the subsequent attempts with heavy losses to the attacker. On the following day, the 3d Panzer Grenadier was caught by artillery fire just as its assault waves were forming. Confused and disorganized, the German infantry were unable to make another bid.
Farther north, on 22 December, the 277th Volks Grenadier Division returned to the fray after licking the wounds it had suffered at Krinkelt-Rocherath and adding soome companies of the 2gth Panzer Grenadier Regiment (3d Panzer Grenadier Division). Early in the morning two companies from the 277th made a sharp attack to gain the high ground east of Kalterherberg occupied by the ggth Reconnaissance Troop. No friendly artillery was ranged in and the German infantry marched through a mine field, crossed a stream under direct bullet fire, and drove through the extended cavalry line. Two of the cavalry platoons were encircled and the attack carried for a thousand yards before Company E of the 47th Infantry and the remaining troopers were able to halt it. Apparently intent on driving as deeply to the American rear as possible, the grenadiers gave the encircled platoons a breathing spell and with nightfall the Americans succeeded in escaping. The fight spread to the 3gth Infantry during the afternoon when small groups of the enemy began to infiltrate. Reinforcements brought forward under a smoke screen nourished the German assault, which by nightfall had won a foothold inside the American main line of resistance. 
During the night of 22 December an artillery bombardment prepared the way for German infiltration elsewhere on the gth Division front. But when day broke the Americans drove the enemy back after a series of short fire fights and restored the line in its entirety. The 277th Volks Grenadier Division no longer possessed the strength to make a real effort against the north wing of the Elsenborn line. The 326th Volks Grenadier Division, its northern neighbor, had given no hand in this fight-not surprising in view of the punishment taken at Hofen and Monschau. Both divisions now fell out of the drive to widen the way west. The surest signal of the failure on the right wing of the Sixth Panzer Army was the ignominious end of the attack in the Butgenbach sector On the morning of 23 December the 18th Infantry barred the gap which had opened the day before on the right of the 26th Infantry-and the 12th SS Panzer Division threw in the sponge.
Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps now had four infantry divisions, the gth, ggth, 2d, and 1st, standing firmly on well-organized ground from Monschau to Weismes. The barrier so presented would restrict and straitjacket the northern shoulder of the German salient, at this moment still expanding to the west. The question remained as to whether, at a later date, the Sixth Panzer Army would or could shake this shoulder free. As it stood, the 1st and gth Divisions were given time to concentrate and regroup their hastily committed regiments, while the 2d and ggth set about the business of acquiring replacements for lost men and weapons, gaining a