War of the Rebellion: Serial 080 Page 0799 Chapter LII. THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN.

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The object of opening the fire of the batteries referred to during half an hour preceding the infantry attack was to demoralize the enemy's troops occupying the defensive lines which were to be attacked, and which were enfiladed and taken in reverse by those batteries. It was expected, also, that the heavy artillery fire would throw into confusion any supports the enemy might have concealed in the woods near his lines. The best proof of the entire success of this plan was the facility with which one unsupported line of skirmishers got possession of those lines, with the loss of only 25 killed and 72 wounded. I am decidedly of the opinion that, regard being had to the locality and the attending circumstances, no better results could have been attained by any other plan than the one adopted, and which failed only because not properly supported.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General.

[Second indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS, July --, 1864.

I had supposed that, in accordance with the plan of General Beauregard of 23rd of June, General Hooke's division was to have driven the enemy from his first and second skirmish and main lines; have swung to its right and carried the position at Hare's house; that General Field's division was to have moved in support of General Hoke, protecting his left flank, occupying the abandoned lines of the enemy, and filling up the gaps between Hoke's left and river road. As far as I am aware the enemy was never driven from his lines. General Hoke's skirmishers reached the front line, but his second line did not; nor did his division move to its right or make any room for Field to enter or occupy them. Field's division could not have entered the enemy's lines from the position given it without passing over Hoke's troops. There seems to have been some misunderstanding as to the part each division was expected to have performed.

R. E. LEE,

General.

Numbers 307. Report of Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Haile, Twenty-third South Carolina Infantry, Elliott's brigade, unassigned troops, of operations July 30.

MAP.

The distance from A to B three chains and fifty links, or seventy-seven yards, and fifty links more to the first gun blown up on the right at letter C. Pit or crater at D. Dirt thrown out as far as the barricade made by the enemy in rear of gun-chamber at B. Letter A rep-