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eReview: Lincoln and His Generals

by T. Harry Williams New York, Gramercy Press, 2001

Review by eHistory Team

[This review is one of the College Book Reports from the old eHistory site. The Reports were a more academic and thorough look at the text than our normal eReviews, complete with end notes and a bibliography]

Professor T. Harry Williams has written an extraordinary book entitled Lincoln and His Generals. This work has served as a catalyst for many other authors, and with good reason!

Dr. Williams is very compelling with his thesis that Abraham Lincoln was a superb war-time president whose grasp of military strategy and attention to command structure provided the ingredients necessary for a Union victory. Indeed, Williams shows that Lincoln had a better understanding of the war than any of his generals, and that Lincoln's stubborn and persistent "meddling" into military matters were crucial to the Union's success. As the title aptly projects, Lincoln's role as a war-time commander-in-chief is the centerpiece of this book.

Frank Vandiver is a military historian who was nearly a generation younger than Professor Williams, and who is clearly influenced by Williams. Dr. Vandiver has written Rebel Brass, a short book that discusses the Confederate command structure and the personalities of the Confederate leadership, with an introduction by Dr. Williams. Although Vandiver does not attempt to place Davis as the central figure in the book, Davis' position naturally makes him a central figure. Vandiver attempts to show how six principal factors complicated the South's command structure: geography, manpower, leadership, economy, attitude (Southern culture) and communications. He discusses these factors throughout and shows their effects, but he does much more analysis of leadership and attitude than the other four factors. While Dr. Vandiver has followed Williams' lead in addressing aspects of the Civil War that are removed from the battlefield, from campaigns and tactics, he does not provide an absorbing, scholarly book that is in any way the equal of Williams'.

Williams is a master writer. He builds his case convincingly; from the first page of the first chapter, Williams demonstrates Lincoln's intuitive understanding that occupation of rebel territory was not to be the primary goal of Union forces. Rather, Lincoln repeatedly encouraged his generals, from Scott to McClellan to Meade, that Confederate forces should be the principal target of the Union army.

Interestingly, Williams shows that on the eve of General Grant's ascension to command of all the Union armies, Lincoln had to personally reorient even Grant's objectives.1 That Lincoln was not shy to express his opinion on military matters, and to correct those of others, was a critical aspect of Lincoln's greatness. Having been disappointed with the strategic views of Scott, McClellan, Halleck, Meade, and many others, Lincoln clung to the courage of his convictions, despite his new Lieutenant General's well-earned reputation as a military leader and battlefield tactician. Persisting in a strategic view he had developed as early as 1861, Lincoln finally found a general to implement it in 1864! Williams forcefully shows that the idea of making Lee's army the target was Lincoln's, not Grant's.

Lincoln was as much in command when Grant was the Commanding General as he was when McClellan was. That Lincoln appeared not as involved is largely due to the fact that Grant was doing what Lincoln wanted. Grant communicated to Lincoln and did not undertake important actions without consulting Lincoln. Grant was simply the instrument of Lincoln's policy, though undoubtedly Lincoln learned some things from Grant and had high admiration, and perhaps even affection, for his Commanding General. However, when Grant was unable to control the Union response to Early's activity in the Shenandoah Valley, which threatened Washington, it was Lincoln who took charge and eliminated the threat.

Vandiver presents an interesting picture of the South's executive leadership though his book is slow getting started. For instance, on many occasions he describes Jefferson Davis as having been incapable of delegating authority; finally, Vandiver concludes that very significant weakness was Davis' most disqualifying and prevented him from being an effective war-time executive. After spending much time enumerating Davis' other weaknesses, Vandiver nonetheless asks us to not to underrate the Condeferate president.3 Regrettably, given the picture painted in the book, and the dearth of positive material about him, it is very difficult not to underrate Davis on the basis of Vandiver's book. What is more important, Vandiver gives us little reason to believe, and no proof, that Davis was effective in other ways. For example, Vandiver points to the fact that in his disputes with the Confederate Congress, Davis "made his situation no easier by frequently being right." Saying the disputes were too well known to recount, Vandiver leaves us hanging by not mentioning even one example.4 If results count, then Davis as a war-time leader was not in the same league as Williams' Lincoln. Vandiver's thesis is that Davis was and would have been a great Secretary of War, but as a Chief Executive his shortcomings were too numerous. When Davis' liabilities were combined with Southern culture and Southern pre-occupation with strong states' rights, Vandiver points out that the rebellion was doomed. But, while he presents interesting summaries on a number of issues that are sure to pique the interest of many readers, Vandiver does not deliver a classic piece.

Williams, on the other hand, is powerful in his delivery. He presents fact after fact, interwoven with thoughtful analysis, to present his view that Lincoln had great strategic insights into the war and how to win it. Both Williams and Vandiver treat the political aspects of being president of a democracy during a war. While Williams documents his conclusions and provides examples that support his thesis, that Lincoln was a superb politician as well as strategist, Vandiver provides only the conclusion that Davis was a failure as a politician.

Williams spends considerable time on General George McClellan. That famous example of tactical and strategic ineptness left a considerable body of writing that was contemporaneous with his service as Commanding General in Chief, and McClellan provided a perfect complement to Lincoln. The General had a well- recognized expertise in training and organizing an army. Indeed, until Grant became a known winner in the East, no General had nearly as much stature among the officers and men of the Army of the Potomac as George McClellan. But McClellan could not listen nor learn from others. He could not even imagine that someone like Lincoln, who had no military training and very little military experience, could possibly have had good ideas related to tactics and strategy. Williams uses McClellan to point out the numerous, positive qualities that Lincoln possessed, such as: the ability to delegate authority, the ability to work with both Republican and Democratic politicians, a keen sense of humor, a willingness to take responsibility for decisions, a continuing personal interest in all aspects of the war, and the ability to grow as a leader as he acquired new knowledge and additional experience. It is easy to imagine the Lincoln-McClellan team besting Robert E. Lee, if only they could have worked together. Unfortunately, they did not, and Williams makes it clear that Lincoln, unlike Davis, was intolerant of failure.

Lincoln's loyalty was to the Union, not to individuals. Davis, on the other hand, was loyal to his friends to the detriment of his cause. As the leader of a rebellion, and one needing a quick victory, since he knew of the South's fatal weaknesses, he could not afford to be loyal to people who did not achieve results, while holding grudges against capable officers with whom he did not have good personal relations.

Lincoln and His Generals does have some weaknesses; Williams is no chemist, and it is easy to recognize that he wrote in the carefree 1950's, and not the politically correct 1990's. While describing General Joseph Hooker, Williams attributes Hooker's indecision and ineffectiveness to being cut off alcohol (Hooker quit drinking upon taking command of the Army of the Potomac.) Describing alcohol as a "stimulant," Williams was both misguided and incorrect by concluding that Hooker "...would have been in better shape if he had a few drinks."

Both authors provide provocative insights into various key figures. Indeed, Vandiver is at his best describing the various personalities in the Executive Branch, and in providing insights into the logistical challenges and successes that marked the South's war effort. He provides a thoughtful analysis of each of the four men who served successively as Davis' principal Secretaries of War - Leroy P. Walker, Judah P. Benjamin, George W. Randolph, and finally James A. Seddon. Vandiver also pays close attention to Stephen Mallory, the Secretary of the Navy. The relationship that each figure had with Davis is highlighted. However, Vandiver provides little insight into other key Executive Branch personalities, like Commissary General Luther Northrop, except to say that they were incompetent; regrettably, his book is too short to have given attention to all the Confederate command. On the subject of logistics, however, a subject crucial to military success but little known to civilians, Vandiver provides an excellent, if brief, summary.

Rebel Brass consumes only 126 easily read pages. In so short a book, asking the author to present details may be too much. Vandiver, however, leaves us wanting data by making broad generalizations about important topics. For example, his summary of Chapter 2 leaves the impression that Southern culture probably prevented the South from mounting a "total war" effort. Later he describes the efforts of Jackson's quartermaster as "key to the general's success in the valley."8 Since Jackson's valley campaign is still used a model for the principles of "maneuver warfare," presenting some details about the quartermaster's efforts would satiate the reader. Instead, the generalization leaves us wondering.

Vandiver does provide some details of how the South's inability to create a strong central government had an adverse effect on, for example, its ability to maintain and efficiently use railroads, impress property, and coordinate important, indeed vital, logistic functions. These are issues most students of the Civil War have not considered, and Vandiver deserves great credit for raising our collective consciousness with respect to them.

Dr. Williams provides a definitive work on the relationship between President Lincoln and his military leaders, a relationship that grew into a command structure which survived into the twentieth century. Vandiver, on the other hand, has given us a good opening volume on the subject of the Confederate command structure and the role that logistics played in the result. For a better understanding of the Confederate high command, students of the war are well advised to read Archer Jones' Civil War Command and Strategy, The Process of Victory and Defeat.