.htm,
1999), hereafter referred to as Miller, Internet, Freedman/ (appropriate
site).
11. Oates, Malice, p. 268.
12. McPherson, Ordeal, p. 269.
13. Handlin, Union, p. 153. McPherson,
Ordeal, p. 484. Oates, Malice, p. 297.
14. Miller, Internet, Freedman/artwar.htm.
15. Basler, Collected Works, Vol. V, pp.
222-223. McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 499. Miller, Internet, Freedman/hunter.htm.
16. McPherson, Battle Cry, p. 499. Miller,
Internet, Freedman/conact2.htm.
17. Basler, Collected Works, Vol. V, pp.
317-319. McPherson, Ordeal, p. 271.
18. Handlin, Union, p. 155. McPherson,
Ordeal, p. 271. Oates, Malice, p. 86. |
