The Tennessee Campaign found Cleburne increasingly thoughtful and pensive. He had more on his mind than the setbacks of his military career as an impetus for his apparent gloom. In June Cleburne had received official word confirming the death of his younger brother, Capt. Christopher Cleburne, who was killed in the battle of Cloyd's Farm in Virginia while serving in John Hunt Morgan's Cavalry. (3) With the fall of Atlanta and the ensuing brief period of inactivity, Cleburne had also hoped he might take leave of the army in October for the purpose of pursuing his romantic interest with his betrothed, Miss Susan Tarleton. Cleburne had hinted in his letters that he hoped he would return to his command, from this leave, a married man. After four long years of rigorous campaigning, it was obvious to friends and staff that their general was increasingly absorbed with reflection on his future beyond the bloody battlefields of war. 

In a letter to her friend Sallie Lightfoot, dated October 3, 1864, Miss Tarleton tells of her disappointment: "You must know he had been counting on a furlough for some time and expected to get it about the first of this month. Well! On the 28th [Sept] when he went to apply, Hood informed him that the next day his corps was to move across the Chattahoochee and take position in Sherman's rear as would break up his communication." (4) Hood had opened his fall campaign on September 29, 1864. 

The derailment of his plans may have set the tone for Cleburne's words in a speech to his men at Powder Springs, Georgia, on October 2. Perhaps the Irish born general had some intuition of what lay ahead for himself and his men on their return to Tennessee. A spectator, John L. McKinnon, recorded the stirring words of the general in his postwar writings: "If this cause that is so dear to my heart is doomed to fail, I pray heaven may let me fall with it, while my face is toward the enemy and my arm battling for that which I know to be right." (5) 

From the beginning of the campaign, Hood's army of an estimated 32,000 was plagued with delays and bad luck. Due to an inadequate and overburdened railroad system, the army sat idle at Tuscumbia, Alabama, while commissary officers struggled to obtain twenty day's rations before the march could commence. The stores were hauled from Cherokee Station to Tuscumbia by wagon, a distance of fifteen miles. The supply system was barely able to keep up with daily demand, much less stockpile the needed rations for the campaign. (6) The weather became Hood's incontestable enemy in November. For the entire month, the rain fell in torrents, turning the campsite into a sea of mud and mire. The swollen Tennessee River frequently washed away railroad bridges and hampered the work of stringing the pontoons for the crossing. The sodden days, bone-chilling nights, inadequate rations, and endless delays took their toll on the morale of the Army of Tennessee's thinly-clad soldiers throughout the entire month. 

These soldiers were hardened veterans, survivors of four years of hard marching and blood-letting on the fields of Alabama, Tennessee, Georgia, Kentucky and Mississippi. With the anticipated arrival of Forrest's Cavalry on November 14 through the 16th, animated talk of the upcoming offensive campaign began to bolster the sagging morale. Many would be returning to their homes for the first time in two years, and they were glad to be advancing northward at last after months of frustrating retreat. 

On the 21st Hood's infantry turned their faces north into the biting winds of a snow storm and towards Tennessee. With Forrest's Cavalry traveling in advance on the 19th, Hood planned to march rapidly north, defeat the Union army under the command of John M. Schofield somewhere in the vicinity of Pulaski, then move on to Nashville and crush the remaining forces under George H. Thomas, who would by then be cowering inside the fortifications of Nashville. 

Cleburne's Division was one of three now under the corps command of Maj. Gen. Benjamin "Frank" Cheatham. The other two divisions were commanded by Maj. Gen. John C. Brown and Maj. Gen. William B. Bate. In November 1864, Cleburne's Division consisted of four brigades under the commands of Brig. Gen.'s Mark P. Lowrey, Daniel C. Govan, Hiram B. Granbury, and James A. Smith. The brigade belonging to Smith, along with Key's Battery, was detached and left behind to shepherd the army's supply train, which was to follow the marching columns with a few days. Detained in this duty at the Tennessee River until the 28th, Smith's Brigade did not again rejoin the army until it was in front of Nashville on Dec. 6th. (7) This left Cleburne's hard-fighting division with little more than 3,000 men in the campaign's critical opening stages. 

Hood's three corps each traveled a different route into Tennessee. In the center Stephen D. Lee's Corps, with the artillery, struggled along roads made nearly impassable by mud. The last to cross the river, Alexander P. Stewart's Corps traveled the shortest route on the right flank. Hood accompanied Cheatham's Corps on the left as they moved towards Waynesborough. 

Despite the bitterly cold winds and frozen roads, Cleburne's men made good progress, covering twelve miles on November 21st and eighteen miles each day on the 22nd and 23rd. On the 24th the day dawned cold and overcast for the hungry men of the Confederate army. Thanksgiving Day came and went with little to attest to the holiday among the marching men, noted Col. Ellison Capers of Gist's Brigade, Brown's Division: "The march from Florence to Columbia was forced all the way, the weather and roads bad, and rations very short, three biscuits only on the 24th and 25th to each man." (8) By the 25th, all three of Hood's corps had converged on the Mount Pleasant road, Lee's Corps camped just beyond Mount Pleasant, Cheatham's Corps five miles south of town and Stwart's Corps east at Henryville. 

The opening shots of the campaign began as Forrest's Cavalry, comprised of three divisions numbering 5,500 troopers, began skirmishing with Thomas's cavalry on the evening of November 21st. At Pulaski, Schofield had remained unconvinced of Hood's advance until the reports of his cavalry commander, Gen. Edward Hatch, were confirmed on this same evening. In response, Schofield hurriedly ordered his army of 24,000 to move from Pulaski to Columbia on the 23rd. Though Hood's advance was reported as early as the 17th to Schofield at Pulaski and General Thomas at Nashville, both Union commanders found themselves scrambling to put enough blue-clad soldiers in the field to stop the long gray serpent now winding its way into Middle Tennessee. 

The opponent attempting to block the Confederates' path to Nashville, John M. Schofield, was a former friend and West Point classmate of John Bell Hood. Under Schofield's immediate command were the IV Army Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. David S. Stanley; Schofield's XXIII Army Corps, temporarily commanded by Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox; and the pieced together collection of cavalry forces commanded by Hatch. It was quickly apparent to Thomas that his cavalry force was inadequate against Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, "The Wizard of the Saddle." Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson was dispatched to Columbia to take immediate command of all Federal cavalry operating in the field, arriving in Columbia on the 24th. 

Thanksgiving morning, at 4 a.m., just south of Columbia, a foot race developed between one of Cox's divisions at Lynnville and Chalmers' Division of Forrest's Cavalry. Cox's men reached the outskirts of Columbia just in time to deploy across the Mount Pleasant to Columbia Pike, keeping the gray horsemen from entering the town. Schofield imagined the race a close one, though Hood's infantry was still two days behind his cavalry. As the Federal army continued to come up throughout the day of the 24th, they were set to work entrenching and fortifying the defenses at Columbia, expecting to do battle with Hood there on the following day. 

It was a cold and rainy Saturday afternoon on the 26th as Cleburne sat astride his favorite horse, Red Pepper, a large bay steed, and watched his men pass. Some of the men were awestruck by their surroundings as they filed past the home of the deceased Gen. Leonidas Polk, the first and grandest of the Polk mansions along the pike. Sam Foster of Granbury's Brigade wrote in his account: "Today we pass the Polk place in Maury County. The prettiest place I have ever seen in my life." (9) 

Cleburne was similarly affected by the quaint beauty of the Polk church. St. John's was a small gothic-style church built of red brick sitting amidst a grove of tall magnolias. Perhaps it reminded Cleburne of the Athnowen churchyard in his native Ireland. Capt. Charles Hill, Cleburne's ordnance officer, noted his general's somber mood as Cleburne alighted from his horse. Respectfully, Hill remained behind, leaning against a tree, while Cleburne walked among the tombstones of the churchyard. When Cleburne returned to Hill's side, he stated in a solemn tone: "It would not be hard to die if one could be buried in such a beautiful spot." (10) Cleburne's prophecy would soon come true. 

Many of the local citizens turned out to welcome and cheer the boys in gray. Furloughs were granted. Hamilton Place, home of Gen. Lucius Polk, brother of the fallen Bishop-general Leonidas Polk, was the scene of much gaiety. A steady stream of officers, including General Hood, Isham Harris (exiled former governor of Tennessee, now on Hood's staff), Cheatham, Bate, Brown, Gen. Edward Walthall, and Gen. Frank Armstrong came and went throughout the day. (11) 

On the following morning, a drizzly Sunday, Hood moved his headquarters from Ashwood Hall, home of Col. Andrew J. Polk, brother to Lucius and Leonidas Polk, to the home of Amos Warfield located closer to Columbia. Lee's Corps moved up on the left of the outer perimeter of the town, Stewart's Corps in the center, and Cheatham's Corps filed in on the right. Cleburne's Division, south and southeast of the town, was headquartered a little over two miles southeast of Columbia. Hood's army now encircled Schofield's defenses, and Hood would make the first critical decision of the campaign. 

His opponent, however, proved reluctant to remain long in Hood's immediate front. Schofield interpreted his orders from Thomas to delay the Confederate army, but not to bring about a general engagement. Rumors circulated throughout the Federal camps that Hood's forces numbered 40,000. The Federal commander decided it would be advantageous to put the Duck River between his army and Hood's, ordering the evacuation of Columbia on the evening of the 25th. With the swollen conditions of the river, the evacuation was not completed until the evening of the 27th. Concerned that Hood might try to cross the Duck at various points and outflank his forces, Schofield posted Wilson's cavalry to guard any likely crossings above and below his position. 

John Bell Hood, former brigade and division commander of the famed "Texas Brigade," was no stranger to this strategy, having studied well the tactics of his two idols, Robert E. Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson, in the Eastern Theater. His plan was indeed to out maneuver his adversary rather than attack his entrenched position. Once in his rear, Hood could turn and press him from the north while Stephen D. Lee pressed him from the south. He planned to catch Schofield offguard by leaving two of Lee's divisions, along with his artillery, to demonstrate in the enemy's front while he marched the balance of his army north to gain the Federals' rear. Spring Hill lay twelve miles north. With Forrest's cavalry again clearing the way, this was to be Hood's objective -- to flank the Federal left. The maneuver was scheduled to commence on the morning of the 28th. Owing to the interminable rains and the fact that the army's pontoons were being hauled by slow-plodding longhorn steers, the pontoons were not in place for the crossing of the Duck until early morning on the 29th. (12) 

Wilson's troopers, charged with blocking the river fords, had somehow overlooked the well-known crossing at Davis Ford. Schofield had ordered Wilson to confirm reports of Confederate cavalry crossing the Duck on the evening of the 28th. Unknown to Schofield, Wilson had ordered a concentration of forces north of the Duck at Hurts Crossroads on the Lewisburg to Franklin turnpike. This left the Federal flank completely unguarded and enabled Hood to cross the river four miles east of the Federal army. 

While Forrest's cavalry successfully crossed the Duck River at three different points on November 28, the Confederate infantry rushed into the recently evacuated town of Columbia. Schofield had withdrawn to the north shore of the river. So many of Hood's poorly clad soldiers began plundering and ransacking the town that the local citizens protested to the general, causing him to issue a circular. 

On this same day General Cleburne gathered his men together for what would be his last address to his division. In his rich Irish brogue, which became truly distinctive only when he was emotional, Cleburne gave a stirring speech in which he vowed he would rather die than surrender. (13) 

Accompanied by a local guide, John "Sol" Gregory, General Hood was in the saddle by 4 a.m. on November 29, watching his men prepare for the march. Due to the loss of his right leg at the battle of Chickamauga, it was necessary for Hood to be strapped into his saddle. Hood ordered the men be in light marching order, as rapidity of movement was critical to the maneuver. Consequently, the bank of the river was littered with knapsacks and various items that might slow them down. Cleburne's division would be the first to cross, General Lowrey's brigade leading the way. By the time the sun's faintly warming rays could be felt on their backs at 7:30 a.m., Cleburne's men were across with General Hood riding at the head of Lowrey's Brigade. The sound of twenty cannon rumbling in the distance before Columbia must have instilled Hood, and perhaps his men, with hope. By 10 a.m. the entire column of 19,000 was across, with Maj. Gen. Edward A. Johnson's Division bringing up the rear. (14) S. A. Cunningham recalled after the war: "It was so clear that the Confederates had stolen a march on Schofield that thrilling enthusiasm was created for Gen. Hood." (15) 

The column had gone but a mile when General Hood stopped to refer to his map, as the actual course differed from that indicated on the map. While Generals Cleburne and Hood looked on, J. S. Gregory, of Biffle's cavalry, sketched the roads in the dirt, explaining the routes at some length. Cleburne then summoned Mr. Jim Smith, a local resident acting as guide to Cleburne and Bate. A lengthy discussion ensued between Hood and Cleburne, after which Cleburne copied the stick drawing,, stating he had more confidence in it than the one Hood was using. (16) 

Spring Hill lay twelve miles north in a straight line from Columbia, but the road the army was following was no more than an old, badly rutted roadbed used by local farmers. It wound around property lines in such a way that it lengthened the distance to Spring Hill by almost five miles. Hood, now appearing sullen, ordered his men forward. 

Hood had little threat to fear for his right flank, as his able cavalry commander was doing his job well. Forrest began skirmishing with Wilson's Cavalry around 4 a.m. at Hurts Crossroads, pushing Wilson northward on the Lewisburg Pike and farther away from Schofield's exposed flank. At 10 a.m. in the small village of Mt. Carmel, which lay five miles due east of Spring Hill, Forrest attacked a hasty line of defense Wilson had erected. The unsuspecting Wilson played right into Forrest's hands when he continued his retreat northward toward Franklin. The attack on Wilson was intended to mask Forrest's true destination -- Spring Hill. Forrest, leaving only Ross's Texas Brigade in Wilson's front, moved with the extent of his command due east on the Mt. Carmel road toward Spring Hill. (17) 

What was to become a concern for Hood was a 1.600-man Federal reconnaissance, under the command of Col. Sidney Post, sent out earlier that morning by Schofield. When Maj. T. E. Jameson of the 48th Tennessee returned from his advance scouting of the marching column, he told General Hood of the long line of Federal infantry drawn up at the Beasley place in a ravine facing south. Hood now faced the real possibility that his flanking maneuver had been detected by Schofield. But he held out hope that a low range of hills to his left might hide his army. To further protect the column, Hood ordered Cheatham's Corps to march in two parallel columns, with two of Brown's brigades to march alongside Cleburne's and Bate's Divisions. Sam Watkins of Maney's Brigade recalled the long and tedious march through muddy fields and woods, stating that the men soon became worn out and were "just dragging themselves along." Even the normally affable General Brown seemed perturbed by the slow progress. (18) 

The column halted for lunch and a brief rest at Blanton's Chapel, improving the disposition of the men but not their commanders. Gregory noted that the officers remained frustrated over the delays. A heated argument ensued between Hood, Cleburne and Granbury. Gregory's impression was that of "some words between them as to Cleburne or Granberry [sic] being put in the extreme advance and some chafing and dissatisfaction because some of the troops were so slow in coming up. (19) 

When the march resumed, the men were in a more cheerful mood as local citizens turned out to offer them tobacco and food. One woman insisted on cooking up two hogs for Cleburne's men. When Cleburne attempted to pay her, she refused and offered to cook him a fine turkey dinner that night. "No, ma'am," replied Cleburne, "we'll be too busy tonight, but tomorrow night I'll be back for it with many thanks." (20) 

By 3 p.m. Cleburne's Division had reached Rutherford Creek, not more than two miles south of Spring Hill. The crackle of small arms fire could be heard in the distance. While Cleburne's men hurriedly waded across the creek, General Hood dispatched a message to Forrest: "hold your position at all hazards," (21) adding that the advance of the infantry was but a few miles distant and moving forward rapidly. 

Back in Columbia at this same time, Schofield, now realizing he had tarried too long at the Duck River, was preparing to travel to Spring Hill personally. He had received Thomas's permission to fall back and take up a line of defense at Franklin if Hood should attempt to flank him. In anticipation of this movement, Schofield had ordered his 800 wagons, along with Stanley's Corps, to move to Spring Hill early that morning. Before Stanley's men got underway, Thomas sent another message to Schofield informing him that Grant wished Thomas to take the offensive. In view of the conflicting signals from Thomas, Schofield rescinded his earlier orders, allowing only Brig. Gen. George Wagner's Division, of Stanley's Corps, to proceed to Spring Hill with the wagon train. This nearly proved fatal to Schofield, as he later realized when he received Col. Post's report of massed Confederate infantry in the Federal rear. Thoroughly exasperated with Wilson's seeming inability to provide accurate information, and in view of S. D. Lee's sustained artillery barrage in his front, he ordered a slow withdrawal of his remaining troops from Columbia to begin at dusk. (22) 

In Spring Hill the situation was quickly deteriorating for the small Union garrison that had been sent there from Nashville to operate the courier lines. The quiet morning for the 200 cavalrymen of the 12th (Union) Tennessee, under the command of Lt. Col. Charles C. Hoefling, was suddenly shattered with the arrival of Schofield's 800 wagons at noon. Hoefling was already in a highly agitated state, having received word from a stray company of the 2nd Michigan Cavalry that Confederate cavalry was approaching from the east. The unmistakable sound of gunfire at 11 a.m. confirmed this and panic spread as the threat to the arriving wagon train was realized. 

With dust flying, Forrest's 5,000 troopers were fast approaching on the Mt. Carmel road. They began skirmishing with advance pickets of the 12th (Union) Tennessee Cavalry two miles east of the town. Forrest, operating under the assumption that the town was lightly held, ordered up a mounted charge. Hoefling's troopers were now being reinforced by a company of the 2nd Michigan, three companies of the 11th Indiana Cavalry, and one company of the 3rd Illinois Cavalry, the latter two having arrived with the wagon train. (23) Due to the rolling terrain, the Union cavalry was able to fend off Forrest's repeated charges while slowly falling back towards the town. This became a crucial factor to the Federals. Elements of Schofield's train guard, and the arrival of General Wagner with two of his brigades shortly after noon kept Forrest from entering the town proper. By 2 p.m. Wagner's third brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Luther P. Bradley had arrived, and repeated charges had exhausted Forrest's ammunition. Forrest could do little but await the arrival of Hood's infantry. 

In the soft waning hour of daylight, Cleburne's Division marching up the Rally Hill Pike must have been a welcome sight for Forrest's weary troopers. Presenting one of the few glorious visions of war, their flags billowing in the autumn breeze, the late afternoon sun reflecting off the tarnished buttons of their uniforms, their boots dropped in cadence on the pike. General Hood, riding with General Cleburne, personally directed his division commander, ordering him to form in echelon on the west side of the pike, facing west. Hood directed that Cleburne should confer with Forrest, then proceed across the fields to take possession of the Columbia-to-Nashville Pike, blocking Schofield's path of retreat. (24) Thus, with this simple and direct order was born the puzzling chain of events that would take years and countless hours of study for historians to unravel.