same duty, and report the result to you. Unless you have commenced moving your command, the commanding general directs that you remain in your present position to-day.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNumbers G. PARKE,
Chief of Staff.
General Stoneman will please march his division over the same route taken by Brigadier-General Humphreys' division.
Wolf Run Shoals, November 22, 1862.
I have the honor to report that this division is in position at Union Mills, the First Brigade, with a battery, occupying the works commanding Wolf Run Ford. The roads, in consequence of the recent storm, are almost impracticable for artillery or trains and for infantry. The march has been very fatiguing. The Occoquan is barely fordable at this point, and I apprehend a further depth of water in a day or two.
The following report is made to me by a deserter, who entered my lines at Union Mills to-day:
Charles Myers, formerly of the Eighth Alabama, now of Stuart's Horse Artillery, says:
I left Culpeper on Tuesday evening, and went to Warrenton. Stuart's cavalry and artillery left Warrenton at 10 o'clock in the forenoon of Wednesday, and moved toward Fredericksburg. He had ten regiments of cavalry and four pieces of artillery, poorly mounted; one Whitworth breech-loading gun, two Parrotts, and one Napoleon. The Confederate took about 25 prisoners at Warrenton.
This man deserted in apprehension of punishment for leaving the Eighth Alabama, without a discharge, and joining Stuart's artillery, for which he had been put in the guard-house. Came from Catlett's Station on the railroad; staid last night at Manassas; saw no Confederates after he left Catlett's.
D. E. SICKLES,
NOVEMBER 22, 1862.
Several days must elapse before the railroad to Fredericksburg can be reconstructed; several days more before, and addition to daily supplies, ten or twelve days' rations can be accumulated in advance. Cars and engines must be transported from Alexandria and unloaded singly. This takes time. Suppose your whole army should e thrown on the south side of the Rappahannock, communicating by boat and pontoon bridges, would it not cover and protect the navigation of that stream? Could not you to be prepared to advance much sooner than if dependent upon supplies exclusively by rail? If unsuccessful, could you not retire behind the Rappahannock, by which time a full depot would be formed at Falmouth? If successful, could not draw supplies from White