BUTLER'S ATTACK ON DREWRY'S BLUFF.
BY W. M. FARRAR SMITH, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

A FIFTEEN INCH GUN.

ON the 31st of March, 1864, General Grant left Washington on a steamer to go and make the acquaintance of General B. F. Butler, then in command at Fort Monroe, and to determine for himself by personal observation if General Butler should be left in command of the force that was to operate from the Yorktown Peninsula in connection with the contemplated overland movement against Richmond. General Grant arrived at Fort Monroe on the morning of April 1st, went at once with General Butler to Norfolk, and satisfied himself during the day that it was proper to leave the command of the department in the hands of General Butler . Just as General Grant was about to leave Fort Monroe to return to Washington, about sunset of the evening of the 1st of April, a violent gale sprang up and detained his vessel at the wharf during that night and the next day. On the morning of the 2d General Grant went ashore, and General Butler then developed his idea of a campaign by making a landing in the " bottle" formed at Bermuda Hundred by the James and Appomattox rivers, and by operating from that position on the enemy in rear of Richmond. (1) The plan was at once adopted. General Grant returned to Washington, leaving a letter of instructions dated' Fort Monroe, April 2d, in which he said :

" When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can.
From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. The fact that has been already stated-that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your force and the Army of the Potomac - must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armie unit."

Had the order directing that City Point should be taken "with as much force as possible" been construed to mean the whole force under General Butler,

(1) On April 1st Butler disclosed to me his plan of landing at Bermuda Hundred. Having only reported to him two or three hours before, I did not like to say anything against the movement, or about my opinion that the first move should be for Petersburg. On April 2d, when General Grant came ashore, Butler got out his maps and sent for me. Not liking to oppose the campaign in Butler's presence, I did not go, but thought Gr ant would have some talk with me about it. He did not, but sat down and wrote Butler's instructions which , Butler understood as indorsing his plan entirely, and so I thought and still think from the text of them. After that of course I said nothing. After the movement, and our first move on Petersburg from Bermuda Hundred, Gillmore and I united in a letter to General Butler, telling him that Petersburg must be taken from the other side, and that he ought to bridge the Appomattox at the Point of Rocks so that we could cross there and get at Petersburg from the east. Butler declined, and said he was not going to build a bridge for West Point men to retreat over. After that we offered no advice: W. F. S.