CHAPTER 4

The Fleet Marines Are Readied

The Air Contingency BLTs-The Eagle Pull Command Element The 31st MAU-The Other Contingency

In the six major planning conferences held in the 15 months between the cessation of combat air support in Southeast Asia and December 1974, III MAF liaison officers and USSAG Eagle Pull action officers developed and refined a highly sophisticated plan to evacuate Americans from Cambodia. After each conference, the Marine attendees would return to III MAF Headquarters at Camp Counney on Okinawa and proceed to revise as necessary their plans and orders for Operation Eagle Pull. These revisions focused on the heliborne option, known as Option III of the basic evacuation plan. This option required several landing sites because of the anticipated number of refugees, whose estimated numbers varied from day to day. Since the Marine Corps possessed most of the heavy helicopters in Southeast Asia, III MAF was naturally sensitive to any talks involving their use.

As these discussions at Nakhon Phanom progressed, agreement centered on the employment of sea-borne helicopters over fixed-wing aircraft or land-based helicopters, thereby allotting the Marine Corps a proportionally larger role in Operation Eagle Pull. In his capacity as liaison officer to the joint planning headquarters in Nakhon Phanom, Major George L. Cates, III MAF's Eagle Pull planner, had to make sure that plans for the MAF's tasking matched its capabilities. By intensifying its readiness training. III MAF took a giant step toward increasing its capabilities. In light of these changes, the 4th and 9th Marines began holding evacuation training classes, making evacuation preparation the order of the day in III MAF. The Air Contingency BLTs

In the first evacuation contingency plan of early 1973, the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii was assigned as the primary security force. Shortly after the decision, CinCPac planners realized that an interim, alternate force might be necessary if an evacuation of Cambodia were ordered without warning. To fulfill this requirement, CinCPac tasked III MAF to provide one company of Marines on a full-time standby basis. The evacuation security force contingency would rotate from company to company within III MAF, but if employed, the rifle company would fall under the operational control of Commander, USSAG from its arrival at the designated assembly point until the conclusion of the operation.'

On 15 April 1973, Major General Michael P. Ryan, III MAF commander, ordered the 31st MAU to provide the reinforced rifle company from its ground combat element, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines. A standing III MAF operation order directed the 31st MAU to develop and maintain the capability of conducting company-size evacuation operations. Ill MAF provided the 31st MAU with very specific guidance as to the organization of the reinforced rifle company. It directed that besides a headquarters detachment, the command clement would include medical and communication elements, a flamethrower section, a 81mm mortar section, and a 106mm recoilless rifle section. The rifle company would also be supported by a sizeable logistics support element. The complexity of the