the Da Nang River and on the lower end of the Tiensha Peninsula, MAG-16, a helicopter group, conducted its operations. Under the command of Colonel Edwin O. Reed, MAG-16 consisted of Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron (H&MS) 16; Marine Air Base Squadron (MABS) 16; an observation squadron, VMO-2; and three medium (HMM-262, - 265, and -363) and one heavy (HMH-463) helicopter squadrons. VMO-2 had in its inventory 27 armed and unarmed Bell UH-1E (Hueys) single-engine light helicopters, used for a diverse number of missions including observation, forward air control (airborne), and ground support.* The 30 relatively new single-rotor Sikorsky CH-53A Sea Stallion heavy-lift helicopters in III MAF, each powered by two-shaft turbine engines and able to carry a payload of over six tons, were all in HMH-463. Two of the medium helicopter squadrons, HMM-262 and -265, flew the twin-turbine tandem rotor Boeing Vertol CH-46A Sea Knight aircraft that had replaced the older and smaller Sikorsky single rotor UH-34 Sea Horse. With the shortage of helicopters caused by the grounding and refitting of the CH-46s in 1967 because of rear pylon failures in flight, the third medium helicopter squadron, HMM-363, still retained the UH-34D." In early January, HMMs -262 and -265 had 47 CH-46s between them while HMM-363 owned 24 of the UH-34s.³

In addition to the helicopters assigned to the flying squadrons, Colonel Reed retained a detachment of 14 Cessna light single-engine fixed-wing O-1C and O-1G bird dog aircraft in H&MS-16 for both air control and observation purposes. Like H&MS-11 at the main base, H&MS-16 at Marble Mountain also possessed one Douglas C-117D Skytrain transport. MAG-16 also had operational control of the U.S. Army 245th Surveillance Aircraft Company, equipped with 18 OV-1 Mohawk aircraft designed for tactical aerial reconnaissance. For the most part, MAG-16 supported the 1st Marine Division at Da Nang but also flew missions on behalf of the 3d Marine Division, Korean Marine Brigade, and Army Americal Division. It also performed a myriad of tasks for the South Vietnamese military units and the related Revolutionary Development pacification campaign.⁴

About 50 miles to the south of Da Nang, at Chu Lai, two Marine Aircraft Groups, MAGs-12 and -13, flew out of the airfield located there. MAG-12, under Colonel Dean Wilker, consisted of three Douglas A4E Skyhawk attacksquadrons,VMAs-121,-211,and-311, and one A-6A Intruder all-weather squadron, VMA (AW)-533. All told the group possessed 12 of the Intruders and nearly 60 of the Skyhawks. The maneuverable Skyhawk was a formidable close support aircraft. An extremely accurate bomber, the single-seat A-4 belied its relative small size and could carry a variety of ordnance and a payload of nearly 8,000 pounds. Three F-4B Phantom II squadrons, VMFAs -115, -314, and -323, with a total of 33 aircraft, constituted MAG-13. The versatile Phantom, capable of a speed nearly equal to the fastest interceptors, could also carry a payload of nearly 16,000 pounds, second only to the A-6A. Two C-117D transports, five Douglas TA-4Fs, and three Korean War- vintage Grumman two-seater, single-engine TF-9J fighter trainers rounded out the Marine aircraft inventory at Chu Lai.⁵***

* The armed Hueys carried air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns and proved to be formidable close air support aircraft. The unarmed Hueys, nicknamed "slicks," were used for medical evacuation, reconnaissance, air control, and occasionally for insertion of reconnaissance teams. Later in the spring of 1968, there was a reduction of the number of Hueys in the VMO squadrons because of the introduction of the fixed-wing North American turbo-prop OV-10A Bronco into the Marine Corps inventory and to III MAF. See Chapter 25. Colonel Samuel J. Fulton, who assumed command of VMO-2 in May, remembered that his squadron then had only 14 Huey gunships and "the only 'slick' I recall is the one that was used for III MAF." Col Samuel J. Fulton, Comments on draft, n.d. [Nov94] (Vietnam Comment File).

** Designed to hold a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops, the CH-46 carried approximately double the load of the UH-34 and with its cruising speed of 115 knots was approximately 25 knots faster than the older aircraft. For detailed discussion of the problems experienced with the CH-46 in 1967, see Telfer, Rogers, and Fleming, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967, pp. 210-11 and LtCol William R. Fails, Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973 (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), pp. 101-02 and 121-24. Major General Anderson, the wing commander, commented that he believed that there was "only one instance of catastrophic failure [of the CH-46], the weakness was identified and grounding ensued immediately." According to Anderson, it was "fuselage and pylon cracks . . . [in several aircraft that] gave rise to this essential refit program." MajGen Norman J. Anderson, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).

*** Lieutenant General Richard E. Carey, who commanded VMFA-115 until 16 January 1968, commented in 1994 that the Phantom was the "fastest interceptor in the American inventory and its speed has not been equaled by any American interceptor to this date." He observed that in addition to its fighter escort and close air support role, it also had an air defense role. His squadron maintained a strip alert against possible MIG incursions into South Vietnam and that on two occasions, General Carey stated, he personally chased MIG aircraft near the North Vietnamese city of Vinh until "told to abort by my GCI [Ground Control Intercept] controller." According to Carey, the "Phantom was the primary reason our ground forces were never attacked by North Vietnamese Air." General Carey wrote that the Douglas TA-4Fs and the Grumman TF-9Js "were constantly used as TAC(A) [Tactical Air controller (Airborne)] when a FAC [Forward Air Controller] was not available." He mentioned that "throughout the war they also provided a fast FAC capability for strikes north of the DMZ and recovery of downed air crews when the slow moving FAC(A) could not survive." LtGen Richard E. Carey, Comments on draft, dtd 12Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carey Comments.