brigade, of Anderson's division (previously occupying this hill), was closed in upon the other brigades of Anderson. The entire day was occupied by the enemy in throwing his forces across the river and in deploying his columns. Our batteries were opened upon the masses of infantry whenever they were in certain range. Our fire invariably drew that of the enemy's batteries on the opposite heights, and they generally kept up the fire long after our batteries had ceased.
Early on the morning of the 13th I rode to the right of my position (Hood's division). The dense fog in the early twilight concealed the enemy from view, but his commands, "Forward, guide center, march!" were distinctly hear at different points near my right. From the direction of the sound and the position of his troops the day before, I concluded that his attack would be upon General Jackson at some point beyond my right. I therefore rode back to a point near the center of my forces, giving notice to General Hood that the enemy would attack General Jackson beyond his right; that he should watch carefully the movements, and when an opportunity offered he should move forward and attack the enemy's flank. Similar instructions were given to General Pickett, with orders to co-operate with General Hood. The attack was made as had been anticipated. It did not appear to have all the force of a real attack, however, and General Hood did not feel authorized to make more than a partial advance. When he did move out, he drove the enemy back in handsome style. About 11 a. m. I sent orders for the batteries to play upon the streets and bridges beyond the city, by way of diversion in favor of our right. The batteries had hardly opened when the enemy's infantry began to move out toward my line. Our pickets in front of the Marye house were soon driven in, and the enemy began to deploy his forces in front of that point. Our artillery, being in position, opened fire as soon as the masses became dense enough to warrant it. This fire was very destructive and demoralizing in its effects, and frequently made gaps in the enemy's ranks that could be seen at the distance of a mile. The enemy continued his advance and made his attack at the Marye Hill in handsome style. He did not meet the fire of our infantry with any heart, however, and was therefore readily repulsed. Another effort was speedily made, but with little more success. The attack was again renewed, and again repulsed. Other forces were seen preparing for another attack, when I suggested to General McLaws the propriety of re-enforcing his advanced line by a brigade. He had previously re-enforced with part of General Kershaw's brigade and ordered forward the balance. About this time Brigadier General T. R. R. Cobb fell, mortally wounded, and almost simultaneously Brigadier General J. R. Cooke was severely wounded. General Kershaw dashed to the front to take the command.
General Ransom, on the Marye Hill, was charged with the immediate care of the point attacked, with orders to send forward additional re-enforcements if it should become necessary, and to use Featherston's brigade, Anderson's division, if he should require it.
The attack upon our right seemed to subside about 2 o'clock, when I directed Major-General Pickett to send me two of his brigades. One (Kemper's) was sent to General Ransom, to be placed in some secure position, to be ready in case it should be wanted. The other (Jenkins') was ordered to General McLaws, to replace that of Kershaw in his line. The enemy soon completed his arrangements for a renewed attack, and moved forward with much determination. He met with no better success than he had on the previous occasions. These efforts were repeated and continued from time to time until after night, when he left, the field