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attention of the enemy to the sector northwest of Cologne where the assembly of troops and supplies would be made openly and in daylight, the whole ruse abetted by an increase in radio traffic.


After a meeting that lasted several hours, Model agreed to submit a new army group plan incorporating most of OB WEST's Martin study. Actually Model and Rundstedt found themselves in accord on only one point, that the Hitler scheme for seizing Antwerp was too ambitious and that there was no purpose to plans carrying beyond the Meuse River. Quite independently, or so it would appear, the two headquarters had arrived at the Small Solution, or the envelopment of the enemy east of the Meuse River. The fact that Model was violently opposed to the Fuehrer's solution and thus could expect no support from OKW may have made him more amenable to Rundstedt's exercise of the command decision. When the revised Model plan arrived at OB WEST headquarters on 28 October, it followed the general outline of the Martin plan. All of this work was preparatory to the receipt of further instructions promised by Jodl. These arrived at OB WEST headquarters by special courier during the night of 2 November.


The Big Solution


Jodl's preliminary plan had gone to Hitler on 21 October. The directive now handed the C-in-C West had been signed and dispatched from the Wolf's Lair on 1 November. Why this delay in issuing the directive? Jodl and Hitler met several times a day. There was no need to wait for information coming from lower headquarters. Time, it was obvious to all, was running out.


There is only one explanation for this surprising delay and it is supported by what is known of the working relationship between the Fuehrer and the chief of his planning staff. Probably one cannot say that the whole of this extended period was devoted to argument; that would have been inadmissible to Hitler and not in keeping with Jodl's character. But it is known that the two men were in fundamental disagreement on the objective of the planned counteroffensive. Jodl's technique would have been to postpone the final drafting and dispatch of the directive while he and Buttlar-Brandenfels tried to "sell" Hitler, pushing a little at a time but withdrawing when storm warnings appeared.


This conflict of ideas, for it hardly can be called a personal controversy, saw the Small Solution opposed to the Big Solution, or Grand Slam. The point of disagreement had risen when Hitler combined into one the two separate plans favored by the WFSt: the attack from Venlo to seize Antwerp, and the double envelopment of Liege by pincers from northern Luxembourg and from the Aachen area. Jodl and his aides had intended that the forces available would be employed in one of the favored plans and one only. A sweeping enlargement on the original WFSt concept, such as Hitler demanded, would require perhaps twice as many new divisions on the Western Front as the twenty-one that were to be provided from the OKW strategic reserve.


Jodl seems to have had no hesitation about setting the two alternatives before Hitler. First, he could go ahead with the Big Solution, aiming at the seizure of