Roosevelt’s task – to deny a sitting
President the nomination of his own party – was a daunting one even for
someone of Roosevelt’s political talent and personal charisma. Roosevelt did
not doubt his popularity among the rank-and-file of the Republican Party.
However, under the party rules as they stood in 1912, this fact had little to do
with the actual process of obtaining the nomination. Only a handful of states
chose their delegates to the national convention in open primaries; in most
states, delegates were chosen by the party apparatus at state or local
conventions. And Taft, as titular head of the party and distributor of
Federal
patronage, continued to control the party apparatus. Roosevelt was well aware
that his only chance was to win the handful of open primaries so convincingly
that the party would be forced to abandon Taft as unelectable. Taft was equally
aware that he needed to lock up delegates quickly in order to convince party
leaders that the Roosevelt movement was doomed before it reached the convention.
The result was an unusually fierce pre-convention campaign and internecine
warfare between competing factions of the Republican Party.
In some states, party warfare was literal.
Fistfights between Roosevelt and Taft delegations broke out at party meetings
around the country. District conventions in Missouri grew so contentious that at
one of them many delegates carried baseball bats. In Michigan, fighting broke
out when a Taft delegate tackled a Roosevelt delegate, Jim Thorpe style, right
on the convention platform. In Arkansas, fighting started at one county
convention when a Roosevelt supporter (who was being denied entry to the
convention hall) brained a Taft supporter with a tomato can. The Oklahoma state
convention grew so tense that observers expected a gunfight to break out at any
moment. In many states, whichever side failed to carry the state convention
(sometimes failing fair and square, sometimes defrauded, sometimes physically
locked out) organized a rump convention and sent a contesting delegation to
Chicago. In the South, where Taft controlled the party apparatus through federal
patronage, Roosevelt supporters with federal jobs were fired wholesale and state
conventions were held as early as possible to prevent Roosevelt from organizing
opposition.
In the few states with direct primary elections,
both candidates campaigned rigorously. Taft, who under ordinary circumstances
would stay in Washington and appear presidential, was forced to stump the
country against one of the most aggressive campaigners in the nation’s
history. In addition to his sense of personal betrayal and the general
conservatism of his temperament, Taft was genuinely infuriated by the notions of
judicial referendum and recall. Much of his campaigning focused on their
dangers.
The Ohio primary on May 21 was considered
particularly important by both sides. Ohio was a swing state in national
electoral politics, and therefore an important barometer of a candidate’s
popularity. It was also Taft’s home state, and few more embarrassing scenarios
existed in American politics than a sitting President losing his own state
delegation. Roosevelt was enormously popular in Ohio, which was in the process
of rewriting its state constitution and therefore in the process of considering
many of the progressive reforms Roosevelt endorsed. The Colonel’s speech calling for judicial recall had been given in front of the Ohio Constitutional
Convention in February. Roosevelt also had very good organization in the state.
Both candidates and dozens of their surrogates crisscrossed the state in special
campaign trains. The rhetoric began to get personal and a bit silly. At a speech
in Cambridge, Taft referred to Roosevelt as, among other things, an
"egotist" and "demagogue"; the following day Roosevelt
called the President a "puzzlewit" and a "fathead." As
if this were not enough entertainment, Robert LaFollette arrived in the state
for a few days of campaigning and attacked them both. The results of all this
were highly embarrassing for Taft: Roosevelt pulled 165,809 votes in the Ohio
primary, Taft 118,362, LaFollette 15,570. |
Nor was this defeat isolated. As early as April
9, when Roosevelt won the Illinois primary with a 2-1 margin, Republicans free
to vote directly had chosen Roosevelt. They did so all spring. Taft won only one
open primary, in Massachusetts, and that very narrowly. LaFollette won primaries
in his home state of Wisconsin and in South Dakota. Roosevelt won all nine
others, five of them in electorally important states: Illinois, Ohio,
California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
It was not enough, however, to deny Taft the
nomination before the convention. Roosevelt held 432 secure delegates on the eve
of the convention, Taft 326, La Follette 41. 254 delegates were contested. It
was the job of the Republican National Committee – controlled by Taft – to
adjudicate delegate disputes. Barring organizational collapse or unforeseen convention heroics inspired by the magnetism of Roosevelt’s personality, the
nomination was still Taft’s to lose. No convention that nominated Taft under
these circumstances, however, was likely to be peaceful or sedate. It was more
likely to shred the party. Such were the conditions under which Republicans traveled
to Chicago in June.
The events of the Republican
Convention would proved dramatic.
[ Ohio 1912 Republican Primary ]
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