When
California delegates, the first to arrive in town, began calling
themselves "Bull Moosers" (Roosevelt in a stray campaign
comment had proclaimed himself "fit as a Bull Moose"),
the new party had itself a mascot cartoonists could send into
battle against the Democratic donkey and the Republican elephant.
Many delegates, paying homage to Roosevelts cowboy days,
wore red bandanas, though few wore them correctly, having never
seen anyone in their lives besides Roosevelt who resembled a
cowboy.
The spontaneous adoration
this unique group exhibited toward Roosevelt was so overwhelming
that some observers thought it even startled Roosevelt a little
bit. The highlight of the convention was Roosevelts "Confession of Faith," in which Roosevelt proclaimed
his support for the entire reform platform in language excoriating
the existing political system "The old parties are
husks, with no real soul within either, divided on artificial
lines, boss-ridden and privilege-controlled, each a jumble of
incongruous elements, and neither daring to speak out wisely
and fearlessly what should be said on the vital issues of the
day" and infused with the same evangelical Protestantism
that drove his audience. The response from the 15,000 delegates
and spectators in the Coliseum was so overwhelming that Roosevelt
repeatedly found it necessary to quiet his own ovations so that
he could continue with his speech. He came out for nearly every
major reform he had trumpeted since 1910, and more: referendum
and recall, direct primaries, woman suffrage, the eight-hour
day, child-labor laws, workplace safety, regulation of business
by the Federal government. And he closed again with his new
catchphrase, "We stand at Armageddon, and we battle for
the Lord."
Not all aspects of
the convention were so smooth, however. Thorny organizational
and ideological issues faced the new party. Should they attempt
to run a full slate of candidates in all state and local races,
or only support Roosevelt for President? How much of Roosevelts
rank-and-file Republican support would be willing to declare
war on its own political past and desert the Republican ticket?
Particularly sticky
was the question of the partys relationship toward African-Americans.
To run a plausible national campaign, Roosevelt believed he
needed to contest the Solid South. Progressive Party organizations
sprang up quickly in several Southern states after the Republican
convention, encouraging Roosevelt in this belief. Attracting
votes in the South, however, meant aligning the Progressive
Party with then-dominant Southern racial mores in other
words, aligning it with racism and segregation. Southern Progressives
demanded Roosevelt deny the legitimacy of black political participation
and ignore black aspirations for social justice. This would
mean abandoning black votes, when many northern blacks (who
could and did vote) and black opinion leaders were at least
tentatively interested in a party that claimed to stand for
comprehensive economic, political, and social reform. Several
prominent Northern white Progressives also considered the race
issue a litmus test of the sincerity of the new partys
commitment to social justice. And the issue could not be dodged:
several Southern states sent two delegations to the Progressive
convention, one "lily-white," one integrated. Which
delegations would be seated?
Roosevelt was, by
any reasonable modern standard, racist. He was a white supremacist
of the variety common among American intellectuals early in
the twentieth century, in that he believed white domination
of American society (and European domination of world politics)
was the natural product of superior "Anglo-Saxon"
racial traits. He lacked, however, the vicious, sadistic racial
antagonisms of many Southern whites, and did not consider intentional
race-baiting either good public policy or good politics. Roosevelts
attempted solution to this dilemma sought to placate both Southern
whites and Northern blacks. Roosevelt argued that in the North,
African-Americans had earned the right to political equality,
but in the South they should place their trust in "the
best white men of the South" in other words, a "lily-white"
party in the South. Roosevelt explained his views--views
he said were Progressive--in August in a widely circulated article
titled "The
Progressives and the Colored Man." This
"solution" was less than satisfying intellectually,
but it did allow Roosevelt to criticize the race policies of
both major parties: he labeled the Democrats race-baiters and
the Republicans hypocrites, since they only supported black
politicians in the South, where they were largely irrelevant.
The Progressive convention seated lily-white delegations from
Southern states but made a great show of welcoming its handful
of black delegates from Northern and border states. The platform
committee, however, ignored an aggressive civil rights platform
plank drafted by the NAACPs W.E.B. Du Bois. platform committee.
As the new party struggled with
race issues, some African-Americans spoke out in its support.
Far more troublesome
to the platform committee was what to do about the antitrust
plank. The majority of rank-and-file Progressives demanded a
strong trustbusting plank. Important financial supporters of
the party, however most notably George Perkins and Frank
Munsey demanded assurances that the platform would not
contain such a plank. The platform committee dodged this dilemma
by approving two antitrust planks that directly contradicted
one another, one tolerant of big business, one hostile. Such
was the euphoria in the convention hall by the time the platform
was read that few ordinary delegates noticed. The radical plank
was excised from most contemporary newspaper reports of the
convention.
For Vice-President,
the convention nominated Hiram Johnson, former governor of California.
No candidates for other offices were offered. The nomination
of Wilson by the Democrats made a Roosevelt victory highly unlikely.
But Roosevelt looked forward to the fight.
Dr. MarcT. Horger
wrote the text for this page. |