company of Alabama cavalry, which served as my personal escort during the action. For personal gallantry and intelligent execution of orders, frequently under the heaviest fire, his example has rarely been equaled. To him, his officers, and his men I feel a deep personal as well as official obligation.
By the officers of my staff I was most faithfully, laboriously, and gallantly served throughout both days, as well as on the marches before and after the action. A record of their names is an acknowledgment but justly due:
Major George G. Garner, assistant adjutant-general (horse wounded on Sunday); Captain H. W. Walter, assistant adjutant-general; Captain G. B. Cooke, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieutenant Towson Ellis, regular aide; First Lieutenant F. S. Parker, regular aide; Lieutenant Colonel F. Gardner, C. S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel W. K. Beard, Florida Volunteers, acting inspector-general (wounded on Monday); Major J. H. Hallonquist, Provisional Army, chief of artillery; Captain W. O. Williams, Provisional Army, assistant to chief of artillery; Captain S. H. Lockett, C. S. Engineers; Captain H. Oladowski, C. S. Army, chief of ordnance; Major J. J. Walker, Provisional Army, chief quartermaster; Major O. P. Chaffee, Provisional Army, assistant quartermaster; Surg. A. J. Foard, C. S. Army, medical director; Surg. J. C. Nott, Provisional Army, medical inspector; Dr. Robert O. Butler, of Louisiana, volunteer for the occasion, rendered excellent service in our field hospitals. Lieutenant Colonel David Urquhart, aide to the Governor of Louisiana, served me with great intelligence and efficiency as volunteer aide.
Several other officers during the engagement, temporarily separated from their own commands, did me the favor to act on my staff and served me efficiently.
Privates H. Montague and M. Shehan, Louisiana infantry, and Private John Williams, Tenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, orderlies in attendance on myself and staff, though humble in position, rendered services so useful and gallant, that their names are fully entitled to a mention in this report. They encountered the same dangers, and when necessary performed nearly the same duties, as officers of my staff, without the same incentives. In rallying troops, bringing up stragglers, and enforcing orders against refugees they were especially active, energetic, and efficient.
It may not be amiss to refer briefly to the causes it is believed operated to prevent the complete overthrow of the enemy, which we were so near accomplishing, and which would have changed the entire complexion of the war.
The want of proper organization and discipline, and the inferiority in many cases of our officers to the men they were expected to command, left us often without system or order; and the large proportion of stragglers resulting weakened our forces and kept the superior and staff officers constantly engaged in the duties of file-closers. Especially was this the case after the occupancy of each of the enemy's camps, the spoils of which served to delay and greatly to demoralize our men. But no one cause probably contributed so largely to our loss of time; which was the loss of success-as the fall of the commanding general. At the moment of this irreparable disaster the plan of battle was being rapidly and successfully executed under his immediate eye and lead on the right.
For want of a common superior to the different commands on that part of the field great delay occurred after this misfortune, and that