been effected and no probability of another general engagement then appearing, I received,on calling upon the commanding general, personal instructions to take to the rear all the artillery not requisite for the divisions, and to co-operate with the ordnance and quartermaster's department in having sought for and secured all the stores wrested from or left by the enemy. With the discharge of these duties on that day and several others succeeding terminated the moderate share it was the privilege of my command and of myself to have during this eventful period in the toils, sacrifices, and inestimable services of our heroic army.
Our loss in the several contests of the occasion was - in Major Jones' battalion, 5 men killed and 24 wounded; 13 horses disabled and 2 wheels destroyed.
In Colonel Brown's regiment - 1 man wounded and 2 horses killed.
In Lieutenant-Colonel Cutts' battalion (Lane's company) - 3 men killed and 5 wounded; 1 horse killed.
In Major Richardson's battalion (Woolfok's company) - 1 man killed and 3 wounded.
In Major Nelson's battalion - 1 man killed and 1 wounded (though 7 struck) and 4 horses disabled, making a total of 10 men killed and 34 wounded and 20 horses disabled.
Of our medical staff, Surg. J. R. Page and Assistant Surgeons Greene, Perrin, Semple, Monteiro, and Hopkins were called upon for the exercise of their skill, and with exemplary fidelity devoted themselves not only to the relief of our own wounded, but to alleviating the injuries of other sufferers. In fact my entire staff was assiduous in duty, and I may safely declare that no truer spirit animated our best troops than was exercised by those under my command.
In conclusion, while gratefully recognizing that Divine favor which crowned us with victory, I would commend to the consideration of the commanding general what seems to me to have been a serious error with regard to the use of artillery in these several fights -too little was thrown into action at once; too much was left in the rear unused. One or two batteries brought into position at a time to oppose a much larger artillery force well posted must greatly suffer, if not ultimately yield, under the concentrated fire. This was in several instances our experience. We needed more guns taking part, alike for our own protection and for crippling the enemy. With a powerful array opposed to his own, we divide his attention, shake his nerves, make him shoot at random, and more readily drive him the field worsted and alarmed. A main cause of this error in the present case was no doubt a peculiar in the country, from the prevalence of woods and swamps. We could form little idea of positions, and were very generally ignorant of those chosen by the enemy and of the best modes of approaching them; nor were good maps readily accessible, by which in some measure to supply this deficiency; hence a considerable degree of perplexity, which nothing but careful reconnaissance, by skillful officers, experienced in such service, could have obviated, but being obviated, attack had been more co-operative, concentrated, and effectual, the enemy's condition more crippled, and our success more triumphant, with less mourning in the land.
I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. N. PENDELTON,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery.
General R. E. LEE, Commanding.