Juche Tower in Pyongyang, North Korea. Built as a monument to both Kim Il-sung and the "self-reliance" ideology of "juche," Juche Tower stands as an example to North Koreans of their diplomatic and economic potential. At the same time, Juche results in diplomatic paradoxes as the North Korean state tries to balance power at home with prestige abroad.
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The Bush administration's controversial October 2008 decision to take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, in an effort to keep Pyongyang's nuclear program halted, opens a new chapter in the history of North Korea's international relations. Nuclear proliferation is worrisome anywhere in the world, but particularly coming from secretive, unpredictable, and, for many analysts around the world, incomprehensible North Korea. Water Mondale once declared 'anyone who claims to be an expert on North Korea is either a liar or a fool.' This month, Mitchell Lerner, a professor of history at Ohio State, braves being called one or the other. He offers insight into how policy is formed in North Korea and what drives its seemingly fickle relations with the rest of the world.
Origins gratefully acknowledges the support of The Center for East Asian Studies at The Ohio State University in preparing this article. For more on recent events in East Asia, see the June 2008 Origins article on Taiwan’s Presidential elections.
Making Sense of the 'Hermit Kingdom': North Korea in the Nuclear Age
While Americans have been focused on the economic crisis and the Presidential elections, events in North Korea have not received the attention they otherwise might. This fall, much to the consternation of American officials, North Korea threatened to restart its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, demanding that the U.S. remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea had agreed to shut down Yongbyon in 2007, following its October 2006 nuclear detonation and the ensuing six-party talks (involving North and South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S.).
Amidst intense debate in Washington, and despite significant opposition, the Bush administration quickly complied with the terror-list demand (in return for certain limited assurances about disarmament, information, and inspections), fearing that the delicate nuclear balance reached in 2007 was about to be overturned. Just weeks after celebrating its 60th anniversary as a country, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was released from George Bush’s “axis of evil.”
Still, few in the U.S. were optimistic that the dispute was now resolved. “I am profoundly disappointed,” complained Florida Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. “By rewarding North Korea before the regime has carried out its commitments, we are encouraging this regime to continue its illicit nuclear program.”
North Korea has arguably been the greatest thorn in the side of American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Yet, while so many in and out of American government express concern and at times outrage over DPRK policy, few claim to understand the underlying motives and objectives that have guided the nation's seemingly incoherent and unpredictable belligerency. "Anyone who claims to be an expert on North Korea," former vice-president Walter Mondale once famously declared, "is either a liar or a fool."
Particularly vexing has been the North's propensity for creating trouble just when it seems to be at its weakest, sometimes even taking bellicose action against the West while at the very same moment its leaders seek Western assistance, spurring anger and frustration from the U.S. and its allies. North Korea, lamented one exasperated American congressman recently "makes it very difficult to have a normal relationship with them."
Events from the past few decades offer a series of instructive examples. Torrential rains in 1995 and 1996, followed by a series of droughts, devastated the nation's food production. Further complicating the situation was the fact that China was also reducing its food aid significantly.
Conditions were simply horrific. Children lived on 35% of the UN recommended caloric intake and families tried to survive on diets of weeds, roots, and bark. "Today," began one official radio broadcast in 1996, "I will introduce you to tasty and healthy ways to eat wild grass." The United States, South Korea, and Japan, among others, helped to fill the void, providing food aid worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Suddenly, in the midst of this disaster, a North Korean submarine on an espionage mission ran aground near South Korean territory. DPRK commandos abandoned the vessel and attempted to infiltrate the South, sparking firefights that left 24 North Koreans and 14 South Koreans dead. A very unrepentant North Korean government condemned the South's behavior as "barbarousness and beastliness," and warned that they might "be forced to take strong countermeasures." South Korea responded by cutting off most aid to the destitute country.
Soon thereafter, U.S. reconnaissance satellites discovered a newly built North Korean launch platform for its medium-range Nodong-1 missile, which placed almost all of Japan in range. Rumors of an impending missile test followed, as did widespread condemnation. In August 1998, while still accepting massive amounts of Western-bloc aid, North Korea launched a multi-stage Taepo-dong I missile across Japan and into the Pacific. Quickly Japan and the U.S. condemned the test and cut off most forms of assistance.
Americans were stunned by the North's ingratitude and irrationality. "We don't know much about North Korea and who this Kim Jong-il is," lamented Congressman Jay Kim (R-CA). "I understand he is not a rational individual."
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