At III MAF Headquarters, General Cushman also made his adjustments to reinforce the northern battlefield. In late December, he implemented Operation Checkers which would eventually result in the 1st Marine Division taking over responsibility for all operations in Thua Thien Province so that General Tompkins 3d Division could concentrate its full resources in the DMZ and Khe Sanh sector. By January 1968, elements of the 1st Division's 5th Marines had deployed into the former 3d Division TAOR south of Phu Bai. Both divisions had established timetables for the phased placement of their regiments and battalions into new operating areas. In sort of hop, skip, and jump movements, hence the name Checkers, the units were to displace one another. For example, the 4th Marines was to assume control of Operation Lancaster in the central DMZ from the 3d Marines. In turn, the 3d Marines was to go to Quang Tri and relieve the 1st Marines. The 1st Marines then was to replace the 4th Marines at Camp Evans in Thua Thien Province and return to the operational control of the 1st Division. Both the 9th Marines and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion would continue with their respective operations, Kentucky and Napoleon. The 2d ARVN Regiment would stay tied in with the 9th Marines on the right and take over more of the strongpoints of the barrier system. On 15 January, General Tompkins planned to transfer his command post from Phu Bai to Dong Ha.⁹

General Tompkins was relatively new to the Vietnam War. He assumed command of the 3d Division in November after the unexpected death of his predecessor, Major General Bruno A. Hochmuth, in a helicopter crash. Holder of the Navy Cross, Silver Star, and Bronze Star, General Tompkins was a veteran of the island campaigns of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Saipan in World War II. He had the 5th Marines in Korea after the signing of the armistice and oversaw the implementation of its terms in his sector. During the Dominican crisis of April-May 1965, he commanded the Marine forces ashore. While Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, he received his orders to Vietnam.¹⁰

Regarded in Marine Corps circles as one of its best tacticians, General Tompkins was thought the ideal candidate to take charge of the DMZ War. Vietnam was to be a unique experience for him. Colonel James R. Stockman, his operations officer who had served with him on Saipan, recalled that when General Tompkins arrived he asked one question: "Tell me about the operational folklore in the division's area of operations." According to Stockman, he told the general that from his point of view it "was a bad war, highly inhibited by MACV restrictions . . . [and] political considerations emanating from Washington."¹¹

General Tompkins soon became well acquainted with the "operational folklore" of the 3d Marine Division. He learned quickly that a regiment may have responsibility for a sector but have none of its battalions under its command. For example, the 9th Marines in the five-battalion Operation Kentucky only had one of its original battalions, the 2d Battalion with only two of four companies, participating in the operation. The other four battalions came from the 1st Marines, 3d Marines, and 4th Marines. According to Colonel Stockman, General Tompkins "caught on fast to the term 'opcon' [operational control]" which permitted the interchange of battalions from regiment to regiment without the relinquishment of administrative responsibility.¹²*

This tasking of units, as one Marine historical analyst, Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, observed, "demonstrated the interchangeable nature of Marine battalions and gave the division commander great flexibility."¹³ Yet this flexibility had a price. Command lines were somewhat blurred and tactical integrity was more difficult to maintain. Simmons noted "One regimental commander estimated that it took about two weeks of working with a new battalion to iron out problems of procedures and communications."¹⁴**

Two other aspects of the "operational folklore" of the 3d Marine Division impinged upon General Tompkins as 1967 drew to a close. One was Khe Sanh and the other was the strongpoint system or barrier. Although ordered to reinforce Khe Sanh with a battalion in December by both Generals Westmoreland and Cush-

* Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, who served both as executive officer and later commander of the 3d Marines, commented that General Hochmuth believed that regiments were "capable of controlling any number of battalions." The regimental headquarters would be located "in the important areas . . . and the principal tactic was in the shifting of the maneuver battalions to various regiments as the situation dictated." Col Vaughn R. Stuart, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 20Dec1994 (Vietnam Comment File).

** Lieutenant General Metzger, the 3d Marine Division assistant division commander in January 1968, remarked that General Tompkins wanted to bring "the tangle of battalions and regiments into some sort of order; to the extent possible, aligning the battalions with their parent regiments." Metzger believed that Tompkins "was faced with nearly an impossible situation, fighting the battle with an inadequate force for the assigned missions." Metzger Comments.