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Almost as soon as the guns had cooled, battlefield participants, would-be experts and ordinary laymen began placing blame for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg and their debate continues even to today. The most frequently mentioned candidates include Generals Longstreet, Ewell and Stuart, as well as General Robert E. Lee himself. But I would like to add a candidate to that list, a fellow whom most readers have probably never even heard of, let alone thought to blame. Yet the evidence strongly suggests that he played a significant, if not critical, role in the debacle. His name was John D. Imboden, and he was a Brigadier General in command of a force of irregulars which operated mostly in the Shenandoah Valley and which included the 18th VA. Cavalry, the 62nd VA Mounted Infantry, the VA Partisan Rangers and Captain J. H. McClanahan's VA Artillery Battery. Although accustomed to operating independently, Imboden's force was placed under Lee's jurisdiction for the duration of the Pennsylvania campaign.

Not knowing exactly how much responsibility the erratic irregulars could be given, on June 20, 1863, Lee ordered Imboden to move down the Shenandoah Valley toward Harpers Ferry, and there to procure all the horses and other supplies he could for the Army as it advanced into Maryland. Imboden was also told (in one of Lee's characteristically discretionary directives) that, "...should you find an opportunity, you can yourself advance north of the Potomac and keep on the left (i.e., west of) this army in its advance into Pennsylvania." Two days later, Lee sent a message to Dick Ewell, whose corps was leading the advance towards the Mason/Dixon Line, indicating that he had directed Imboden, if opportunity offered, to place himself "...on your [left] and in communication with you [and to] keep you advised of the movements of the enemy, and assist in collecting supplies for the army." This was the identical order Lee had given JEB Stuart, except that Stuart was to have placed his cavalry on Ewell's right, whereas Imboden was to take a position on Ewell's left. Because neither man carried out his assignment as intended, the Army of Northern Virginia was left virtually blind insofar as knowing the whereabouts of the Union Army of the Potomac was concerned. But Imboden's absence also created another problem which contributed to the loss of the battle of Gettysburg, as we shall soon see.

Instead of heading north paralleling Ewell's advance through Maryland and on into Pennsylvania, for some unknown reason Imboden veered off to the west and headed upriver for Hancock, Maryland, thus losing contact with Ewell (if he ever had contact in the first place), and taking his force out of supporting distance for several days. He didn't find his way back to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, until the fighting had already commenced at Gettysburg and, most importantly, his unavailability caused Lee to have to leave a large infantry force atop the extension of South Mountain (at the so-called Cashtown Gap) to guard the the army's rear and supply train. That infantry force was, as the reader may already have guessed, General George Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps, which was consequently unavailable during the second day's attack on the left end of the Federal position, including Little Round Top.

In his book From Manassas To Appomattox, "Old Pete" Longstreet laments Pickett's absence that second afternoon. He writes that, "...As events of the battle of the 2nd passed, it seems fair to claim that with Pickett's brigades present at the moment of Wofford's advance for the gorge at Little Round Top, we could have had it before Crawford (and the PA Reserves Division) was there." This was hindsight on Longstreet's part, of course, and had Pickett's men been on the field that day, Longstreet may well have formulated an entirely different tactical battle plan, which no one can now say might or might not have worked. The fact is, however, that Hood's Division received little if any support for its determined (almost desperate) attack, which had it been properly followed up, might have swirled around Little Round Top and reached the rear of the Union lines -- thus possibly routing the Yankees (or at the very least, causing Meade to order a pull back to the Pipe Creek line, which he seems to have favored in the first place).

Longstreet relates that Lee was quite vexed at Imboden for having diverted his cavalry to Hancock. Imboden didn't reach Lee's headquarters atop McPherson's ridge until the afternoon of the 3rd, possibly at about the time the great Confederate artillery bombardment of Cemetery Ridge was taking place. Imboden himself wrote after the war that Lee was not at his headquarters when he arrived, and that he was told to return later that evening. By the time he did so, the outcome of the battle was clearly evident, and the exhausted and disheartened Confederate commander informed him that he wanted his outfit to escort the 17-mile long wagon train of wounded back to the Potomac. Imboden doesn't indicate exactly what was said between he and Lee that night (of July 3-4), but it seems safe to assume that Lee was no more cordial to him than he'd been to his other errant cavalry commander, whom Lee evidently believed had also failed to carry out the intent of his orders.

In Imboden's (and also, Ewell's and JEB Stuart's) defense, Lee's orders tended to be somewhat less than precise and were often maddeningly discretionary. During the Gettysburg campaign, we hear of him telling Ewell to take Culps Hill if practicable, and of Stuart being allowed to judge for himself whether he could "...pass around the Federal army without hindrance, and cross the river east of the mountains." Imboden's orders seem to have reflected that same sort of discretionary phraseology which might have been more appropriate if delivered to a "Stonewall" Jackson than to an Imboden or Ewell. 

Reenactment of Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg

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