WHY BURNSIDE DID NOT RENEW THE ATTACK AT FREDERICKSBURG.
BY RUSH C. HAWKINS, BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL, U. S. V.

NOVEMBER 22d, 1862, the whole Union army had reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, and General Lee, who had proved upon more than one occasion his watchfulness and enterprise, took means to insure the arrival, about the same time, of the Army of Northern Virginia on the heights in the immediate rear of Fredericksburg.

Without the slightest delay the enemy's line of defense was marked out, nor did their labors cease until their defensive lines were made formidable and complete by the mounting of a large number of guns. In the meantime the Army of the Potomac had drawn its abundant supply of daily rations, subjected itself to some drilling and several reviews, while its commander had been carrying on an animated correspondence with the powers at Washington, chiefly in relation to pontoons which had been promised but had failed to reach Falmouth until long after the arrival of both armies at the points they then occupied. [See p. 121.] Some time during the first week in December the much looked-for pontoon train appeared, and then came the oft-repeated camp rumor of a "movement over the river," which in a few days assumed a more definite form, the actual plan of attack becoming the topic of many a camp-fire. It was freely stated that the whole army was to cross the river about such a time, and that the chief attack was to be made by General Sumner's Right Grand Division upon the enemy's center immediately back of Fredericksburg, where the hills were steepest and the fortifications strongest.

There were a few officers in the Army of the Potomac who had watched the gradual. growth of the enemy's lines, and knew something of the natural formations in that direction,- a succession of steep hills which, in themselves, were almost as potent for defensive purposes as the average artificial fortifications. I, for one, had been over that ground several times the August before while engaged in ascertaining the best line for a grand guard for the protection of the roads leading from the back country into Fredericksburg. ' The three or four officers who were possessed of this knowledge expressed themselves very strongly in opposition to the plan of attack as foreshadowed by the gossips of the camp, and the news of these adverse opinions having come to General Burnside, he sent a circular to the general officers of the Right Grand Division and colonels commanding brigades to meet him at the Phillips house on the evening of December 9th. At the time appointed the large room of that mansion was filled with general officers, with here and there a colonel and a few grand division staff-officers. General Burnside made a speech in which he partly disclosed and explained his plan for the coming battle. It was received without any particular criticism or comment, but General French, who was very enthusiastic, said the battle would be won in forty-eight hours, and called for three cheers for the commander, which were given.

The meeting ended, Colonel J. H. Taylor, assistant adjutant-general of the Right Grand Division, and myself were standing together in the hall of the house, when General Burnside came along and said to me, " What do you think of it ? " I answered, " If you mako the attack as contemplated it will be the greatest slaughter of the war ; there isn't infantry enough in our whole army to carry those heights if they are well defended." He then turned to Colonel Taylor and said, "Colonel what do you say about it " " The response came quickly and was sufficiently definite, I quite agree with Colonel Hawkins. The carrying out of your plan will be murder, not warfare." The commanding general was very much surprised and irritated at these answers, and made a remark about my readiness to throw cold water upon his "plans"; he repeated the assertion of French about victory within forty-eight hours, and passed on.

The meeting dispersed, the officers who had composed it going to their respective commands and giving their final orders for the movement of the following day. Besides attending to the details of moving my command on the morrow, I found time to write three letters - one to my mother, another to my wife, and a third to Charles P. Kirkland, of the city of New York. In each of these defeat was distinctly and without qualification predicted. The first letter in the order mentioned has been preserved, and from it the following quotations are given : "Camp, near Falmouth, VA., December 10th, 1862.

"Dear Mother-. . . . To-morrow, if our present plans are carried out, the great battle of the war will commence. . . . I have little hope of the plans succeeding. I do not think them good,-there will be a great loss of life and nothing accomplished. I am sure we are to fight against all chances of success. There is. a rumor and a hope that Banks may have landed on the James River ; if so, a large part of the enemy's force will be diverted from this point, hut if they have a force anywhere near our own in number we are pretty certain to get whipped." The letter to Judge Kirkland was much stronger and more explicit, and evoked an answer from which one paragraph is quoted : "New York, December 18th, 1862.

" How wonderfully prophetic is your letter, written on the 10th of December. It foretells exactly the awful disaster and reverse that our cause has met with. How is it possible, if you thus knew all this, that those having control were ignorant of it ? This whole transaction seems now almost incredible. To think of the thousands of splendid, brave, patriotic fellows absolutely butchered without the least beneficial result : on the contrary, with a result disgraceful and disheartening to us, but I fervently trust a result from which we can recover.'' This matter of the letters is here referred to, not in a spirit of pride, but simply to show a want of knowledge, judgment, and foresight on the part of those high in command.

We now pass over the bombardment of December 11th, the many disastrous attempts to lay the pontoons in front of Fredericksburg, and come to 3 o'clock of that day, when volunteers were called for to cross the river in open boats for the purpose of