Analysis
The Rhineland Campaign, although costly for the Allies, had
clearly been ruinous for the Germans. The Germans suffered some 300,000
casualties and lost vast amounts of irreplaceable equipment. Hitler, having
demanded the defense of all of the German homeland, enabled the Allies to
destroy the Wehrmacht in the West between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine
River. Now, the Third Reich lay virtually prostrate before Eisenhower's massed
armies.
Eisenhower was gratified with the
results of the Rhineland Campaign. They clearly justified his tenacious
adherence to a broad-front strategy. In late March he wrote Marshall that his
plans, which he had 'believed in from the beginning and [had] carried out in the
face of some opposition from within and without, [had] matured . . .
splendidly.' Yet all participants did not agree with the estimate.
Since the breakout from the Normandy
beachhead, the most formidable opposition to Eisenhower's broad-front strategy
consistently came from the British. Part of their resistance stemmed from
Churchill's emphasis on approaching Germany through Italy and the Balkans and
hence the reluctance to launch DRAGOON, a key aspect of Eisenhower's plans.
After the breakout, the British, most notably Montgomery, pressed for a single,
fully supported drive into Germany to end the war quickly. One reason for
Montgomery's demand was the fact that by 1944 the costs of the war were
bankrupting Great Britain; shortening the war would relieve the overwhelming
economic drain. The United States was not experiencing such pressures, and
Eisenhower chose a surer, albeit more cautious and time-consuming, approach.
But Eisenhower surely had other good
reasons to avoid a risky drive into Germany. Until Antwerp began replenishing
Allied stores in late November, logistics remained the supreme commander's
principal consideration. Quite simply, he strongly believed that the plans put
forward by Montgomery, Bradley, or Patton for a single, deep drive into Germany
could not be supported logistically. In addition, as evidence mounted that the
Germans had recovered from their panicked flight from the Seine River,
Eisenhower worried that the enemy would concentrate and hit the exposed flank of
any thrust along a single axis. The quick German response to MARKET-GARDEN and
their offensives in the Ardennes and the Alsace substantiated Eisenhower's
concerns that the Germans were still an extremely dangerous enemy. Thus
Eisenhower chose to press the German defenses continually, straining the enemy
from Antwerp to Switzerland, and to increase Allied strength in men and materiel
for the inevitable assault into the heart of the Reich. Consequently, he
frequently changed the main Allied effort and executed secondary attacks when he
saw opportunities across the broad front facing his armies. In many ways the
Rhineland Campaign became a protracted, bloody battle of attrition, a battle the
Allies had the resources to win. Nevertheless, for all the controversy over the
single-thrust or the broad-front strategies, it is indisputable that the
Rhineland Campaign ended in success, a triumph that paved the way for final
Allied victory.
Eisenhower's tactful, yet determined,
stewardship of a complex and often contentious coalition force made the
successful conclusion of a difficult campaign possible. The indomitable soldiers
fighting in the Allied cause, however, transformed the possibilities of
high-level plans into victory on the ground. In incredibly harsh weather, over
difficult terrain, and against a determined foe, Eisenhower's soldiers had
triumphed. Of all these soldiers, the infantryman had had the hardest lot. In
mid-December Eisenhower wrote to Ernie Pyle, the well-known war correspondent,
that it was his foot soldiers who had demonstrated the 'real heroism—which is
the uncomplaining acceptance of unendurable conditions.' At Aachen, at Metz, in
the Huertgen Forest, in the Vosges Mountains, along the length of the Siegfried
Line, and on to the Rhine River, the Allied infantryman had persevered and,
through his determination, vanquished the Wehrmacht.