As soon as the fact was communicated, I gave directions for the line of pickets to be re-established and to advance. This was not done in season to bring up our left with the right, and fearing that the latter would be too much exposed from its advanced position I gave directions to establish itself on our old line. Will forward Grover's report as soon as I receive it. Very little resistance was offered to the advance, though the pickets seemed to be numerous, but avoided collision.
I am of the impression that the enemy in front is weak to-day. From both of my lookouts we have not been able to see to exceed five regiments. The rebel camps are all standing. We could see no troops in them or occupying their earthworks. Not a piece of artillery was fired on us nor was a piece seen by any one. Please forward this to General Marcy at once.
Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 23, 1862-4 p.m.
Flag-Officer, Fort Monroe:
Have the gunboats which I asked you for some days since, and which you expected soon, yet arrived and been sent to White House?
It is a matter of great importance that this additional protection should be given to our depots at the earliest practicable moment.
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 23, 1862-10.50 p.m.
General FITZ JOHN PORTER,
Commanding Fifth Corps:
Your dispatch of 10.45 received. Your dispositions of your troops are approved by the commanding general.
You will please hold a portion of your force in reserve to watch your right flank toward Walnut Grove, Bethesda Church, &c.
Send patrols at once along the line of the Chickahominy to ascertain whether the enemy are building bridges, and if they are doing so send a sufficient force of reliable infantry to attack them unexpectedly and drive them off.
Send during the night any information you may gain, and after daybreak at least half hour.
If you are attacked be careful to state as promptly as possible the number, composition, and position of the enemy. The troops on this side will be held ready either to support you directly or to attack the enemy in their front.
If the force attacking you is large the general would prefer the latter course, counting upon your skill and the admirable troops under your command to hold their own against superior numbers long enough for him to make the decisive movement which will determine the fate of Richmond.
Do not lose sight of the absolute necessity of keeping me constantly and fully informed of everything which occurs is your front.
R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff.