eHistory logo Primary Sources Section
Primary Sources Home | Search eHistory

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies

You are currently in Volume XVI | Pages range from 1 to 1168

Go to Page (current volume):  
Index | Previous | Next
OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 1, vol 16, Part 1 (Morgan's First Kentucky Raid, Perryville Campaign)
Page 9 Chapter XXVIII. GENERAL REPORTS.

had in its effects. General Buel deserves neither blame nor applause for it, because it was at time understood to be the policy of the Government. At least he could violate no orders on the subject, be cause there were none.

2. SUFFERING KENTUCKY TO BE INVADED BY REBELS UNDER BRAGG.

We find that the rebels under Bragg concentrated at Chattanooga about the 22nd of July, 1862, 1862, for the purpose of invading Kentucky. Prior to that, on the 11th day of June, General Buell, with his Army of the Ohio was ordered by General Halleck to march against Chattanooga, and take it, with the ulterior object of dislodging Kirby Smith and his rebel force from East Tennessee. We are of opinion that General Buell had force sufficient to accomplish the object if he could have marched promptly to Chattanooga. The plan of operation, however, prescribed by General Halleck compelled General Buell to repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Corinth to Decatur and put in in running order, as a line of supply during the advance. While that road proved of comparatively little service, the work forced such delays that a prompt march upon Chattanooga was impossible. The delays thus occasioned gave Bragg time to send a numerous cavalry force to operate against General Buells' lines of supply, which were unnecessarily long. So successful were the incursions of the cavalry that no opportunity was found, after the Memphis and Charleston Railroad was completed to Decatur, to concentrate enough of the Army of the Ohio to capture Chattanooga and execute the ulterior purposes of the expedition.

The massing of the rebel force at Chattanooga compelled a relinquishment of the design against that place; after which General Buell was required to exert all his energies to prevent the recapture of Nashville and the invasion of Kentucky. This he could have done, in our opinion, by an early concentration of his army at Sparta, McMinnville, or Murfreesborough, with a view to active offensive operations against Bragg the moment he debouched from the Sequatchie Valley. Instead of that, he waited until the 5th of September before concentrating at Murfreesborough, from which he retired to Nashville, thereby allowing Bragg to cross the Cumberland River without interruption. The Commission cannot justify the falling back from Murfreesborough to Nashville, but is of opinion that it was General Buell's duty from that point to have attacked the rebel army before it crossed the Cumberland, and it is the belief that had course been pursued Bragg would have been defeated.

3.-THE FAILURE TO RELIEVE MUNFORDVILLE.

In the relative movements of the armies of Generals Buell and Bragg Munfordville was important on account on account of its railroad bridge over Green River and its natural strength as a position for battle. Bragg moved upon it by way of Glasgow, and not anticipating great resistance, he dispatched a column in advance of his main body to take it. The column was repulsed by the garrison on the 14th of September. Bragg the moved his whole army against the post. On the 17th of September it was justifiably surrendered. The order to hold Munfordville proceeded from General Wright, commanding the Department of the Ohio, of which Kentucky formed a part. It was given in expectation that General Buell would reach the place in time to save it. General Wright


Page 9 Chapter XXVIII. GENERAL REPORTS.
OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 1, vol 16, Part 1 (Morgan's First Kentucky Raid, Perryville Campaign)
Index | Previous | Next
This symbol external link icon indicates an external link
All images and content are the property of eHistory at The Ohio State University unless otherwise stated.
Copyright © 2014 OSU Department of History. All rights reserved. [citation and copyright information]
eHistory icon